Patterson v. Newspaper & Mail Deliverers' Union of New York & Vicinity
Docket: Nos. 1476, 1480, Dockets 92-7964, 92-6242
Court: Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit; December 19, 1993; Federal Appellate Court
The appeal centers on the standard for modifying a consent decree in a case not involving a government entity. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and a class of minority employees are contesting a July 30, 1992, order from the District Court for the Southern District of New York, which vacated a consent decree approved in 1974 that established an affirmative action program for newspaper deliverers in New York City. This decree included anti-discrimination provisions and designated an Administrator for enforcement. The EEOC and the class, represented by the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund, argue that the District Court incorrectly applied the standard for modification and that the entire decree should remain in effect, particularly the anti-discrimination provisions. However, the District Court's ruling was upheld, as it determined that the decree's essential purpose had been fulfilled, justifying its complete vacatur.
The background reveals that the Newspaper, Mail Deliverers’ Union historically controlled job access through discriminatory union membership rules, previously limiting membership to the first-born sons of members until 1952. Following this, the Union implemented a new membership system that categorized workers into 'regular situations' and 'shapers,' with various levels of hiring priority. Despite reforms, minority workers faced barriers to joining the more favorable Group I and II lists, with systemic issues preventing movement from Group III to regular positions.
In 1973, the EEOC and a group of minority deliverers filed separate lawsuits against a Union and employers under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, arguing that a 1952 system, while seemingly neutral, perpetuated discrimination against minorities. These cases were consolidated and tried before District Judge Pierce. Prior to a ruling, the parties reached a settlement that was approved by Judge Pierce, directing the Union and employers to implement the agreement and allowing the court to retain jurisdiction for enforcement. Judge Pierce's findings highlighted a long-standing pattern of discrimination, revealing that minorities represented 30% of the eligible workforce but only 2% of deliverers, with even lower percentages among regular situation holders and Group I members. Despite objections from White Group III deliverers who felt the agreement favored minorities, the decision was upheld on appeal.
The settlement agreement consists of five sections. The introductory section acknowledges a statistical imbalance in minority representation without admitting legal violations, stating the agreement aims to correct this imbalance and its effects. Section A prohibits discriminatory actions by the Union and employers. Section B establishes an Administrator to handle complaints of disparate treatment, with a term of five years, subject to court direction for continuation. Section C outlines an affirmative action program targeting a minimum of 25% minority employment in the industry by June 1, 1979, clarifying that this goal is an objective rather than a rigid quota.
The agreement mandates the immediate elevation of all minorities in Group III to Group I, with future regular position vacancies filled exclusively from Group I based on seniority. For each regular position filled, one Group III deliverer will move up to Group I, alternating between the most senior minority and nonminority. Group III vacancies must be filled by three minorities for every two nonminorities. Additional provisions include variations for specific employers, special one-time rules, transfer limitations, and a requirement for the Union to offer membership to all Group I individuals. Section D, titled 'general provisions,' obligates employers to assist qualified individuals in the application process, regulate employment applications, require compliance reports, and provide backpay to certain class members, while also maintaining jurisdiction in the District Court. Paragraph 33 of Section D indicates that inconsistent provisions in collective bargaining agreements are suspended but may be reinstated upon termination of the order unless otherwise directed by the Court. By 1979, minority employment was at 13.3%, leading Judge Pierce to extend the Administrator's office for five years. In 1984, this office was indefinitely extended. Defendants sought to terminate the order in 1985, claiming the 25% employment goal was met. Judge Conner, reassigned to the case in 1987, emphasized that the agreement aimed for industry-wide minority representation. In November 1988, he deemed there was enough evidence to suspend specific affirmative action program ratios pending further evaluation. A 1991 report by the Interim Administrator indicated an industry-wide minority employment figure of 28.53%. Following a lack of challenge to this figure by plaintiffs, the District Court planned a hearing on vacating the order, opposed by private plaintiffs but not by the EEOC, which sought to retain certain provisions. In a July 8, 1992 opinion, Judge Conner decided to vacate the entire order, citing a flexible standard for terminating consent decrees once their primary goals are achieved. He dismissed the plaintiffs' argument for continued enforcement until all discrimination facets were addressed, as well as the EEOC's position as overly simplistic. A motion to amend the judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) was denied, but the District Court allowed processing of discrimination claims filed with the Administrator prior to July 8, 1992.
