Court: Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit; September 9, 1996; Federal Appellate Court
Defendant Learjet manufactured an aircraft that crashed near Aspen, Colorado, resulting in the death of all on board, including Harold Goldsmith. His relatives and estate representatives filed a wrongful death and survival damages lawsuit against Learjet in the U.S. District Court for the District of Kansas. The district court granted summary judgment for Learjet, citing the Kansas borrowing statute, which barred the action because it would have been untimely under Colorado law, where the cause of action arose.
The plaintiffs appealed, arguing: 1) the district court incorrectly applied the Kansas borrowing statute by borrowing Colorado's saving statute instead of applying Kansas's; 2) the court wrongly concluded that the Kansas saving statute does not apply to wrongful death actions; and 3) the statute of limitations should have been tolled due to one plaintiff, Josh Goldsmith, being a minor.
The appellate court found the first two questions were unsettled under Kansas law and certified them to the Kansas Supreme Court for clarification. After receiving the court's responses, the appellate court reversed the district court's dismissal of the claims by the personal representatives and remanded them for further proceedings, along with the claim by Henry Josh Goldsmith. However, the dismissal against Adam Goldsmith, Julie Beth Goldsmith, and Beth Goldsmith in her individual capacity was affirmed.
The background indicates that less than two years after the crash, the decedent's estate representatives filed a survival action in Kansas state court, which they voluntarily dismissed. They subsequently filed the second action in federal court in Kansas. Learjet contended this second action was time-barred by the statutes of limitations of both Kansas and Colorado, which limit wrongful death actions to two years. The plaintiffs argued that the Kansas saving statute extended their time to file the second action, but Learjet maintained that the Kansas borrowing statute precluded the action, as Colorado law would have barred it at the time of filing. Colorado’s savings statute only allows a 90-day extension under specific circumstances, which the plaintiffs did not meet.
The district court granted Learjet's motion for summary judgment, concluding that: 1) the Kansas borrowing statute incorporates Colorado's saving statute, which does not preserve the Plaintiffs' second cause of action; 2) the Kansas saving statute does not permit the saving of wrongful death actions; and 3) the statute of limitations did not toll for Plaintiff Josh Goldsmith due to the appointment of a legal guardian for the minor. In the interest of judicial federalism, the court determined that the first two issues were questions best addressed by Kansas courts and certified three questions to the Kansas Supreme Court regarding the borrowing and saving statutes. The Kansas Supreme Court ruled negatively on the first question, positively on the second, and deemed the third moot as a result of the first ruling.
The case's summary judgment was reviewed de novo under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), which allows for summary judgment when there are no genuine issues of material fact. A key issue was whether the Kansas borrowing statute also borrowed Colorado's saving statute, with Plaintiffs arguing against this and Learjet advocating for the borrowing of all relevant foreign laws affecting claim timeliness. The Kansas Supreme Court ultimately disagreed with Learjet, stating that the Kansas borrowing statute does not extend to foreign saving statutes, relying on precedents including See v. Hartley.
The defendant contended that K.S.A. 60-513(c) establishes a strict four-year limit for initiating medical malpractice actions, which would prevent the saving statute from applying. The court rejected this interpretation, affirming that the saving statute remains effective beyond the four-year limit. It ruled that if an action is filed within the applicable limitations period, it is subject to the savings provision of K.S.A. 60-518, thereby making a subsequent action timely despite the initial four-year limitation of K.S.A. 60-513(c). The court noted that the first action's timeliness under Colorado law suffices for Kansas jurisdiction, and thus the subsequent filing's timeliness should be assessed under Kansas's saving statute rather than Colorado's.
Regarding wrongful death claims, the Kansas Supreme Court historically determined that the state’s saving statute did not apply, as established in Rodman v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. However, following the 1963 legislative restructuring of the wrongful death statute, which separated the two-year limitation from substantive provisions, Plaintiffs argue that wrongful death actions should now be governed by the general limitations provisions, including the saving statute in K.S.A. 60-518. They differentiate this situation from Rodman by asserting that prior cases involved limitations directly tied to the statute. Although Rodman has not been expressly overruled, more recent cases, like Frost v. Hardin, imply that the saving statute may indeed apply to wrongful death claims, with the Frost case being acknowledged by the Kansas Supreme Court without dissent.
