Martin v. United States

Citation: 96 F.3d 853Docket: Nos. 96-2011, 96-2267, 96-2541, 96-2568 and 96-8027

Court: Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; September 4, 1996; Federal Appellate Court

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Five cases have been consolidated to address four interpretative questions under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) and the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, both enacted in April 1996. The first question pertains to whether a petition for mandamus falls under the PLRA's requirements for prison inmates suing in federal court. It is concluded that the answer is not straightforward. When a mandamus petition targets the judge in the petitioner's case, it resembles an interlocutory appeal, and its applicability under the PLRA depends on the nature of the underlying litigation. If the litigation is civil, the mandamus petition must comply with the PLRA. Conversely, if the litigation is criminal, the mandamus petition is exempt from compliance. This distinction arises because a mandamus petition in a criminal context does not constitute prisoner litigation, as the defendant may not even be incarcerated. Such petitions are procedural steps in criminal matters rather than civil actions, aligning with the definition of “civil action” in 28 U.S.C. 1915(b)(1). If interpreted otherwise, it would lead to an inconsistency where a prisoner with multiple frivolous civil suits could be barred from seeking mandamus in a criminal context without prepaying fees, which likely contradicts Congress's intent to reduce baseless prisoner civil rights litigation.

The primary issue concerns whether Fed.R.App. P. 4(c) influences the requirement under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act for prisoners to obtain a certificate of appealability when appealing a federal habeas corpus denial. Rule 4(c) establishes that a prisoner's notice of appeal is considered timely if it is given to prison officials for mailing by the appeal deadline, regardless of when it is received by the district court. The determination hinges on whether the appeal is treated as filed at the moment the notice is handed to prison officials or if it merely avoids being untimely if submitted by the deadline.

If the notice is deemed filed upon being handed to officials before the enactment of the new statute, then no certificate of appealability is required, as the appeal is considered filed prior to the statute's effective date. This procedural requirement should not apply retroactively without a clear congressional intention, as established in relevant case law. Additionally, previous applications of Rule 4(c) have aimed to prevent dismissals due to untimeliness rather than to provide a more favorable process post-enactment of the new law. Notably, Congress did not amend Rule 4(e), which states that the filing occurs when the notice is handed to prison officials, reinforcing the view that the appeal occurred before the statute's effective date, thereby negating the need for a certificate of appealability.

The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) does not apply to habeas corpus proceedings or section 2255 proceedings, as these are fundamentally distinct from civil rights actions addressed by the PLRA. Habeas corpus is sui generis, having its own procedural rules, and serves primarily to challenge criminal judgments, unlike civil claims. Applying the PLRA to habeas corpus would restrict access for prisoners who have previously filed frivolous civil suits, contrary to the long-standing principle of easy access to federal habeas relief. The antiterrorism law, enacted concurrently, specifically addresses concerns of groundless litigation in the context of habeas corpus. 

Additionally, the court agrees with the Second Circuit that the initial partial fee mandated by the PLRA must be paid before considering the merits of any appeal in civil actions by prisoners, even if the case is deemed frivolous. This ensures that frivolous appellants do not receive a merits decision free of charge while other appellants with potentially valid claims must pay. Collecting fees post-dismissal is less effective, as prisoners may become unable to pay due to changes in their financial circumstances. The court declines to dismiss the mandamus petition and the appeals, while requiring the appellant in one case to pay the appellate filing fee before the court will consider the merits of that appeal.