Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit; July 6, 1994; Federal Appellate Court
A suit has been filed by the Spokane Tribe of Indians against the State of Washington to compel the state to negotiate in good faith for a gaming compact as mandated by the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA). The critical issue in this case is whether the state is immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment, despite Congress's intent to allow such actions. A circuit conflict exists on this matter; the Eighth Circuit ruled that states are not immune, while the Eleventh Circuit concluded otherwise. The district court dismissed the case against the state but allowed it to proceed against individual state officers under the Ex Parte Young doctrine. However, the appellate court reversed this decision, stating that the state is not immune from the suit, making the Ex Parte Young doctrine unnecessary.
Congress enacted the IGRA in 1988 following the Supreme Court's California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians decision, which clarified that states could not enforce gaming laws on Indian reservations if they permitted gambling. The IGRA categorizes gaming into three classes: Class I (social games), Class II (Bingo and similar games), and Class III (all other games). To conduct Class III gaming, tribes must negotiate a Tribal-State Compact with the respective state. The IGRA requires tribes to initiate negotiations with the state, which must negotiate in good faith. If the state fails to do so, federal courts have jurisdiction over the tribe's claims and can compel the state and tribe to reach an agreement within 60 days. If no agreement is reached, a mediator is appointed, and if mediation fails, the Secretary of the Interior can impose regulations after consulting with the mediator.
The Tribe requested negotiations for a compact with the State of Washington on November 14, 1988, and formal talks began in August 1989. Despite multiple meetings in 1990 and 1991, Washington rejected both the Tribe's draft compact and a universal compact with other tribes. On June 4, 1991, Washington insisted that the Tribe accept state jurisdiction and gaming limitations or seek remedies under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA). Subsequently, the Tribe filed a complaint on June 6, 1991, claiming violations of the IGRA against Washington, Governor Gardner, Attorney General Eikenberry, and Deputy Director Miller. The Tribe sought a declaratory judgment for the state's failure to negotiate in good faith and an injunction for concluding a compact within 60 days. The district court dismissed the state's claims but allowed the case against individual defendants to proceed. The individual defendants appealed the denial of their immunity claim, and the district court certified the dismissal of the Tribe’s action against the state for appeal.
The excerpt also addresses Eleventh Amendment immunity, referencing the Supreme Court's historical stance that bars citizens from suing their own state or another state. It highlights key cases that define the parameters of this immunity, including situations where states may waive their immunity or where Congress may abrogate it under its constitutional powers. Notably, the Tribe has not argued that Washington consented to federal jurisdiction, making the central issue whether the statute has indeed abrogated the state's immunity.
Congressional intent to abrogate state sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment must be clearly expressed in statute language. The Supreme Court and federal courts consistently affirm that a general authorization to sue is inadequate. Notably, the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA) demonstrates clear congressional intent to allow suits against states, particularly when a tribe can show that a state has not engaged in good faith negotiations regarding tribal-state compacts. Section 2710(d) of the IGRA provides for federal court jurisdiction and shifts the burden of proof to the state if a tribe presents evidence of a state's failure to negotiate in good faith. The intent of Congress is evident, as it sought to provide tribes a federal forum to ensure fair negotiations with states.
Regarding Congress's power, the Supreme Court asserts that Congress can abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity when acting under constitutional provisions granting it plenary authority over state matters, such as the Fourteenth Amendment and the Interstate Commerce Clause. However, the specific intersection of federal authority over tribes and state sovereign immunity related to the IGRA has not been directly addressed by the Supreme Court. In Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, the Court ruled that the Eleventh Amendment generally prohibits tribes from suing states, noting that states' waiver of immunity applies only to mutual concessions between states and not to tribes.
A general waiver of immunity from tribal suits cannot be inferred from the Constitution, but Congress may abrogate that immunity under the Indian Commerce Clause, particularly when it demonstrates clear intent, as in the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA). The reliance on Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico is misplaced, as that case only addressed state taxation on non-Indian interests on tribal lands without infringing on tribal commerce, without clarifying congressional authority under the Indian Commerce Clause. In contrast, Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co. established that Congress has the power to abrogate state immunity under the Commerce Clause, noting that states relinquish some sovereignty when granting Congress regulatory power. The opinion emphasized that both the Commerce Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment empower Congress while simultaneously limiting state authority. Acknowledging that Justice Brennan's opinion in Union Gas was a plurality, Justice White concurred that state immunity can be overridden by clear congressional intent under the Interstate Commerce Clause. The district court incorrectly concluded that distinctions between the Indian and Interstate Commerce Clauses justify state immunity against tribal suits, as Congress retains authority over both under Article I, Section 8.
The Supreme Court's analyses in Union Gas and Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer apply to the Indian Commerce Clause, emphasizing Congress's plenary powers in Indian affairs. The Union Gas opinion addressed the Commerce Clause broadly, not restricting it to interstate matters. The Indian Commerce Clause, as articulated in Worcester v. Georgia (1832), grants Congress comprehensive control over Indian affairs, inherently limiting state powers unless Congress permits state law application on reservations. This principle is deeply rooted in U.S. history, emphasizing that tribes maintain their inherent right to self-governance absent congressional action. The Supreme Court affirmed in Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe (1991) that tribes are domestic dependent nations with sovereign authority over their members and territories. Consequently, Congress's authority under the Indian Commerce Clause is at least equal to, if not greater than, its authority under the Interstate Commerce Clause. This view aligns with District Judge Marcus's conclusion regarding the congruence of congressional power over both domains. The Eleventh Circuit's reversal of a district court's decision in Seminole Tribe v. Florida raised questions about the Union Gas decision's current relevance but did not alter its binding authority. Even if the Supreme Court were to limit Congress's power over interstate commerce, its broader authority over tribal matters remains intact. The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA) was enacted to address regulatory gaps in Indian gaming stemming from state dependence on Congress for regulatory authority.
Following California's defeat in Cabazon Band, Congress sought to create a framework allowing states to influence tribal gaming operations while enforcing state laws. The Eleventh Amendment's state immunity should not obstruct this goal; rather, state sovereignty is inappropriate within this federal scheme. The Eleventh Circuit expressed concerns over a potential regulatory gap if the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA) was deemed unenforceable, suggesting that the Secretary of the Interior could still impose regulations once a state claimed immunity. However, this view misinterprets the statute's intention, where the Secretary's role is a last resort after court-appointed mediation between tribes and states. Therefore, the State of Washington is not immune from suits under the IGRA, which mandates good faith negotiations for tribal gaming compacts. The district court's dismissal of the suit against the state is reversed, and the order allowing claims against individual defendants under Ex Parte Young is vacated. The court notes that state officer immunity depends on state immunity, and the defendants may argue for dismissal based on the IGRA's provisions during remand. The Eleventh Amendment's language is cited to highlight the constraints on judicial power regarding suits against states by citizens of other states or foreign subjects. The decision is reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
