Court: Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit; July 27, 1995; Federal Appellate Court
Judge Murnaghan authored the opinion, joined by Chief Judge Ervin and Judge Motz, affirming the district court's ruling in favor of the Stafford County School Board. Matthew B. Goodall, a child with profound hearing impairment, and his parents sued the County to compel it to provide a cued speech transliterator for Matthew at his private religious school, arguing that the costs incurred for alternative services infringed upon their free exercise of religion, violating the First Amendment and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA). The Goodalls contended that the County's refusal imposed a substantial burden without a compelling governmental interest justifying it.
Prior to 1984, the County had provided special education services at no cost, but after the Goodalls enrolled Matthew in Fredericksburg Christian School, they had to bear the costs, which amounted to approximately $14,000 in the 1993-94 school year. They sought reimbursement and acknowledgment of the County's obligation for future services. The court noted a previous case (Goodall I) where a similar claim was rejected, confirming that providing such services would violate the Establishment Clause. The Supreme Court's decision in Zobrest, which allowed the provision of interpreter services in religious schools, prompted the Goodalls to bring this suit. Ultimately, the district court found no substantial burden on the Goodalls' religious exercise due to the County's refusal to provide a transliterator.
The district court granted judgment to the County under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(c) after finding no cognizable burden in the Goodalls’ case, prompting the Goodalls to appeal. They assert claims under the First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA). The Free Exercise Clause prohibits laws that impede religious practices unless they are neutral and generally applicable, as established in cases like Employment Division v. Smith and Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye. Generally applicable laws that incidentally affect religious practices do not violate this clause and do not require justification based on a compelling governmental interest.
Congress enacted RFRA in 1993 to restore the compelling interest test for cases where the free exercise of religion is substantially burdened, even by neutral laws. RFRA mandates that the government cannot impose substantial burdens on religious exercise unless justified by a compelling interest and the least restrictive means of achieving that interest. To prevail under RFRA, a claimant must first demonstrate that their religious exercise is substantially burdened; only then must the government justify that burden. The Goodalls must prove their religious exercise is substantially burdened by the County’s policy for the County to have the obligation to provide evidence of its interests. The analysis may reference pre-RFRA cases to determine the burden on the plaintiffs' religious practices.
No substantial burden on an individual's free exercise of religion exists when a law merely increases the cost of practicing religious beliefs. In *Braunfeld v. Brown*, Orthodox Jewish merchants challenged a Pennsylvania law that prohibited Sunday retail sales, arguing it imposed economic hardship by limiting their ability to compensate for losses incurred from their Saturday observance. The Supreme Court ruled that the law did not infringe on their religious exercise despite potential financial loss. Further, the Court has consistently held that having a constitutional or statutory right does not obligate the government to subsidize that right, as seen in cases like *Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash.* and *Rust v. Sullivan*. Economic inconveniences do not constitute constitutionally impermissible infringements on religious freedom. The Goodalls' claim, centered around financial burdens of sending their child to a religious school without state subsidy for necessary services, does not amount to a substantial infringement of their rights under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA). The Court finds that the existing financial burden does not significantly impede their exercise of religion, and precedents regarding unemployment compensation do not alter this conclusion.
The Supreme Court's standard for evaluating a plaintiff's burden in unemployment benefits cases indicates that if a state ties the receipt of crucial benefits to actions contrary to religious beliefs, it imposes a substantial burden on religious exercise. In this context, the Goodalls argue that the provision of a cued speech transliterator for their son, Matthew, qualifies as an important benefit, necessitating the County to demonstrate a compelling interest for its denial. However, the Goodalls are not compelled to act against their religious beliefs; rather, they face a financial burden if they choose to keep Matthew in a sectarian school instead of utilizing the public school system, where such services would be provided at no cost. Consequently, their financial obligation does not meet the threshold of a substantial burden under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA).
Additionally, the Goodalls' Free Exercise Clause claim fails as the County was not obligated to present evidence regarding its special education policy, and it is acknowledged that Matthew would receive necessary services if enrolled in public school. Regardless of the applicability of the County's policy, the Goodalls' claim remains unsubstantiated. Their argument under the Establishment Clause also fails since while it governs the County's ability to provide services to sectarian schools, it does not require such provision.
Furthermore, prior rulings established that the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) does not obligate Stafford County to fund services requested by the Goodalls for Matthew's education in a Christian school. Thus, the Goodalls have not demonstrated that Stafford County's refusal to provide a cued speech transliterator constitutes a substantial burden on their religious exercise. The district court's decision granting judgment in favor of the County is affirmed. The definition of cued speech, a phonetic system aiding deaf children, is acknowledged, and there is agreement on the financial costs incurred by the Goodalls for transliterator services, as well as Matthew's need for such services to benefit from his education.
The County argues against the Goodalls' ability to assert their claim under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA). However, the court determines that the Goodalls adequately pleaded a RFRA violation in their amended complaint, warranting consideration of their claim. The precedent set by Sherbert mandates that the government must demonstrate a compelling state interest to justify significant restrictions on free exercise rights. The parties concur that the Goodalls' decision to enroll their son, Matthew, in a Christian school stems from their sincerely-held religious beliefs. Testimony from Matthew's mother indicated that providing interpreting services for him caused emotional strain; however, this concern is now moot as Matthew has had a paid transliterator since the ninth grade. The court refrains from addressing the Goodalls' arguments under the Privileges and Immunities Clause and the Equal Protection Clause, as these were not presented in the district court and no exceptional circumstances were provided to justify their omission. Additionally, it notes that at the time of the Goodall I decision, the relevant statute was identified as the Education of the Handicapped Act (EHA).
