William Frank Parker, Plaintiff-Appellant/cross-Appellee v. Larry Norris, Director, Arkansas Department of Correction, Defendant-Appellee/cross-Appellant
Docket: 94-3022
Court: Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit; October 11, 1995; Federal Appellate Court
William Frank Parker, an inmate on death row in Arkansas, appeals the district court's denial of several claims in his habeas corpus petition. The State cross-appeals, arguing that Parker was improperly denied adequate psychiatric assistance during the penalty phase of his trial. The Eighth Circuit Court concludes that Parker received the required psychiatric assistance throughout his trial and affirms the district court's rejection of his other claims. The court remands the case with instructions to deny Parker's habeas corpus petition.
The factual background reveals that following his divorce from Pam Warren, Parker attacked her parents, James and Sandra Warren, ultimately killing them. He also abducted Pam, injuring her and a police officer before surrendering. Initially convicted of capital felony murder, Parker's conviction was overturned by the Arkansas Supreme Court, which led to a retrial where he was convicted of premeditated capital murder and sentenced to death. This conviction was upheld by the Arkansas Supreme Court, which also denied postconviction relief.
In his federal habeas proceedings, Parker raised nine claims, including asserting that his retrial violated the Double Jeopardy Clause. The district court denied this claim and later granted relief on the psychiatric assistance issue while rejecting the others. Parker appeals the denial of his Double Jeopardy claim, his guilt-phase psychiatric assistance claim, and three claims related to the jury’s findings on aggravating circumstances. The State's cross-appeal contests the psychiatric assistance ruling.
Parker was initially convicted of capital felony murder for the deaths of James and Sandra Warren during a burglary, but this conviction was reversed by the Arkansas Supreme Court, which determined that the burglary did not have an independent objective distinct from the murder. The court remanded the case, leading to a new conviction of capital murder under a different legal theory, which Parker argues violates the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment. This clause generally allows retrial after a conviction is overturned unless the reversal is due to legally insufficient evidence, which Parker claims applies to his case. However, the Supreme Court has clarified that reversals based on evidentiary insufficiency equate to acquittals, while reversals for other reasons, such as trial errors, do not bar retrials. The Supreme Court's decisions, including Burks v. United States, Tibbs v. Florida, and Montana v. Hall, indicate that retrial is permissible unless the reversal specifically establishes the defendant's lack of culpability. In Parker's case, as the Arkansas Supreme Court's reversal was based on legal interpretation rather than evidence insufficiency, the Constitution permits the retrial on a different charge.
Parker contends that Hall is an outlier in double jeopardy law, a position the court rejects. The Supreme Court's ruling in United States v. Ball establishes that the Double Jeopardy Clause does not prevent retrial when a conviction is overturned due to a legally flawed indictment. The court references Burks, affirming the correctness of Ball's principles regarding retrials to correct trial errors. The district court assessed whether Parker's initial conviction was invalidated by a defect in the charging instrument or by evidentiary insufficiency akin to an acquittal. It examined two Arkansas Supreme Court decisions: Parker I, which addressed statutory interpretation rather than evidential sufficiency, and Parker II, which clarified that the conviction was overturned due to trial errors related to the incorrect application of the capital murder statute. The district court's analysis aligns with the Arkansas Supreme Court's findings, indicating that the reversal was not due to a failure of the state to prove its case. The court emphasizes the importance of respecting the characterizations made by the reversing court to uphold the principles underpinning the Double Jeopardy Clause, noting that retrials serve both defendants' rights and societal interests. Consequently, the district court correctly denied Parker's double jeopardy claim.
Additionally, Parker alleges violations of Ake v. Oklahoma, claiming he was denied state-funded psychiatric assistance during both trial phases. The district court rejected the claim for the guilt phase but granted relief for the penalty phase, prompting appeals from both parties. Background indicates that Parker had previously attempted an insanity defense, was evaluated by state hospital professionals, and both sides' experts concurred on his competency and sanity at the time of the crimes.
Parker sought to represent himself before the second trial, claiming he understood the proceedings and was not mentally impaired. His appointed defense counsel requested a psychiatrist's assistance, asserting Parker might be incapable of aiding his defense, contrasting Parker’s claims. The State argued that prior psychological evaluations indicated Parker's sanity was not a significant trial issue. The trial court held a hearing, granted Parker's self-representation while designating counsel as standby, and initially denied the need for additional psychiatric assistance since Parker did not assert an insanity defense.
One month later, during voir dire, standby counsel renewed the request for a defense psychiatrist, citing Parker’s change of mind. The court denied this request, stating there was no mental disease issue. However, when Parker faced issues contacting his psychiatrist, Dr. Oglesby, the court intervened, ensuring he could communicate with both Dr. Oglesby and his attorneys. Parker later complained about restrictions on his conversations with Dr. Oglesby, prompting him to request a continuance to facilitate better communication. During a hearing regarding this motion, Parker affirmed Dr. Oglesby’s testimony was essential for his defense, specifically for mitigation purposes, and expressed a desire to prepare adequately before Dr. Oglesby’s arrival in court.
Parker was granted a four-day continuance to access Dr. Oglesby, but the trial proceeded without further mention of the psychiatrist or an insanity defense. During the penalty phase, the State initially presented no evidence regarding Parker's mental state. Dr. Oglesby, testifying for the defense, stated that Parker suffered from a major depressive disorder, explosive rage disorder, mixed personality disorder, and substance abuse at the time of the homicides, claiming these conditions impaired his judgment and could establish statutory mitigating circumstances.
In rebuttal, Dr. Pritchard, a psychologist for the State, asserted that Parker was competent and not insane during the killings, arguing the acts were too methodical to stem from major depression or rage disorder. However, he acknowledged Parker was experiencing an emotional disorder but disputed the claim of extreme emotional disturbance. Dr. Oglesby later reiterated his views on Parker's significant depression impacting his behavior.
