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Knopp v. Magaw
Citations: 9 F.3d 1478; 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 29953; 63 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 42,689; 63 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 353; 1993 WL 475499Docket: No. 92-6152
Court: Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit; November 18, 1993; Federal Appellate Court
The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF) appeals a district court's preliminary injunction that prevents the transfer of Mr. Knopp, an ATF supervisor, while his employment discrimination claim is unresolved. ATF contends the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction and that Mr. Knopp failed to demonstrate irreparable harm or a likelihood of success. The appellate court, exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1292(a)(1), reverses the district court's decision due to lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Mr. Knopp, transferred from Oklahoma City to Louisville, filed a complaint with the EEOC in December 1991 after an agent's complaint led to his transfer. He sought a preliminary injunction on January 15, 1992, prior to the 180-day waiting period for judicial action following his EEOC filing. The court found that Mr. Knopp's lawsuit did not meet the jurisdictional requirement as established in 42 U.S.C. 2000e-16(c), which mandates that federal employees can only file a civil action after 180 days have passed since filing with the EEOC. The appellate court cited precedent that emphasizes the exclusive judicial remedy provided by §2000e-16 for federal employment discrimination claims and upheld that administrative exhaustion is a jurisdictional prerequisite. Consequently, because Mr. Knopp's district court filing occurred before the 180-day period elapsed, the court lacked jurisdiction, and the appeal resulted in the reversal of the preliminary injunction. The court also noted that Mr. Knopp's claims were effectively identical, and judicial involvement at this stage would disrupt the intended congressional balance between administrative and judicial processes. Jurisdiction is not addressed or decided in several referenced cases, including Middleton-Keirn v. Stone and McNail v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters. Additionally, cases like Bailey v. Delta Airlines and Manning v. Trustees of Tufts College do not resolve jurisdiction issues. The other cited cases involve employer retaliation against employees for filing EEOC complaints, where district courts had jurisdiction to provide injunctive relief to prevent subversion of administrative processes. In contrast, Mr. Knopp's situation does not involve retaliation since he filed his EEOC complaint after the ATF denied his request to stay his transfer, thereby eliminating any risk of retaliatory transfer that could impede his complaint or judicial review. The district court can review Knopp's discrimination charge on its merits after 180 days without an EEOC determination or upon completion of the agency's review, as per 42 U.S.C. 2000e-16. The court referenced Drew v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. to justify exercising jurisdiction in limited cases to prevent irreparable injury and establish likelihood of success on the merits. However, this does not apply here as subject matter jurisdiction must precede equitable powers. The district court conflated the jurisdiction and preliminary injunction issues. The Drew decision found jurisdiction by comparing equity actions under the 1964 Act with similar actions under the 1972 amendments, concluding that the amendments did not eliminate the complainant’s rights since they were not an exclusive administrative remedy. The district court did not adopt Drew’s jurisdiction holding, and unlike Ms. Drew, Mr. Knopp is a federal employee filing under 42 U.S.C. 2000e-16, with the exhaustion issue already settled in favor of federal employees. Consequently, the decision is reversed and remanded to the district court.