Wilberto Riascos-Prado v. United States

Citations: 66 F.3d 30; 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 25976; 1995 WL 542500Docket: 1138

Court: Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit; September 13, 1995; Federal Appellate Court

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Wilberto Riascos-Prado appeals the July 13, 1994 order from the U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut, which dismissed his motion to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. The district court held that Riascos-Prado's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel were procedurally barred because they were previously raised unsuccessfully during his direct appeal, regardless of new factual allegations. The court dismissed the amended § 2255 petition without addressing the merits of the claims.

The Court of Appeals disagreed with the district court's view that all ineffective assistance claims constituted a single legal ground. It determined that Riascos-Prado's claim regarding counsel's conflict of interest—specifically that he was pressured to plead guilty—was a distinct issue that warranted consideration. Consequently, the appellate court vacated the dismissal of the § 2255 petition and remanded the case for the district court to assess whether an evidentiary hearing was necessary.

Riascos-Prado was arrested on July 13, 1990, following a search of his apartment that yielded over 2.5 kilograms of cocaine, firearms, and after he admitted ownership of the drugs. He was indicted on charges of conspiracy to possess cocaine with intent to distribute and possession with intent to distribute. On April 2, 1991, he pled guilty to the conspiracy charge and was sentenced on July 30, 1991, to 180 months of imprisonment followed by four years of supervised release.

Riascos-Prado, represented by new counsel, appealed his conviction and sentence, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel for several reasons: failure to refile a suppression motion regarding his detention and postarrest statement, lack of explanation about the consequences of his guilty plea, and inadequate representation at sentencing. He also contested the amount of cocaine attributed to him, a two-level enhancement for firearm possession, and the high-end sentencing decision. The appellate court affirmed the conviction, finding the initial stop reasonable, dismissing claims of ineffective assistance as meritless, and upholding the cocaine attribution and enhancement.

Subsequently, Riascos-Prado filed a pro se motion to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2255, leading to an amended petition that reiterated claims of ineffective assistance, alleging failure to investigate the voluntariness of his postarrest statement, a conflict of interest, and lack of explanation regarding sentencing guidelines. He also claimed an unfair sentencing hearing due to the government's failure to disclose a potential motion to reduce a co-defendant's sentence for substantial assistance. The district court denied the Sec. 2255 motion, stating that Riascos-Prado could not raise ineffective assistance claims that had been previously addressed in his direct appeal. It concluded that the new factual allegations did not constitute a new ground for relief but were attempts to relitigate resolved claims, resulting in dismissal without addressing the Brady/Giglio violation.

An appeal was filed following the dismissal of Riascos-Prado's claims under section 2255, which prohibits relitigating issues already addressed on direct appeal. This rule was reinforced by Cabrera v. United States and Schlup v. Delo, highlighting that successive claims require a showing of cause and prejudice. Riascos-Prado's counsel admitted that his ineffectiveness claim related to a prior suppression motion was barred, as it was previously litigated. The district court relied on Williams v. United States to reject all of Riascos-Prado's ineffective assistance claims, noting that similar arguments had been made in earlier petitions. Riascos-Prado's assertion that his counsel failed to explain the sentencing guidelines was deemed a reiteration of a previously rejected claim regarding the involuntariness of his guilty plea. However, a new claim about a conflict of interest, where Riascos-Prado alleged he was pressured to plead guilty due to his inability to pay his counsel, was acknowledged as a distinct issue warranting further consideration.

The Fifth Circuit previously allowed a pro se petitioner to introduce a new ineffective assistance of counsel claim in a second Sec. 2255 petition despite having raised different reasons in an earlier petition, highlighting a lack of evidence that the petitioner was aware of the new claims at the time of the first petition. In contrast, Riascos-Prado is unlikely to possess new information regarding his inability to meet his counsel's fee demands, nor the alleged pressure to plead guilty. Riascos-Prado's prior claims of ineffective assistance were raised on direct appeal, and generally, failure to raise such claims on direct appeal bars them in a subsequent Sec. 2255 petition unless the petitioner demonstrates cause for the default and actual prejudice. However, an exception exists for ineffective assistance claims as established in Billy-Eko v. United States, where such claims may be brought in Sec. 2255 proceedings rather than on direct appeal due to the inherent conflict of interest for trial counsel. Nonetheless, if the claim is solely based on the trial record and the petitioner was represented by new appellate counsel, he must show both cause and actual prejudice for failing to raise it on appeal. The court anticipates that few cases will involve claims strictly based on the trial record, but unjustifiable delays in asserting ineffective assistance claims will still invoke the cause and prejudice standard if they could have been raised on direct appeal. The procedural implications suggest that conflating all ineffective assistance claims into one legal ground could complicate appellate counsel's responsibilities, as new counsel must pursue straightforward claims on direct appeal while reserving more complex claims for a Sec. 2255 petition. This separation of claims is essential to maintain a workable legal framework.

Key points from the legal excerpt include:

1. The reasoning from *Douglas* is affirmed, emphasizing the need to address separate claims for ineffective assistance of counsel individually rather than merging them into one argument. This establishes that ineffectiveness claims are distinct "grounds" under the procedural rules set forth in *Billy-Eko*.

2. The government suggested during oral arguments that new appellate counsel should notify the court of any ineffectiveness claims needing further evidentiary development. This would allow the court to either remand the claim or preserve the defendant's right to post-conviction remedies. However, this was not framed as a mandatory action, and such claims typically proceed through a subsequent *Sec. 2255* petition.

3. Riascos-Prado's appellate counsel cannot be criticized for not anticipating *Billy-Eko*, as it was decided post-appeal.

4. The government argued that Riascos-Prado's claims lacked merit and did not warrant an evidentiary hearing; however, the panel believes this determination lies with the district court.

5. The panel agrees with the district court's handling of Riascos-Prado’s ineffectiveness claims, except for the conflicted counsel claim, which is vacated and remanded for further consideration. On remand, the district court may consider the context of other ineffectiveness claims relevant to the conflict allegation.

6. The district court's order is vacated, and the case is remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is assumed the court implicitly rejected the Brady/Giglio claim, as Riascos-Prado's support for this was deemed speculative and unsubstantiated, disallowing it from being pursued on remand.