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State v. Moyle

Citations: 66 Or. App. 274; 673 P.2d 1366; 1983 Ore. App. LEXIS 4054Docket: DA 240844-8208; CA A28286

Court: Court of Appeals of Oregon; December 20, 1983; Oregon; State Appellate Court

Narrative Opinion Summary

This case involves the defendant's appeal against the dismissal of charges under Oregon's harassment statute, ORS 166.065(1)(d), which criminalizes telephonic threats of serious physical injury. The defendant was charged with making threats to kill and kidnap, prompting a demurrer challenging the statute's constitutionality under Article I, section 8, of the Oregon Constitution. The trial court ruled in favor of the defendant, declaring the statute unconstitutional. However, the state appealed this decision. The appellate court held that the statute does not infringe upon free speech rights as the threats do not constitute protected speech. The court further determined that ORS 166.065(1)(d) is neither overbroad nor vague, as it clearly defines prohibited conduct and aligns with historical exceptions to free speech restrictions. Consequently, the court reversed the trial court's ruling, remanding the case for trial. The decision underscores the state's authority to prohibit threats of serious felonies, reflecting public policy interests in maintaining peace and safety.

Legal Issues Addressed

Constitutionality of Harassment Statute ORS 166.065(1)(d)

Application: The court finds that ORS 166.065(1)(d), which criminalizes telephonic threats of serious physical injury, does not violate constitutional protections for free speech under Article I, section 8, of the Oregon Constitution.

Reasoning: The court finds that the alleged threats do not constitute protected speech and thus reverses the trial court's ruling.

Historical Exceptions to Free Speech Restrictions

Application: The statute aligns with historical exceptions to free speech, akin to prohibitions under the English Waltham Black Act of 1723.

Reasoning: The state argues that ORS 166.065(1)(d) falls within a historically recognized exception, citing the English Waltham Black Act of 1723, which prohibited certain threatening speech.

Overbreadth Doctrine in Free Speech

Application: The statute is not overbroad as it specifically targets threats of felonies and serious physical injury, which are not protected speech.

Reasoning: ORS 166.065(1)(d) specifically targets threats of felonies and serious physical injury, which are inherently wrongful acts.

Vagueness Doctrine and Statutory Clarity

Application: ORS 166.065(1)(d) is not unconstitutionally vague as it provides clear definitions and limits its scope to specific threatening conduct.

Reasoning: The trial court found ORS 166.065(1)(d) to be sufficiently clear and specific, distinguishing it from its predecessor by limiting its scope to threats involving serious physical harm or felonies intended to harass, annoy, or alarm.