The jury's verdict included a finding of mitigating circumstances related to unusual pressures but unanimously rejected claims of extreme mental or emotional disturbance and impairment from mental defects or drug abuse. Parker contended that the prosecution's success in presenting expert testimony was compromised by an Ake violation, which mandates that defendants must have access to a competent psychiatrist when sanity is a significant trial factor. The court referenced a precedent, Starr v. Lockhart, emphasizing the distinction between mitigation and guilt evaluations, indicating that Parker's examination did not adequately address the essential mitigating factors.
Due process does not guarantee defendants the right to their chosen experts but does entitle them to experts who assist in evaluating, preparing, and presenting their defense. In this case, the trial court initially denied Parker's request for a psychiatrist but indicated it would reconsider if need was demonstrated. Parker's self-representation, lack of support for the motion, and refusal to claim an insanity defense meant that this initial ruling did not violate the Ake standard, which requires a showing that mental condition is crucial to the defense.
Later, Parker expressed a desire to present psychiatric testimony and was allowed access to Dr. Oglesby, his treating psychiatrist. The court facilitated this by ordering access and granting a four-day continuance for Parker to meet with Dr. Oglesby. Throughout the trial, there were no further complaints regarding access to psychiatric assistance, and neither side called expert testimony during the guilt phase. During the penalty phase, Dr. Oglesby testified extensively in support of Parker's mitigating circumstances.
The trial court provided Parker with state-funded access to Dr. Oglesby, who was regarded as Parker's expert, and there were no limitations on consultations. Parker did not request further evaluations or assistance post-access, nor did Dr. Oglesby indicate a need for more time or testing. Parker's claim that the State violated Ake due to insufficient assistance from Dr. Oglesby lacks merit, as the trial court allowed unlimited access before and during the trial, distinguishing it from similar cases. Thus, no Ake violation occurred.
At the time of Parker's conviction, Arkansas law mandated a death sentence if the jury unanimously found that statutory aggravating circumstances justified it and outweighed any mitigating circumstances. One aggravating circumstance was a defendant's prior violent felony. During the penalty phase, the State presented evidence of Parker's prior conduct, including an incident where he threw a knife at Pam Warren and pointed a shotgun at her, arguing these actions constituted aggravated assault and terroristic threatening. Although no charges were filed for these acts, Arkansas law allows the prosecution to use uncharged felonies to establish aggravating circumstances. The jury found this aggravating circumstance, and the Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed the sufficiency of the evidence.
Parker did not challenge the constitutionality of the prior felony aggravating circumstance but raised three issues regarding its application: the trial court's failure to instruct the jury on lesser-included offenses of the alleged prior felonies; the inconsistency of the jury's finding of a prior violent felony with its finding of "no significant history of prior criminal activity"; and the Arkansas Supreme Court's allegedly unconstitutional application of a lower appellate review standard.
Parker contended that if the jury had been instructed on lesser-included offenses, it might have determined he committed misdemeanors, which would not qualify as prior felonies. He referenced *Beck v. Alabama*, which mandates lesser-included offense instructions during the guilt phase of capital cases. However, the court distinguished Parker's situation from *Beck*, noting that Alabama's statute, which prohibited such instructions, was unique and created undue uncertainty in capital cases. The court explained that lacking the option for lesser-included offenses could lead juries to convict for improper reasons or acquit based on an unjust perception of deserving punishment.
During the penalty phase of Parker's trial, the jury was instructed that it could consider one or more prior violent felonies as a statutory aggravating circumstance. This did not create an 'all or nothing' scenario since the jury had already convicted Parker of capital murder. Even if the jury identified the prior felony aggravating circumstance, it was still required to evaluate whether this circumstance justified a death sentence and whether it outweighed any mitigating factors. The Arkansas law was found to align with the Supreme Court's decision in Beck, which aims to prevent jury confusion between capital murder and innocence.
Parker contended that the jury's findings were inconsistent, as they unanimously identified the prior violent felonies as aggravating while some jurors indicated that Parker had no significant prior criminal history as a mitigating factor. The Arkansas Supreme Court ruled these findings were not contradictory, suggesting that while the jury agreed on the existence of prior violent felonies, individual jurors could determine the significance of that history differently. Parker's argument on this matter was dismissed as semantic.
Additionally, Parker claimed that the verdict form did not allow jurors to consider non-unanimous mitigating circumstances, which he argued violated Supreme Court precedents. This argument was previously rejected in another case. Furthermore, Parker asserted that his due process rights were infringed when the Arkansas Supreme Court stated that the burden of proof for establishing an aggravating circumstance was lower than that for a conviction. However, the court clarified that the jury had found the aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt, adhering to Arkansas law. The Arkansas Supreme Court upheld the jury’s findings, validating the trial court’s application of the proper standards.
Parker's argument fails to consider the federal standard for reviewing state court decisions regarding aggravating circumstances in capital cases, which is based on the "rational factfinder" standard from Jackson v. Virginia. The district court applied this standard, determining that a rational trier of fact could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the "prior violent felony" aggravating circumstance existed. Consequently, the district court's judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded with instructions to deny Parker's habeas corpus petition. Additionally, Parker filed a motion for psychiatric assistance, which was assumed to be denied by both the Arkansas Supreme Court and the district court; however, the trial court's subsequent actions suggest it may have granted the request. Testimony indicated that Parker directed his defense strategy and refused to allow an insanity defense. The Arkansas Supreme Court has demonstrated its capacity for meaningful appellate review of death penalty cases, having previously reduced sentences or ordered new trials in instances of insufficient evidence supporting aggravating circumstances.