EEOC argues that the District Court incorrectly applied a flexible standard for modifying a consent decree, advocating instead for a more rigorous standard established in United States v. Swift, Co., which requires a clear demonstration of significant change in circumstances before modification. Swift mandates that modifications can only occur if the dangers justifying the decree have significantly diminished and a "grievous wrong" is evident due to new, unforeseen conditions. Although United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp. suggested a more flexible approach, it emphasized that the "grievous wrong" standard should not be disregarded. The flexible standard was notably applied in New York State Association for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Carey, where the court found that institutional reform cases warranted a more adaptive approach.
Recent Supreme Court rulings, specifically in Board of Education of Oklahoma City Public Schools v. Dowell and Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, have indicated that a flexible standard is appropriate in institutional reform cases, emphasizing that significant changes in fact or law justify modifications to decrees. The District Court in the current case refrained from strictly adhering to Swift, opting instead for the flexible standards of Dowell and Rufo. Judge Conner highlighted that while the flexible standard has typically been applied in governmental contexts, it also applies here due to the public's interest in safeguarding fundamental rights. EEOC acknowledges that this case marks a significant adoption of the flexible standard in a non-governmental context, reflecting the Supreme Court’s inclination towards flexibility in institutional reform and acknowledging the complexities of implementing comprehensive decrees.
The language from Swift regarding 'grievous wrong' is not meant to prevent modifications to consent decrees. A post-Rufo decision, Still’s Pharmacy, Inc. v. Cuomo, indicates that Rufo signifies a broad change applicable beyond just institutional reform cases. Different circuits exhibit varying interpretations of the standard for modifying consent judgments. The Seventh Circuit asserts that Rufo effectively nullified Swift's strict standard, emphasizing that the flexible standard is relevant for all equitable cases, not just those involving governmental entities. While three circuits recognize a relaxation of Swift’s standard in institutional reform cases, two have not addressed its application in public issues litigation without government involvement, and one has opted out of applying it to commercial litigation.
The flexible standard articulated in Dowell and Rufo applies to cases aimed at significant public rights, regardless of whether the reform target is a governmental body. Decrees affecting broad practices warrant a flexible approach for modification or termination based on changed circumstances or achievement of the decree's aims. The need for careful modification balances the necessity for agreement enforcement with the promotion of constructive settlements to avoid lengthy litigation. For plaintiffs, the assurance of agreement enforcement encourages settlement, while for defendants, the possibility of modification motivates reasonable settlement terms. Courts of equity should navigate this tension, utilizing their powers to provide relief and, when appropriate, terminate their oversight. Thus, applying a flexible standard for dissolving decrees is deemed appropriate.
The District Court's decision to vacate the entire decree is analyzed, with a focus on the affirmative action provisions. LDF is the sole party arguing for the retention of these provisions, acknowledging that minority representation has reached 25 percent and is likely to increase due to upcoming retirements among White employees. While LDF concedes that the 25 percent goal could have been suspended had it been met by 1979, they assert that the failure to meet this deadline necessitates (a) establishing a new goal based on the current minority representation in the qualified workforce and (b) maintaining hiring quotas until this new goal is achieved. Citing census data, LDF notes that minority workforce representation exceeded 42 percent in 1980 and over 50 percent in 1990. They reference Youngblood v. Dalzell, where the Sixth Circuit mandated a reevaluation of affirmative action goals after a failure to meet a deadline.
The decree aims to address a "statistical imbalance" rather than achieve total parity, with the 25 percent figure based on 1970 census data. The decree is framed as an objective rather than an inflexible quota, allowing for flexibility in time limits but not in the numerical goal itself. The District Court concluded that raising the 25 percent figure was not necessary, and thus it was appropriate to dissolve the promotional quotas. The court determined that the achievement of the 25 percent goal warranted the elimination of affirmative action provisions, leading to the decision to vacate the entire decree. The court maintains that while it was not required to vacate additional provisions, it was entitled to do so, affirming that a court can terminate a decree once its primary objective is met.
