Hargett v. Valley Federal Savings Bank

Citations: 60 F.3d 754; 32 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 1349; 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 20624; 66 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 43,661; 68 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 852Docket: 94-6254, 94-6368

Court: Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit; August 4, 1995; Federal Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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In the consolidated appeal involving Alpha W. Hargett, III, against Valley Federal Savings Bank, the Eleventh Circuit evaluated the timeliness of two claims: an age discrimination claim filed with the EEOC before Judge Blackburn and a retaliation claim addressed by Judge Hancock. Hargett argued against Judge Hancock's summary judgment favoring Valley in the retaliation case and several orders from Judge Blackburn, including the denial of his motion to amend his complaint and the determination that his age discrimination charge was untimely.

Hargett was employed by Valley starting June 13, 1990, and was laid off on November 15, 1990, shortly after turning 41, due to a depressed market. In November 1991, he submitted an EEOC "Intake Questionnaire" claiming age discrimination, followed by a sworn charge on February 11, 1992. His employment reinstatement requests were denied, and he later found his former position filled by a younger employee. Hargett filed his age discrimination claim in district court on September 25, 1992, and deposed Valley's representative, who indicated that Hargett's EEOC charge may have influenced their hiring decisions.

The court affirmed Judge Blackburn's rulings and reversed Judge Hancock's summary judgment, ultimately impacting the outcome of Hargett's claims against Valley.

Hargett initiated a pro se age discrimination lawsuit under 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq., which was assigned to Judge Blackburn. After obtaining legal representation, Hargett amended his complaint on December 31, 1992, alleging age discrimination by Valley in various employment aspects. Valley admitted that Hargett met the preconditions for the lawsuit under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. Following attempts at conciliation by the EEOC, Hargett filed his lawsuit within the required time frame after receiving a Notice of Right to Sue.

On May 17, 1993, Valley sought summary judgment, arguing both the merits of Hargett's claims and the untimeliness of his EEOC charge. Valley subsequently amended its answer to include a statute of limitations defense. During a pretrial conference on July 6, 1993, Valley asserted that Hargett’s EEOC charge was untimely, but Hargett did not raise a retaliation claim at that time, despite having deposition testimony suggesting retaliation.

On July 5, 1993, Hargett filed a new EEOC charge for retaliation, receiving a right to sue letter on August 26, 1993. He commenced his retaliation lawsuit in district court on September 17, 1993, which was assigned to Judge Hancock. Hargett later moved for consolidation of the two cases, but Judge Hancock ruled that the motion should have been filed with Judge Blackburn. Valley contested the consolidation and filed a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment, asserting the untimeliness of Hargett’s EEOC charge.

On February 3, 1994, Hargett filed a cross-motion for summary judgment in the retaliation case. The issue of consolidation was stayed by Judge Blackburn and ultimately deemed moot when Judge Hancock ruled Hargett's retaliation claim was untimely. On February 25, 1994, Judge Hancock granted Valley’s motion for summary judgment, finding that Hargett had sufficient notice of potential retaliation as early as April 21, 1992, based on correspondence from Valley.

Judge Hancock determined that Hargett's EEOC retaliation charge was untimely, having not been filed within the requisite 180 days. Furthermore, Hargett's independent retaliation action could not utilize ancillary jurisdiction from the age discrimination case, as that case was not properly before the court. Hargett attempted to amend his complaint to include the retaliation claim on March 9, 1994, but Judge Blackburn denied this motion on March 30, 1994, noting that Hargett had failed to include the retaliation claim in the pretrial order despite being aware of it since May 1993. The court also stated that the untimely filing of Hargett's age discrimination claim prevented the addition of the retaliation claim. On the same day, Judge Blackburn granted Valley's motion to amend its answer and subsequently granted summary judgment in favor of Valley, concluding Hargett did not establish a prima facie case of age discrimination and that Valley provided a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for Hargett's termination. Hargett's failure to file his age discrimination claim timely barred his lawsuit entirely.

The issues presented for review include whether Judge Blackburn erred in determining the age discrimination claim was untimely, whether she abused her discretion in denying the amendment to add a retaliation claim, whether she erred by allowing Valley to amend its answer regarding the statute of limitations, whether the rehire claim was time-barred, and whether either court abused its discretion concerning Hargett's motion for consolidation. The standard of review for summary judgment is de novo, where the court must find no genuine issue of material fact. Hargett filed his age discrimination claim with the EEOC on February 11, 1992, which is barred if he knew or should have known of the acts in question more than 180 days prior.

Judge Blackburn determined that the 180-day filing period for Hargett's age discrimination claim began on November 15, 1990, the date of his layoff, which he identified as the last discriminatory action in his EEOC charge and intake questionnaire. Even if this starting date was incorrect, the claim would still be untimely since Hargett was aware by early 1991 that a younger individual, Regina Richards, had taken over his duties, providing sufficient grounds to file a claim. Consequently, both the EEOC filing in 1992 and the intake questionnaire in November 1991 were deemed late. 

