Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit; March 28, 1996; Federal Appellate Court
A police officer, Frederick M. Stiesberg, Jr., appeals the dismissal of his civil rights action against the State of California, the California Highway Patrol (CHP), and several superior officers, following his transfer from Commander of the CHP’s North Sacramento Area to Commander of the Air Operations Division. The transfer was lateral, affecting neither his rank, pay, nor privileges, but Stiesberg alleges it was punitive due to traffic citations issued by his officers to the daughters of CHP Commissioner Maurice Hannigan, Jr. Stiesberg filed a lawsuit in June 1992, claiming pressure to alter a traffic report and subsequent verbal abuse and investigation before his transfer. The district court dismissed several claims initially, and after Stiesberg amended his complaint to assert deprivation of state and federally protected interests, the court dismissed his federal claims on grounds that the transfer did not violate any substantive liberty or property interests protected by federal law. The court noted that mere procedural failures by a public employer do not alone create federal interests. Stiesberg subsequently chose to dismiss his remaining state law claims without prejudice, leading to a judgment in favor of the appellees. Stiesberg’s appeal followed, and the court reviewed the dismissal de novo.
Reported decisions concerning section 1983 typically focus on employee discharges rather than disciplinary actions. Even if Stiesberg's transfer is considered disciplinary, which is debatable given its lack of adverse impact on his rank, pay, or privileges, a mere transfer without notice does not establish a due process claim. To succeed on a substantive or procedural due process claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate a constitutionally protected liberty or property interest. A protected property interest exists when there is a reasonable expectation of entitlement based on existing rules or state law. While procedural requirements alone do not create a property interest, they can do so if they impose significant restrictions on decision-making.
Stiesberg argues that the Public Safety Officers Procedural Bill of Rights Act prohibits punitive transfers without an administrative hearing. The Act's definition of "punitive action," which includes transfers for punishment, could support his claim. However, even if his transfer was punitive, the Act does not restrict the state's authority to transfer officers; it only provides procedural protections when a transfer is punitive. Therefore, Stiesberg fails to demonstrate a deprivation of a protected property interest under the Due Process Clause.
Additionally, Stiesberg claims a violation of his liberty interest due to reputational damage from accusations of lying and incompetence. A liberty interest in employment is protected if the reasons for a personnel action could significantly harm an individual's community standing or hinder future employment in their profession.
Stiesberg alleges verbal abuse and incompetence accusations but asserts these actions did not significantly stigmatize him. Legal precedent confirms that defamation alone does not infringe on constitutionally protected interests unless it is tied to the loss of a government benefit, such as employment. The appeal raises the question of whether Stiesberg has a constitutionally protected interest in his position at CHP, which is unprecedented in this circuit. The Seventh Circuit's ruling in Altman v. Hurst is cited, where a police sergeant's claims of wrongful transfer and harassment were dismissed, establishing that no liberty or property interests were at stake. Similarly, Stiesberg's complaints about his transfer and workplace annoyances do not constitute a federally recognized interest. Consequently, the district court appropriately dismissed his section 1983 claims.
Stiesberg's original complaint included a claim of "Violation of Public Policy," arguing that he was retaliated against for enforcing traffic laws. This claim was dismissed by the district court, which found no grounds for violation of public policy. In his First Amended Complaint, he claimed a violation of California Labor Code § 1102.5, which was also dismissed as inapplicable to state agencies. Stiesberg concedes the district court’s dismissal was correct but argues that California's common law public policy related to Labor Code § 1102.5 should have been considered on its merits.
Stiesberg's claim hinges on the interpretation of California Labor Code section 1102.5, which prohibits employer retaliation against employees who disclose information regarding suspected violations of state or federal law to government agencies. This statute serves as a whistleblower protection mechanism, safeguarding employees from employer persecution for reporting illegal conduct. However, Stiesberg failed to demonstrate that he reported any illegal activity, as the only alleged misconduct involved traffic citations issued by his officers.
California case law, particularly Garcia v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., reinforces the principle that public policy protects employees from retaliation for disclosing information about unlawful employer actions. The district court affirmed the dismissal of Stiesberg's claims, noting that he did not meet the statute's criteria. Additionally, two other officers, Flagg and Sharp, filed a similar action that was consolidated with Stiesberg's case, but they are not parties to this appeal. The district court dismissed federal civil rights claims against the State of California and CHP and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over related state law claims, a ruling Stiesberg did not contest on appeal.
The interpretation of California’s public policy doctrine has been refined by recent case law, indicating it should align more closely with constitutional and statutory provisions rather than being overly broad.
