Portland Feminist Women's Health Center v. Advocates for Life, Inc.
Docket: No. 91-35512
Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit; September 2, 1994; Federal Appellate Court
The case involves the Portland Feminist Women’s Health Center (PFWHC) seeking legal remedies against anti-abortion activists, specifically Advocates for Life (AFL) and its representatives, for disrupting clinic services. PFWHC filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985(3) and 1986, claiming violations of patients' constitutional rights to interstate travel and to choose abortion. A jury initially ruled against the defendants, who then appealed. Following the Supreme Court's decision in Bray v. Alexandria Women’s Health Clinic, the appellate court reversed the district court's judgment, determining PFWHC had not stated a valid claim under the cited statutes. Subsequently, the court dealt with a related case, National Abortions Federation v. Operation Rescue, which impacted this case. The appellate court recalled its opinion, allowing further consideration of the implications of Operation Rescue. The district court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and the appellate court's jurisdiction stemmed from 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Upon review, the appellate court reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further proceedings. The defendants, including AFL—an anti-abortion nonprofit led by Andrew Burnett—conducted various protests and “rescue missions” at the clinic. PFWHC’s initial state court claims included conspiracy to violate civil rights, violations of Oregon RICO, and other tort claims, but the case was removed to federal court, where the district court dismissed the federal claims but retained state claims.
Plaintiffs successfully amended their complaint, leading the district court to find valid claims under 42 U.S.C. 1985 and 1986. A preliminary injunction was issued on June 9, 1986, later affirmed with modifications. Defendants, including AFL and individuals Burnett and Martin, were held in contempt for violating this injunction. A jury trial resulted in a verdict against AFL for PFWHC’s claims under 42 U.S.C. 1985(3) and Oregon RICO, and against Martin for the same federal claim. The defendants' motion for judgment non obstante veredicto was denied. On March 13, 1991, the district court issued a Final Judgment and Permanent Injunction, awarding PFWHC $6,624 total and imposing a permanent injunction against the defendants. The plaintiffs were also awarded attorneys' fees under 42 U.S.C. 1988 and Or.Rev.Stat. 166.725(7)(a).
Subsequently, the Supreme Court rejected a component of PFWHC’s 42 U.S.C. 1985(3) claim in Bray v. Alexandria Women’s Health Clinic, ruling that “women seeking abortion” do not qualify as a protected class under the first clause of 42 U.S.C. 1985(3). The Court established that the requirement for "animus" does not extend to those opposing abortion, and incidental impacts on women's rights do not constitute a conspiracy to deprive. Furthermore, the Court concluded that a purely private conspiracy cannot aim to deprive individuals of their federal right to abortion, and claims regarding equal protection were not appropriate for review. The Court also ruled that the abortion clinics were not entitled to attorneys’ fees.
The “deprivation” clause issue is governed by the precedents set in Bray and Operation Rescue. PFWHC contends that the district court’s judgment should be upheld because AFL only appealed the denial of its motion to dismiss based on insufficient claims, asserting that the evidence from the trial is not relevant on appeal. PFWHC highlights a vague allegation from its complaint claiming AFL acted with animus “toward women generally,” arguing this suffices for a claim under 42 U.S.C. 1985(3). However, the court rejects this argument, emphasizing that a party cannot rely on isolated words from pleadings when the full context of the case contradicts the claim. The court notes that while Bray did not rule out "women generally" as a potential class, it specified that claims of animus against women must demonstrate a purpose that focuses on women as a class, which PFWHC fails to establish. The district court found that AFL's actions were aimed at stopping abortion rather than targeting women specifically. The jury instructions indicated that liability could only be found if AFL acted against plaintiffs because they were women seeking to exercise their constitutional rights to abortion, not merely due to their gender. Thus, the court concludes that the jury did not find AFL liable for sex-based discrimination.
Judge Frye's second opinion clarified the case's context, asserting that the complaint sufficiently states a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. 1985(3) for a class of women exercising their constitutional right to abortion. She noted that the plaintiffs allege discrimination against this specific class, aligning with the precedent set in Reichardt v. Life Ins. Co. The court determined that the “deprivation” clause of the complaint was substantively similar to prior cases, including Bray, where the Supreme Court rejected claims based on discrimination against women seeking abortions. Consequently, the judgment against defendants under this clause was deemed unsound.
PFWHC contended that the complaint also invoked the “hindrance” clause of 42 U.S.C. 1985(3), which aims to prevent obstruction of constitutional rights. The plaintiffs' amended complaint detailed conspiracies to disrupt and harm abortion providers and their clients. The court found that the allegations provided sufficient notice of a “hindrance” claim, referencing relevant case law and the necessity for notice pleading. The pre-trial order and jury instructions supported this theory, emphasizing that conspiracies to hinder equal treatment for women seeking abortions violate their rights. Additionally, evidence, such as photographs of defendants blocking clinic access, corroborated the claim of hindrance.
The analysis reveals that one of the plaintiffs' theories under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) was legally defective, which invalidates the general jury verdict unless substantial evidence supports all theories presented. Generally, a jury verdict is upheld if supported by substantial evidence for each liability theory. However, an exception allows for sustaining a general verdict if it can be attributed to a viable theory, in this case, the “hindrance” clause theory. Factors for exercising this discretion include potential jury confusion, applicability of defenses, strength of evidence for the sustaining count, and overlapping disputed factual issues. The court determined not to exercise this discretion, noting the significant distinctions between the deprivation and hindrance clauses, with materially different factual proof requirements. The evidence for the hindrance theory was found weak, and there was no indication of the jury's basis for the verdict. Consequently, the general verdict is deemed invalid, leading to the conclusion that PFWHC is not entitled to attorneys’ fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, resulting in the vacating of the district court's fee award.
Additionally, while defendants were found liable under the Oregon RICO statute, those claims are not on appeal. However, the court suggests that the fee award against Advocates for Life and Andrew Burnett may be excessive, directing the district court to reevaluate the award on remand based on the ratio of damages awarded to those sought and the number of liable defendants versus those sued. Appellants argued that the District Court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over state claims due to the ruling in Bray, which held the first clause of § 1985(3) did not provide a federal cause of action against anti-abortion activists. The court determined that although PFWHC’s § 1985(3) claim fails, it was not wholly insubstantial prior to Bray's ruling, thus preserving jurisdiction. It also concluded that plaintiffs adequately alleged a § 1985(3) violation under the statute's second clause. The judgment of the district court is reversed in part and vacated in part, with the case remanded for further proceedings, and parties are to bear their own appeal costs.