Hargett's motion to amend his complaint to include a retaliation claim was denied by Judge Blackburn, who did not find an abuse of discretion. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a), the court has broad discretion regarding amendments after the deadline. The Supreme Court's standard in Foman v. Davis promotes allowing amendments unless there are clear reasons against it, such as undue delay or futility. Hargett was aware of the retaliation claim as of May 19, 1993, but did not include it in the pretrial order issued on July 7, 1993. Judge Blackburn's denial of the amendment, filed over eight months later, was upheld, citing precedents emphasizing the importance of timely amendments.

Additionally, the application of the Gupta rule was deemed appropriate. This rule states that a new EEOC charge for retaliation is unnecessary if the claim is related to an existing administrative charge before the court. In a similar case, Barrow v. New Orleans Steamship Ass'n, it was ruled that a retaliation claim could not be linked to an age discrimination claim that had been untimely filed.

The Fifth Circuit ruled that two age discrimination charges were not properly before the district court due to one being untimely and the other not initially presented to the EEOC, leading to the dismissal of the related retaliation charge. The Eighth Circuit's decision in Wentz v. Maryland Cas. Co. established that an unsuccessful age discrimination claim does not preclude a related retaliation claim if the allegations are connected to timely filed administrative charges. The Fifth Circuit found persuasive reasoning in this decision, concluding that Hargett's retaliation claim could not relate back to an untimely age discrimination claim, justifying Judge Blackburn’s discretion in denying Hargett's amendment request.

Regarding the motion to amend the answer, Hargett argued that Judge Blackburn improperly allowed Valley to include a statute of limitations defense after having previously admitted that all conditions for suit were met. However, the court emphasized its discretion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a) to permit amendments, noting that Hargett was not prejudiced as he was made aware of Valley's challenge to the EEOC filing's timeliness prior to the pretrial conference. The court also clarified that a defense not included in an answer is not waived if raised in the pretrial order, which supersedes the original pleadings. Thus, Judge Blackburn acted within her discretion in allowing Valley's amendment.

Valley's statute of limitations defense, raised at the pretrial conference and included in the pretrial order, was not a surprise to Hargett, allowing Judge Blackburn to permit the amendment without abusing her discretion. Hargett's age discrimination claim related to rehire is deemed time-barred because the statute of limitations began on November 15, 1990, the date of his layoff. Hargett argued that the 180-day period for his rehire claim started on April 21, 1992, when he received a letter from Valley regarding his rehire status; however, Valley contended that Hargett failed to substantiate this claim in opposition to their summary judgment motion, thus precluding him from raising it on appeal. Furthermore, Hargett's claim did not stem from a separate act of discrimination, as he cited the same discriminatory reasons for both layoff and rehire. Even if the 180-day period commenced on April 21, 1992, Hargett did not file a separate EEOC charge for the rehire claim within the required timeframe, nor could he attach it to his earlier, untimely filed layoff claim. Additionally, the court found that Hargett did not raise the discriminatory rehire argument in the district courts, which typically bars consideration in appellate review. Regarding the retaliation claim, although Judge Hancock ruled that it could not be linked to the age discrimination claim, the appeal asserts that the 180-day filing period for the retaliation claim did not start on April 21, 1992, as previously determined.

An employer violates the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) if it retaliates against an employee for filing an EEOC charge. Under 29 U.S.C. 623(d), it is unlawful for an employer to discriminate against any employee or job applicant for opposing discriminatory practices or participating in investigations related to such claims. In Hargett's case, Valley contended that he had enough information to file a retaliation claim when he received a letter two months after his EEOC filing, stating he was not a candidate for rehiring. Judge Hancock determined that the statute of limitations for the retaliation claim started on April 21, 1992, the date of the letter. However, the court referenced Stafford v. Muscogee Co. Bd. of Educ., indicating that the timing of when a reasonable person recognizes retaliation differs from when they recognize discrimination regarding rehiring.

Valley argued the limitations period began on May 20, 1992, when Hargett acknowledged a new hire at Valley, suggesting he should have realized he was retaliated against. The court disagreed, stating that Hargett's retaliation claim was timely since he wasn't aware of the retaliation until May 1993, when a senior vice-president indicated in a deposition that Hargett's EEOC filing influenced his non-rehire. Prior to this testimony, Hargett believed the actions against him were solely due to age discrimination. The April letter did not provide sufficient grounds for a reasonable person to conclude retaliation had occurred, as it was consistent with his age discrimination claim. Consequently, Judge Hancock's ruling on the timeliness of the retaliation claim was found to be in error, leading to a reversal and remand.

Additionally, Hargett claimed that Judge Blackburn and Judge Hancock abused their discretion by not ruling on his motion for consolidation, which was not addressed in either court. Although unusual, the lack of a ruling did not prejudice Hargett, as a separate EEOC filing was necessary for the retaliation claim. The court affirmed Judge Blackburn's judgments, reversed Judge Hancock's decision on the retaliation claim's timeliness, and remanded the case for further proceedings.