Court: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit; September 3, 1996; Federal Appellate Court
A tragic accident occurred when a 12-year-old girl, Kelli Lochman, suffered severe injuries while diving from a dock at Whiting Park, operated by Charlevoix County, Michigan. The legal issue at hand is whether Section 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899 provides a right enforceable under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Whiting Park offers public recreational facilities, including docks used for diving. The dock in question was moved to a shallower location in May 1993, which was less than 4 feet deep, rendering it unsafe for diving. An instructor from the Boyne City Swim School expressed concerns to park manager Philo Sumner about the dock's new location, but he refused to either extend the dock or post a warning sign. Later that day, Lochman dove from the dock, struck her head on the bottom, and became quadriplegic.
In February 1995, the Lochmans filed a complaint against Sumner and Charlevoix County, asserting violations under 1983 related to the Act, as well as due process claims and state law claims. They argued that moving the dock without Army Corps of Engineers’ approval violated Section 10, which prohibits unauthorized obstructions in navigable waters. The county acknowledged it did not secure the required approval before relocating the dock. The defendants sought summary judgment, claiming no actionable right exists under 1983 for the alleged violation. The district court granted summary judgment on federal claims and dismissed the state law claims without prejudice, concluding that the Lochmans could not establish a right of action under the cited federal statute.
In granting summary judgment on Count I, the district court primarily referenced Wilder v. Virginia Hospital Ass'n and California v. Sierra Club, while also noting the Supreme Court's ruling in Maine v. Thiboutot, which confirmed that Section 1983 provides remedies for violations of federal statutes as well as constitutional violations. Wilder establishes two exceptions to the Thiboutot principle: first, if a statute does not create enforceable rights under Section 1983, and second, if Congress has explicitly precluded enforcement of the statute within its text. The court in Wilder indicated that determining the first exception involves assessing whether the statute was intended to benefit the plaintiff, and if so, it creates an enforceable right. To evaluate the second exception, courts must determine if the statute's remedial measures are comprehensive enough to indicate congressional intent to exclude Section 1983 remedies. A three-part test for the first exception requires courts to consider: 1) whether the statute was intended to benefit the plaintiff, 2) whether it imposes binding obligations on the government rather than merely expressing preference, and 3) whether the plaintiff's interest is sufficiently specific to be judicially enforced. All three criteria must be met for a remedy under Section 1983 to exist, with the burden of proof resting on the plaintiff. In Sierra Club, the Court determined that Congress did not create a private right of action under 33 U.S.C. 403, emphasizing that the intent of Congress is key to whether such a right exists, to be assessed through four factors from Cort v. Ash.
The first Cort factor evaluates whether the plaintiff is part of a class intended to benefit from the statute in question. The Court emphasized that the focus should be on congressional intent to confer federal rights, not merely on who benefits from the Act. Upon examining the Act's language and legislative history, the Court determined that Congress aimed to empower the Secretary of War (now Secretary of the Army) to manage obstructions in navigable waters, without regard for individual rights. The second Cort factor assesses whether Congress intended to establish a private remedy for violations of the Act. The Court concluded that the legislative intent did not support the creation of a private remedy. Consequently, since the first two factors indicated no congressional intent to provide federal rights or a private remedy to the plaintiffs, the Court deemed it unnecessary to address the remaining Cort factors, which would only be relevant if the first two suggested such intent.
The plaintiffs argue that California v. Sierra Club does not resolve their claim, asserting that their case involves a different context—an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of section 10, rather than a direct action under section 10 itself. They reference the Wilder Court's distinction regarding the analysis of private rights of action versus enforceable rights under § 1983 and cite the Supreme Court's hesitance to find that Congress intended to eliminate reliance on § 1983 for federally secured rights. The plaintiffs contend that section 10 was meant to protect all lake users impacted by unauthorized structures, arguing that the lack of a direct action reinforces their claim for a § 1983 remedy.
The defendants counter that both exceptions to the Thiboutot rule apply to section 10, asserting that the statute does not create enforceable rights under § 1983. They argue that the first inquiry in the Wilder test—whether Congress intended to benefit individuals like the plaintiffs—is aligned with the first Cort factor. While acknowledging that the tests differ in focus, they maintain that the core question remains whether Congress intended to confer a benefit on the plaintiffs.
The Supreme Court, in the case of Sierra Club, determined that Congress did not intend to create a private right of action for individuals harmed by violations of section 10 of the Act. The defendants argue that the comprehensive enforcement mechanisms established by the Act, including criminal penalties in section 12 and the Department of Justice's enforcement responsibilities in section 17, indicate Congress’s intent to preclude individual remedies under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The court clarified that a remedy under § 1983 is only available if a statute creates specific rights, privileges, or immunities, which section 10 does not. The analysis revealed no intent from Congress to benefit specific individuals; instead, the Act is aimed at maintaining unimpeded navigation in waterways. The language of the Act and its legislative history confirm that it was designed for the public good, enabling federal oversight of interstate commerce concerning navigable rivers, rather than safeguarding individual rights. The court referenced the legislative history and previous case law to emphasize that the Act does not confer rights upon particular classes of persons, reinforcing that Congress's focus was on governmental authority, not individual claims.
The court conducted a Cort v. Ash analysis to assess whether section 10 of 33 U.S.C. contains an implied right of action, rather than a Wilder analysis, which would determine if it establishes rights that allow for a 1983 remedy for violations. Despite the plaintiffs' claims, the outcome of Sierra Club remains relevant because the key question is whether Congress intended section 10 to benefit the plaintiffs. The court referenced Wilder and Suter, emphasizing that establishing a federal right enforceable under 1983 hinges on whether the statute was meant to benefit the plaintiff. The plaintiffs did not prove that Congress intended to create such a right for individuals claiming injuries under section 10. Consequently, since section 10 does not protect those individuals, there is no need to consider the second Thiboutot exception regarding the validity of their 1983 action. After a de novo review of the summary judgment order, the court found that the plaintiffs failed to show a genuine issue of material fact, thus affirming the district court's judgment. Section 10 prohibits unauthorized obstructions to navigable waters of the United States and outlines the requirements for constructing structures in these areas.