The Kansas Supreme Court has clarified the applicability of the saving statute in wrongful death actions, indicating that the previous ruling in Rodman—that the saving statute does not apply to such actions—no longer holds due to changes in statutory language. The court confirmed that K.S.A. 60-518 applies to wrongful death claims, leading to the conclusion that the Kansas saving statute can preserve a second action. However, the court noted that only the original plaintiffs from the first action can invoke the saving statute. In this case, only the personal representatives of the Harold Goldsmith estate are eligible to continue, while individual claims from Adam Goldsmith, Julie Beth Goldsmith, and Beth Goldsmith in her individual capacity are barred. Additionally, Henry Josh Goldsmith, a minor, argues that the statute of limitations is tolled until he reaches the age of majority, in line with Colorado law, which provides for tolling for minors. However, if a legal representative is appointed for a minor after the right accrues, the statute of limitations will run against the minor as it does for individuals not under disability.
Josh is recognized as a minor, but the dispute revolves around whether he has a legal representative appointed. Under Colorado law, when a defendant asserts the statute of limitations as an affirmative defense, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate that the statute has been tolled. Josh needed to show that no legal representative had been appointed, but the record indicates he provided no evidence to support this claim. Consequently, since the statute of limitations was not tolled, his action would be untimely in Colorado, which in turn would bar his action in Kansas under the Kansas borrowing statute.
Josh contends that Learjet did not assert in the district court that he bore the burden of proof regarding the appointment of a legal representative, claiming this constituted a waiver. However, Learjet did argue that Josh could not invoke tolling for other reasons, including an assertion that a legal representative had been appointed under his father’s will. The court found that Learjet did not waive the issue, but it acknowledged the confusion surrounding it. Therefore, the matter is remanded to allow Josh to present evidence about the appointment of a legal representative, which could toll the statute of limitations.
The court reversed the district court's summary judgment favoring Learjet against the personal representatives of the Harold Goldsmith estate and against Josh Goldsmith, remanding both for further proceedings. It affirmed the summary judgment for Learjet against the remaining plaintiffs, who are not Kansas residents. The Kansas saving statute allows for a new action to be commenced within six months after a failure, while the Kansas borrowing statute states that if an action cannot be maintained in the state where it arose due to the statute of limitations, it cannot be maintained in Kansas unless the plaintiff is a resident who has held the cause of action since it accrued. The plaintiffs' initial action was timely filed under both Kansas and Colorado law, with the limitation for wrongful death actions set at two years.
Prior to 1963, Kansas law allowed personal representatives to file wrongful death actions if the deceased could have pursued a claim had they lived, with a two-year statute of limitations. In 1963, the wrongful death provisions were recodified (Kan. Stat. Ann. 60-1901 to 60-1905) without a limitations clause. The Kansas Supreme Court ruled that the Kansas borrowing statute does not prevent the plaintiff's claims, leading to the decision not to address a previously certified question deemed non-determinative. There are uncertainties regarding whether either Colorado or Kansas law permits personal representatives to initiate a wrongful death claim, as Colorado law restricts such claims to the spouse or specific heirs, while Kansas law allows only heirs at law to commence actions. The district court is directed to examine this issue on remand due to insufficient briefing. Additionally, Colorado law defines a 'legal representative' broadly, and the plaintiffs reference McClanahan v. American Gilsonite Co. regarding the burden of proof for tolling statutes. However, the current view is that the burden lies with the party invoking tolling to demonstrate that no legal representative exists. An affidavit from Beth Goldsmith, asserting only her son's birth date, is deemed inadequate to establish a lack of appointed legal representation for her son, Josh, during the relevant period.
