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Florida Manufactured Housing Ass'n v. Cisneros

Citations: 53 F.3d 1565; 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 14917; 1995 WL 316436Docket: 94-2307

Court: Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit; June 12, 1995; Federal Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

Narrative Opinion Summary

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit addressed a challenge by the Florida Manufactured Housing Association and other manufacturers against the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development’s (HUD) revised wind resistance standards for manufactured homes. These standards, revised following Hurricane Andrew, were contested on grounds that HUD did not properly consult its Advisory Council, misinterpreted 'cost' under the Manufactured Housing Act, and that the standards were arbitrary and capricious. The court applied the 'arbitrary and capricious' standard of the Administrative Procedure Act, finding HUD's actions reasonable and compliant with statutory requirements. The petition for review was considered timely based on the publication date of the Final Rule. The court upheld HUD's interpretation of the consultation requirement and its cost-benefit analysis, emphasizing the necessity of balancing safety with affordability. HUD's decision not to reconvene the Advisory Council was deemed reasonable, and its broader inclusion of societal impacts within its cost considerations was validated. Ultimately, the court denied the manufacturers' petition for review, affirming the validity of the revised wind resistance standards and highlighting HUD's authority to protect public safety through appropriate regulatory measures.

Legal Issues Addressed

Administrative Rulemaking under the Administrative Procedure Act

Application: The court applied the 'arbitrary and capricious' standard to HUD's informal rulemaking process, affirming the validity of the wind resistance standards.

Reasoning: This standard is 'highly deferential' and presumes the validity of agency actions. Factors that may indicate an arbitrary and capricious rule include reliance on impermissible factors, failure to consider significant aspects of an issue, providing explanations contrary to the evidence, or presenting implausible decisions.

Consultation Requirement under the Manufactured Housing Act

Application: HUD's single consultation with the Advisory Council was deemed reasonable under the circumstances, fulfilling statutory requirements.

Reasoning: The court found that the statutory requirement for HUD to consult with the Advisory Council was met, and it was reasonable for HUD not to reconvene the Council prior to the publication of the Final Rule.

Cost-Benefit Analysis in Regulatory Decisions

Application: HUD's cost-benefit analysis was upheld as reasonable despite manufacturers' challenges, affirming the new wind standards.

Reasoning: The Regulatory Impact Analysis (RIA) indicates that new standards for manufactured housing are projected to reduce property damage by 75% in Wind Zone II and 83% in Wind Zone III during severe wind events.

Deference to Agency Interpretation

Application: The court did not grant deference to HUD's redefined 'issued' date due to inconsistency within the same rulemaking process.

Reasoning: In this case, despite HUD's interpretation of 'issued' potentially warranting deference, a change in its position during the same rulemaking process—perceived as an attempt to trigger a jurisdictional challenge—leads to a conclusion that no deference should be granted.

Interpretation of 'Cost' under the Manufactured Housing Act

Application: HUD's consideration of broader societal impacts alongside consumer price increases in its cost analysis was upheld.

Reasoning: The claim lacks statutory support, as the Act only requires HUD to 'consider' costs without specifying how to weigh them against other factors.

Judicial Review Timing under Administrative Procedure Act

Application: The petition for review was deemed timely based on the publication date of the Final Rule, rather than the internal issuance date.

Reasoning: The court asserts that the sixty-day filing period for review should commence only once the public is notified of a rule's content, emphasizing the need for fair notice to affected parties.