Court: Court of Appeals of Oregon; July 1, 1992; Oregon; State Appellate Court
Claimant sought review of a Worker’s Compensation Board order that denied him vocational assistance benefits due to his inability to come to Oregon for services. The court affirmed the denial. Claimant, who sustained a back injury in 1978 leading to significant disabilities and surgeries, negotiated a plea bargain in 1986 that required him to complete probation in Tennessee. Under ORS 656.340(6), vocational assistance is available under conditions set by the director, including the worker's availability for assistance. OAR 436-120-040(3) mandates that workers must be available in Oregon for such assistance, though services may be provided outside Oregon if deemed more effective by the insurer.
Claimant's request for vocational services in Tennessee was denied by SAIF due to his unavailability in Oregon, a decision upheld by the director and the Board. Claimant argued that eligibility should be based on the 1978 law rather than the 1987 request date, but the Board found no error since ORS 656.202(2) does not apply to vocational assistance. Claimant also contended that OAR 436-120-040(3) exceeded the director's authority and violated the policy promoting injured workers' self-sufficiency. However, the court noted that the statute permits the director to establish eligibility conditions and that the specific statutory authority prevails over the general policy.
The Board's decision to uphold the rule was affirmed, and the court found no abuse of discretion in the director's refusal to waive the eligibility condition. Lastly, claimant argued that ORS 656.340(6) violated his constitutional rights to interstate travel and equal protection under the Oregon and U.S. constitutions, but the court did not find merit in this claim.
Claimant contends that ORS 656.340(6) unfairly categorizes injured workers in Oregon into two groups regarding eligibility for vocational assistance. However, a privileges and immunities claim is unsuccessful if individuals can qualify for the favored class on equal terms. In this case, the claimant's inability to access vocational assistance in Oregon stems from his probation status, not the workers' compensation laws, and he does not dispute the validity of his probation. Thus, the denial of benefits does not violate his rights to equal privileges and immunities. Additionally, the claimant's Fourteenth Amendment challenge is unpersuasive. He references Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, arguing that denying benefits based on residency violates interstate travel rights. However, Memorial Hospital is not applicable here, as OAR 436-120-040(3) does not impose a residency requirement; it only requires that workers be available in Oregon to receive benefits. Therefore, needing to be present in Oregon does not violate his right to interstate travel. The ruling is affirmed, noting that former ORS 656.340(6) has been renumbered to ORS 656.340(7) and that OAR 436-120-040(3) has been modified to OAR 436-120-040(5). Although Tennessee’s vocational rehabilitation agency found the claimant eligible for its services, he sought greater benefits from Oregon.
ORS 656.012(2)(c) outlines the objectives of the Workers’ Compensation Law, emphasizing the need to restore injured workers to self-sufficiency both physically and economically as quickly as possible. However, the right to vocational assistance is conditional, as stated in ORS 656.340(6), which allows the director to set eligibility conditions for vocational assistance. Despite potential conflicts with the broader legislative intent of self-sufficiency, specific statutory authority for these rules takes precedence. The Board appropriately upheld the eligibility rule in question, and the director did not abuse his discretion in refusing to waive conditions for the claimant.
The claimant also contended that ORS 656.340(6) violates the Oregon Constitution's Article I, section 20, and the Fourteenth Amendment by creating unequal classes of injured workers regarding access to vocational assistance based on their ability to travel to Oregon. However, since the claimant's probation, not the law itself, restricts his ability to access vocational assistance in Oregon, his challenge on equal privileges and immunities grounds fails. Similarly, the claim under the Fourteenth Amendment does not succeed, as OAR 436-120-040(3) does not impose a residency requirement; it requires availability in Oregon for benefits, which does not infringe on the right to interstate travel. The court affirmed the decision, noting that the claimant's eligibility for vocational services in Tennessee does not affect his pursuit of Oregon's benefits.
