State v. Lawler

Citations: 194 Wash. App. 275; 374 P.3d 278Docket: No. 46593-1-II

Court: Court of Appeals of Washington; May 25, 2016; Washington; State Appellate Court

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Greycloud Lawler appeals his convictions for multiple offenses, including second degree rape, kidnapping, and assault. The court affirms the convictions, ruling that the trial court did not err in not dismissing a potentially biased juror, whom Lawler opted not to challenge, and that defense counsel's inaction did not amount to ineffective assistance. 

The incident that led to Lawler's charges occurred on February 14, 2014, when Lawler and his partner, MDJ, argued at a motel, escalating to violence where Lawler strangled MDJ, covering her mouth to prevent her from screaming. After a night of violence, he prevented her from leaving, threatening her and ultimately forcing her to have sexual intercourse against her will. MDJ later reported the assault to motel staff and the police, who found physical evidence of the abuse when they arrived. Lawler was later arrested with weapons and methamphetamine. 

During jury selection, a prospective juror disclosed his personal experiences with sexual assault and domestic violence, expressing doubt about his ability to remain objective.

During voir dire, juror 23 expressed difficulty in setting aside personal experiences to follow the trial court’s instructions, indicating he might struggle to be impartial. Despite this, neither the prosecution nor the defense followed up on his concerns, and he was not challenged for cause. The trial court acknowledged the presence of several jurors who felt they could not be fair, suggesting the dismissal of two, which was not contested by the parties. Lawler, the defense, did not challenge juror 23 and ultimately seated him on the jury.

The jury subsequently convicted Lawler of multiple offenses, including second-degree rape and kidnapping, with findings that these were committed while armed. Lawler appealed, arguing that the trial court's failure to dismiss juror 23 violated his right to an impartial jury. The legal principles cited include the Sixth Amendment and Washington State law, which require jurors to be excused if their views would significantly hinder their ability to perform their duties impartially. Lawler claimed juror 23 exhibited actual bias, a valid ground for dismissal, but it was noted that expressing an opinion alone does not suffice for a challenge unless it is clear that the juror cannot act impartially.

The trial court possesses the authority to dismiss a juror during jury selection without a party's challenge based on two legal provisions: RCW 2.36.110, which empowers judges to excuse jurors deemed unfit due to bias, prejudice, or other impairments; and CrR 6.4(c)(1), which requires judges to excuse jurors if grounds for challenge exist. If a party challenges a juror for cause, the court's ruling is reviewed for manifest abuse of discretion, as the trial judge can directly observe the juror's demeanor. This standard applies to dismissals under both RCW 2.36.110 and CrR 6.4(c)(1). A biased juror cannot be deemed harmless, necessitating a new trial if such a juror is empaneled.

During voir dire, juror 23 expressed doubts about his ability to remain fair and impartial due to personal experiences related to family. Although he showed some uncertainty in his responses, indicating a struggle to be objective, these equivocal statements do not mandate dismissal for cause. Notably, juror 23's family experiences differed significantly from the case at hand. Importantly, no attempts were made to rehabilitate juror 23, leaving him without a definitive statement of his capacity to judge the case impartially.

A trial court has a mandatory obligation to dismiss a biased juror sua sponte, as established by RCW 2.36.110 and CrR 6.4(c)(1), even if no challenge is made by either party. These statutes impose a continuous duty on judges to excuse jurors deemed unfit due to bias or other issues. The Supreme Court has emphasized that a trial judge must act to dismiss a juror if grounds for a challenge exist, regardless of whether a party has exercised such a challenge. However, concerns arise regarding the court's interference with jury selection strategies. The State argues that a trial court should refrain from dismissing jurors without clear evidence of bias, as doing so could disrupt a defendant's strategic control over jury selection. Decisions to accept or dismiss jurors often rely on defense counsel's tactical judgment. The court referenced State v. Coristine, which highlights a defendant's right to control strategic decisions, suggesting that this principle applies to decisions regarding challenges to jurors. However, the record does not indicate that the trial court consulted with defense counsel about the decision not to challenge juror 23, leaving uncertainty about the strategic nature of counsel's inaction.

In *Irby*, the court determined that the trial court made an error by not excusing a juror who displayed actual bias, as evidenced by her statement of being "more inclined towards the prosecution" and her desire to declare the defendant guilty. The court highlighted that this statement suggested a lack of impartiality, noting that the trial court has broad discretion in juror evaluations, but must act when bias is evident. The failure to further inquire into the juror's statements led to the conclusion that seating her constituted a manifest constitutional error. The situation was complicated by the defendant's waiver of his right to counsel and presence during the trial, which increased the trial court's responsibility to ensure a fair jury.

In contrast, the analysis of juror 23 indicated no abuse of discretion by the trial court in deciding not to dismiss him. His responses were considered ambiguous, reflecting uncertainty rather than a definitive bias. The court acknowledged limitations in assessing juror 23's demeanor and nonverbal cues, which might have influenced his statements. His comments were interpreted as expressing discomfort with the case rather than outright bias, distinguishing his situation from that of the juror in *Irby*. Overall, the trial court's ability to observe jurors directly placed it in a better position to evaluate potential bias than appellate review could provide.

The trial court demonstrated awareness of potential juror bias during voir dire, noting concerns from several jurors about their ability to be fair and suggesting the dismissal of two jurors. However, juror 23 was neither mentioned for dismissal by the court nor challenged by the defense counsel, indicating both believed juror 23 could be impartial. Defense counsel actively participated in jury selection, utilizing peremptory challenges and moving to excuse other jurors, but chose not to challenge juror 23, which suggests a strategic decision to keep him on the jury. The court's discretion in dismissing jurors is acknowledged, emphasizing that it may defer to defense strategies unless a juror's bias is clear. Consequently, it was determined that the trial court did not err in retaining juror 23.

In addressing the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel regarding the failure to challenge juror 23, the standard for such claims requires showing that counsel's performance was both deficient and prejudicial. There is a presumption of reasonableness in counsel's performance, and it is the defendant's burden to prove the absence of any legitimate strategy for counsel's actions. If the defense's choices can be interpreted as strategic, then the performance is not deemed deficient.

Defense counsel chose not to challenge juror 23 for cause or use a peremptory challenge, utilizing only five of the six available preemptory challenges. Lawler contends this decision was unreasonable due to juror 23's expressed inability to remain objective. However, it is presumed that defense counsel's performance was effective, suggesting a strategic desire for juror 23 to remain on the jury. Lawler's assertion that this decision was not tactical is unsubstantiated, as there are plausible legitimate reasons for the choice, including juror 23’s background or demeanor. Consequently, Lawler's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is rejected, and his convictions are affirmed. An additional point made but not addressed involves the potential waiver of challenging the trial court's failure to dismiss juror 23, as the State did not raise this issue.