Court: Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit; April 30, 1996; Federal Appellate Court
Steven D. Compton filed a products liability lawsuit against automobile manufacturer Fuji Heavy Industries, Ltd. and distributor Subaru of America, Inc. after suffering severe spinal injuries from an automobile rollover accident. The jury determined that both companies were 56% at fault, resulting in a judgment of $6,574,081 against them. On appeal, they raised two main issues: the admission of testimony from Mr. Compton’s design expert, Larry Bihlmeyer, and the denial of their renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law. The court affirmed the lower court's decisions.
The incident occurred on February 19, 1988, when Compton, along with four friends who had been drinking, lost control of a 1982 Subaru GL Station Wagon. Compton, seated in the back without a seatbelt, sustained a spinal cord injury, leading to quadriplegia, due to the roof collapsing inward during the rollover. In his 1990 complaint, Compton alleged the vehicle was defectively designed, particularly criticizing the excessive roof and side intrusion into the passenger compartment.
During the trial, Subaru and Fuji challenged Bihlmeyer’s qualifications as an expert witness on automobile roof design, asserting he did not meet the criteria established in the Daubert case for expert testimony. However, after a preliminary hearing, the district court deemed Bihlmeyer qualified. He testified that the roof design was deficient as it allowed excessive crush during the rollover, recommending structural improvements to limit roof crush to 2-3 inches and maintain adequate headroom. The court noted that the forces required to achieve such standards seemed impractical for consumer vehicles. Bihlmeyer based his analysis on inspections of both the damaged Subaru and an identical undamaged model.
Mr. Bihlmeyer established roof crush and headroom requirements by comparing headroom measurements of the accident vehicle with those from hundreds of other accident vehicles he analyzed over eight years as a consulting engineer. He supported his proposed requirements with six sources: 1) a 1972 Ford standard proposal for a minimum headroom of 29.4 inches after roof crush; 2) technical papers on a Ford experimental safety vehicle; 3) a 1966 proposed federal standard for light utility vehicles requiring roll bars and 33 inches of headroom; 4) an SAE paper discussing roof crush as an energy-absorbing device; 5) Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 216, which does not mandate headroom after roof crush; and 6) an SAE paper on rollover accidents without proposed headroom requirements.
Subaru and Fuji moved for judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a) at the close of the evidence, arguing that Mr. Bihlmeyer’s testimony was so implausible that no reasonable juror could find it credible, but the district court denied the motions after reviewing his testimony. The jury later found Subaru and Fuji 56% at fault for Mr. Compton’s injuries. Following the verdict, Subaru and Fuji renewed their Rule 50 motion, which was again denied.
The district court evaluated the admissibility of Mr. Bihlmeyer’s testimony, expressing doubts about his credibility but ultimately ruling that he met the criteria for expert testimony under Federal Rule of Evidence 702. The court acknowledged the relevance of the Daubert standard, indicating that Mr. Bihlmeyer’s testimony involved scientific knowledge that could assist the jury in determining potential design or manufacturing defects. Subaru and Fuji contended that the district court erred in admitting his testimony, claiming it lacked evidentiary reliability and was merely a personal opinion lacking grounding in industry data or scientific principles.
Subaru and Fuji argue that Mr. Bihlmeyer’s testimony should be excluded under the Daubert standard due to the absence of peer review, testing, and general acceptance of his theory. Mr. Compton counters that Daubert is not relevant to Mr. Bihlmeyer’s nonscientific testimony, asserting it is based on his expertise and experience rather than scientific methods. He maintains that the district court accurately stated that factors like error rate and peer review are less significant for engineering testimony. The court reviews the applicability of Daubert de novo, with a limited review for abuse of discretion regarding the district court's decision to admit expert testimony. Under Rule 702, expert testimony is admissible if it will assist the trier of fact, and trial courts have broad discretion in determining expert witness competency, as long as they do not restrict relevant theories. The Supreme Court's Daubert ruling introduced additional requirements for the admissibility of novel scientific evidence, as seen in a case involving the drug Bendectin, where expert testimony based solely on animal studies was deemed inadmissible without supporting epidemiological evidence.
The Supreme Court reversed a prior decision, rejecting the Frye test and establishing a new framework for the admissibility of expert scientific testimony under Rule 104(a). A trial judge must evaluate whether the expert's testimony is based on (1) scientific knowledge that (2) assists the trier of fact in understanding or determining a fact in issue. This requires assessing the scientific validity of the reasoning or methodology used and its applicability to the case's facts. The Court provided a nonexhaustive list of factors for consideration, including testing, peer review, general acceptance, and error rates, emphasizing that the focus should be on methodology rather than conclusions.
The Daubert factors apply only when an expert's testimony relies on specific principles or methodologies. If the testimony is based solely on experience or training, a traditional Rule 702 analysis suffices, requiring the trial court to ensure the testimony is relevant and reliable. Cases such as United States v. Rice and United States v. Markum illustrate the application of Rule 702 without invoking Daubert when expert testimony is grounded in personal experience.
In this case, the district court erred in applying Daubert to Mr. Bihlmeyer’s testimony, which was based on general engineering principles and his extensive experience rather than a specific methodology. Despite the error, the court's decision to allow his testimony was upheld because it was deemed helpful and relevant, and Mr. Bihlmeyer was considered qualified to provide such testimony.
Mr. Bihlmeyer, an aerospace and mechanical engineer with 22 years of experience in automotive engineering, was deemed qualified to provide expert testimony despite Subaru and Fuji's claims of his lack of specific experience in car roof design. His background includes 14 years at Ford, where he worked extensively on vehicle components and roof design, and additional years conducting design analyses as a consulting engineer. Legal precedent establishes that an expert can provide testimony based on general engineering principles even if they lack niche specialization, and the district court found no abuse of discretion in allowing his testimony.
Subaru and Fuji also challenged the district court's denial of their Rule 50(b) motion for judgment as a matter of law, asserting the court was obligated to grant it due to concerns about Bihlmeyer’s credibility. However, the court maintained that the jury should evaluate the weight and credibility of his testimony, which met the standards outlined in Rule 702. Furthermore, they argued that Bihlmeyer’s claims regarding the Subaru roof's defects were insufficient under Kansas law, which requires more than a feasible alternative design to establish a defective design. The record indicated that Bihlmeyer identified at least six specific design defects, supporting his conclusions adequately. Lastly, they contended his testimony did not overcome the presumption of nondefectiveness under the Kansas Product Liability Act (KPLA), which protects manufacturers if their products comply with applicable safety standards unless the plaintiff can prove otherwise.
Subaru and Fuji contend that their Rule 50(b) motion should be granted due to Mr. Compton's failure to demonstrate the inadequacy of federal regulatory standards, specifically FMVSS 216, which sets strength requirements for passenger compartment roofs. The district court determined that FMVSS 216 applies only to the A pillars (the front pillars), while Mr. Compton's injuries resulted from the collapse of the C pillars (behind the rear doors) and D pillars (behind the cargo deck), leading to the conclusion that Kan. Stat. Ann. 60-3304(a) was inapplicable. Upon reviewing the regulation, the court found no unreasonable interpretation by the district court regarding FMVSS 216's scope, as the regulation focuses on the roof's front structure and does not explicitly cover the rear seat roof crush. Therefore, it upheld the district court's denial of the Rule 50(b) motion. The Product Liability Advisory Council, Inc. filed an amicus brief advocating for the application of Daubert to all expert testimony, but the court chose not to address this issue. The court emphasized its authority to affirm a district court's decision based on any sufficiently supported grounds, regardless of whether those grounds were used by the district court. The judgment of the district court was affirmed.
