Templeman v. Gunter

Citations: 16 F.3d 367; 1994 WL 27256Docket: No. 93-1333

Court: Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit; February 1, 1994; Federal Appellate Court

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Vernon Templeman, a prisoner at Colorado's Centennial Correctional Facility, filed a civil rights lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Colorado Department of Corrections officials violated his due process and equal protection rights by transferring him from general population to administrative segregation in October 1992. The district court dismissed his complaint based on the recommendation of a magistrate judge, citing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d), which allows for dismissal if a complaint is deemed "frivolous." The magistrate judge found that Templeman had no liberty interest in his prison classification, employment, or earned time credits, and concluded that the DOC adhered to necessary procedures, while Templeman’s claims of bias and equal protection were deemed vague.

Templeman had been in administrative segregation from 1984 to 1991 before being moved to general population, where he enjoyed benefits such as earned time credits and a prison job. In October 1992, during a transfer process involving general population inmates, Templeman faced a Warden’s Classification Committee without prior notice, which determined his transfer based on his history of escapes and violence. Although he requested a three-member panel for his hearing, it was conducted by a single officer, who upheld the decision to transfer him.

The court noted that under § 1915(d), a complaint may be dismissed if the factual allegations are implausible or based on a meritless legal theory. The Due Process Clause provides protection against deprivation of life, liberty, or property; however, it does not guarantee a prisoner a specific degree of liberty regarding classification. Templeman argues that Colorado law grants him rights to remain in general population under certain conditions, implying that due process must be observed before depriving him of that status.

Explicit mandatory language in state law can establish liberty interests, as noted in *Kentucky Dep’t of Corrections v. Thompson*. State statutes may create protected liberty interests if they restrict official discretion, as explained in *Hewitt v. Helms*. The argument that Colorado laws guarantee inmates the right to remain in the general population absent certain conduct is rejected. Colorado Department of Corrections (DOC) Regulation 600-2 permits transfers to administrative segregation based on the discretion of classification officers, who can consider a non-exhaustive list of factors, including any other significant reasons. Additional regulations cited do not provide specific criteria for administrative segregation but focus on procedural requirements.

Regarding benefits lost due to administrative segregation, Templeman was awarded earned time credits while in the general population but lost eligibility for these credits while in segregation. He claims that state law mandates earned time credits if he meets statutory criteria, noting that the earned time statute is generally discretionary. However, a specific subsection appears to require mandatory earned time awards for inmates sentenced for offenses occurring between 1979 and 1985. The statute mandates a review of an inmate’s performance record to grant earned time deductions. Denying earned time credits could infringe on Templeman’s liberty interest by affecting his parole release date.

Nevertheless, the DOC maintains that inmates in administrative segregation typically do not meet the necessary criteria for earned time credits, such as progress in areas like group living and social adjustment. Since DOC officials had discretion to place Templeman in administrative segregation and he did not meet the criteria for earned time, he has not been deprived of any earned time to which he was entitled.

Good Time Templeman argues that his transfer to administrative segregation resulted in the denial of good time credits, but the good time statute allows discretion for withholding these credits based on conduct. Therefore, his transfer did not infringe upon any liberty interest. 

Templeman also lost his prison job upon his transfer. Without any statute or regulation guaranteeing him employment, he lacks a constitutional right to a prison job; thus, losing it during administrative segregation did not deprive him of liberty or property. 

Regarding statutory clemency credits, Templeman claims he lost these while in administrative segregation. However, the governor has full discretion over sentence commutation, and regulations explicitly state that inmates in administrative segregation are ineligible for such credits. Consequently, he is not entitled to them and was not deprived of a liberty interest.

Templeman raises complaints about procedural violations related to his assignment to administrative segregation, including lack of notice for hearings and impartiality of the classification officer. Despite these claims, since he was not deprived of any liberty interest, no specific process was constitutionally required, even if state law mandated it.

Lastly, Templeman alleges unequal treatment compared to similarly situated inmates. Although he provided examples in his objections, the court upheld the dismissal of his equal protection claim, noting he did not indicate that the defendants' actions were based on suspect classifications. He must demonstrate that the differences in treatment were not reasonably related to legitimate penological interests, which he failed to do.

Prison regulations that affect inmates' constitutional rights are deemed valid if they are reasonably related to legitimate penological interests, as established in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center Inc. Classification decisions by the Department of Corrections (DOC) are discretionary, requiring officials to evaluate various criteria in determining inmate classification. Templeman’s assertion that other inmates are similar in all relevant aspects is deemed "clearly baseless," as even minor differences in inmates' histories or perceived risks of future misconduct can justify differing classifications. His claim of no relevant differences between himself and other inmates is not considered plausible. Consequently, the district court's dismissal of Templeman's complaint is affirmed.