Duke v. Smith

Citations: 13 F.3d 388; 1994 WL 10792Docket: No. 92-4093

Court: Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit; February 2, 1994; Federal Appellate Court

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David Duke initiated a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the Southern District of Florida, contesting Florida Statutes § 103.101, which regulates access to the presidential primary ballot. The district court consolidated the preliminary injunction hearing with a trial but denied relief to the plaintiffs. The appellate court found state action and reversed the lower court's decision.

Florida Statutes § 103.101 outlines the sole method for candidates to access the presidential preference primary ballot. The plaintiffs, including Duke, sought to be included on the 1992 ballot by submitting their names to the Presidential Candidate Selection Committee, which consists of various state officials. After the Florida Democratic and Republican Parties provided their candidate lists to the Secretary of State, the plaintiffs were not included. They then petitioned the Secretary of State for reconsideration, which led to a brief reconvening of the Committee, where no discussion occurred, and their petitions were ultimately rejected.

The plaintiffs alleged that the reconsideration process was unconstitutionally vague, permitting arbitrary government actions that violated their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The district court ruled against the plaintiffs, concluding they did not demonstrate state action. On appeal, the plaintiffs raised several issues regarding the justiciability of their challenge, the applicability of state law, the constitutionality of the reconsideration process, and the alleged violation of Duke's rights based on his political beliefs. The appellate court confirmed jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and determined that the Committee acted under state law, prompting a reversal of the lower court's ruling.

The district court’s order is reviewed de novo regarding the issue of state action, a mixed question of law and fact. To establish a 1983 claim, plaintiffs must demonstrate that the alleged conduct was executed by a person under state law and that it deprived an individual of constitutional rights. The analysis focuses specifically on the reconsideration provisions of statute 103.101(2)(c), which mandates that if a presidential candidate requests reconsideration for ballot placement, the selection committee must reconvene by a specified date. 

In precedent, Duke v. Cleland illustrated a similar situation where a state statute allowed the Secretary of State to create a candidate list, with the candidate remaining on the ballot unless all party committee members agreed to remove them. The court emphasized that party membership is not a state concern but noted that an entity may be deemed to have a governmental character if it is heavily influenced by state actions. The state’s empowerment of officials to exclude candidates from the primary ballot directly implicates state action. The committee's role is critical as it restricts electoral options, a function closely tied to governmental operations. Despite exercising independent judgment, the committee's decisions are fundamentally linked to state authority, rendering its actions state action under the Fourteenth Amendment. The committee's determinations regarding candidate eligibility are largely unreviewable and constitute state action as defined by relevant legal precedents.

The Georgia and Florida statutes, while operationally different, ultimately yield similar outcomes regarding the role of bipartisan state-created Committees in determining ballot access for candidates. The Florida statute, specifically Section 103.101(2)(c), does not allow political parties discretion in candidate reconsideration, as the Committee is empowered to decide who is fit to run and govern. This constitutes state action, as established by precedent, including the ruling in Gray v. Sanders regarding state regulation in election processes. 

In assessing whether the Plaintiffs experienced a deprivation of constitutional rights due to the Committee's application of the reconsideration procedure as per 103.101(2)(e), the analysis follows a two-pronged approach. The first prong has already been satisfied by identifying state action. The second prong examines whether the reconsideration procedure infringed upon rights protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. 

The Supreme Court employs a flexible standard for judicial review in ballot access cases, weighing the severity of the asserted constitutional injury against the state’s justification for the burdens imposed by its election laws. Generally, reasonable requirements for accessing a presidential primary ballot are permissible. However, if a state election scheme severely burdens fundamental rights, it must be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest. Conversely, if the restrictions are deemed reasonable and nondiscriminatory, the state's regulatory interests may justify them. 

The Plaintiffs assert their rights to vote for preferred candidates, Duke's right to not be excluded from reconsideration based on political beliefs (free speech), and the candidates' rights to have their petitions evaluated by clear standards (procedural due process). These rights must be balanced against the state's interests justifying the burdens introduced by the reconsideration procedure.

The state provided insufficient justification for the statute, allowing the district court to conclude that the Presidential Candidate Selection Committee's meeting primarily serves to establish a deadline for political parties to submit their candidates to the Secretary of State. This requirement could be addressed through a simple statute. Weighing the Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights against the procedural convenience for the Secretary of State, the balance favors the Plaintiffs due to severe restrictions on their rights, particularly the Committee's broad discretion to exclude candidates seeking reconsideration. Under strict scrutiny, Florida Statute 103.101(2)(c) was found lacking, as it only vaguely states that the Committee will reconvene to reconsider candidates without clear standards, leading to arbitrary enforcement. Consequently, the statute was deemed unconstitutional. The court reversed the district court's order and remanded the case for further proceedings. The Plaintiffs in this action include multiple individuals, and the statute mandates the formation of a Presidential Candidate Selection Committee, comprised of various legislative leaders and the Secretary of State, to manage candidate submissions for the presidential preference primary ballot. Each political party must submit its candidate list by December 31 preceding the primary election, which the Secretary of State will then publish and forward to the selection committee in January.

Presidential candidates or their delegates will appear on the preference primary ballot unless all committee members of their political party agree to omit their names. The selection committee convenes in Tallahassee on the designated Tuesday each year, publicly announcing the selected candidates by 5 p.m. the following day. The Department of State notifies these candidates in writing via registered mail. Candidates not included can request their name be added by writing to the Secretary of State by the second Tuesday in January. If such a request is made, the committee will reconvene to reconsider by the second Thursday after the first Monday in January, with the Department of State promptly informing the candidate of the outcome.

The document notes that the determination of which candidates to submit is beyond state control due to political parties' First Amendment rights. The Plaintiffs in this case sought injunctive and declaratory relief under federal law, while an emergency motion to intervene was dismissed as untimely. The court reviewed this dismissal under an abuse of discretion standard and found none, affirming the dismissal. It also recognized that the case met the 'capable of repetition yet evading review' exception to mootness. The court determined that the argument about the preservation of the appeal was without merit, as the lawsuit involved the entire statute, and the district court adequately examined the relevant provisions. Notably, the Florida committee differs from Georgia’s in that the latter requires the Secretary of State to independently select names for submission to political parties, whereas in Florida, a bipartisan committee makes the final decisions on candidates.

A state-mandated procedure allows individuals or groups significant discretion in deciding who appears on the primary ballot. The district court's analysis focused on the Secretary of State's non-voting, ministerial role. While there is agreement with the district court's findings, a deeper examination of the entire statute, particularly the reconsideration provisions, is necessary. Defendants Poole, Crenshaw, and Lombard acknowledged that if state action is determined, Section 103.101 is unconstitutional. The Anderson Court's balancing test allows for varying levels of scrutiny based on case specifics. A strict scrutiny analysis is deemed appropriate for the reconsideration process; however, subsection (2)(c) would not survive even the lowest scrutiny standard. Political speech and association are protected under the First Amendment. Evidence indicates that the Committee did not reconsider Duke for the ballot due to his affiliations with white supremacist groups, making further appeal issues unnecessary as his exclusion was based on his speech and associations.