Pahl v. Board of Chiropractic Examiners

Citations: 164 Or. App. 378; 993 P.2d 149; 1999 Ore. App. LEXIS 2117Docket: 97-1016; CA A101644

Court: Court of Appeals of Oregon; December 14, 1999; Oregon; State Appellate Court

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The petitioner is challenging the State Board of Chiropractic Examiners' decision to suspend his chiropractic license, claiming that the board lacked authority to do so after he voluntarily surrendered his license. The board, however, maintained that it did not have to accept the voluntary surrender and proceeded to find the petitioner in default for engaging in unprofessional conduct, including inappropriate sexual contact with a patient and inadequate record-keeping. The board imposed a one-year suspension along with conditions on the petitioner’s practice. 

Petitioner argued that surrendering his license meant relinquishing his property interest in it, suggesting that the board had no jurisdiction to act. The state countered that professional licenses are created and regulated by statute, and the board's failure to accept the surrender does not undermine its regulatory role. The relevant statutes (ORS chapter 684) outline that a chiropractic license can only terminate through expiration or revocation, with no provision for voluntary surrender included. The court concluded that allowing a licensee to unilaterally terminate their license in the face of professional discipline contradicts the board's regulatory responsibilities, affirming the board's authority to impose disciplinary actions.

The board possesses broad authority to impose sanctions on licensed chiropractors, including the suspension or revocation of their licenses, probation, and civil penalties, as detailed in ORS 684.100(9). Allowing a chiropractor to evade the board's oversight by unilaterally surrendering their license would undermine public protection and leave professional misconduct unaddressed. This could create uncertainties for future licensing considerations and hinder investigations due to lack of available evidence and witnesses. The legislature did not intend for chiropractors to circumvent the regulatory process through voluntary relinquishment of their licenses; therefore, the board has the authority to reject such surrenders if they impede its disciplinary responsibilities. While the board may accept a voluntary relinquishment under certain conditions, it is not obligated to do so and can decline an informal resolution proposed by a licensee. The petitioner’s argument that he has an absolute right to abandon his license due to property interests is unsupported, as previous cases do not establish that voluntary surrender precludes regulatory authority or future action by the board.

The excerpt addresses the legal nuances surrounding the voluntary surrender of a professional license, specifically focusing on the implications for both the licensee and the agency’s regulatory authority. It clarifies that prior cases, including Schurman v. Bureau of Labor, do not provide guidance on how a voluntary surrender is executed. In Schurman, the court found that an agency lacked the authority to revoke an expired license, which is distinct from the current issue of whether a licensee's voluntary relinquishment effectively terminates the license. 

While it is generally accepted that a licensee's voluntary surrender may indicate an abandonment of their property interest, this does not impact the agency's regulatory powers. The analysis must consider the statutory framework rather than common-law property concepts. The text concludes that a chiropractor’s voluntary relinquishment does not remove the board’s disciplinary authority, allowing the board to issue a default order in response to the petitioner’s failure to contest disciplinary actions. 

It notes that some agencies have codified their rules regarding license surrender, which contrasts with the agency in Schurman that lacked clear statutory authority. The legislative amendments to various licensing schemes since Schurman affirm the authority of agencies to act post-termination of licenses. However, the absence of such provisions in the board’s statutes does not alter the current legal interpretation regarding the petitioner’s attempt to compel acceptance of a voluntary license relinquishment.