Local 30, United Slate, Tile & Composition Roofers, Damp & Waterproof Workers Ass'n v. National Labor Relations Board
Docket: Nos. 92-3416, 92-3498
Court: Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit; August 11, 1993; Federal Appellate Court
Local 30, a union, petitions for judicial review of a National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) decision from July 20, 1992, which found that Local 30 violated the National Labor Relations Act by (1) picketing to coerce Gundle Lining Construction Corporation into reassigning work from another union and (2) pursuing a section 301 lawsuit against Gundle after the NLRB assigned the disputed work to Local 172, another union. The appeals are consolidated under two docket numbers. Separately, Gundle is appealing a federal district court's confirmation of an arbitration award in favor of Local 30.
Gundle, which specializes in landfill lining, had an agreement with Local 30 to perform cell lining work at the Ocean County Landfill, which included hiring from Local 30’s hall. Local 30 performed this work until late 1989, when Gundle opted to assign a new cell lining job at the same landfill to Local 172, following dissatisfaction expressed by the landfill developer regarding Local 30's performance. On November 6, 1989, Gundle and Local 172 entered into a project agreement, and Local 172 began work. Concurrently, Local 30's president learned of Gundle's actions and assumed they were using unrepresented employees for the work, prompting Local 30 to picket the site on November 8, 1989, claiming wage violations. The picketing ended later that day upon discovering that Local 172, not unrepresented employees, was performing the work, leading to the conclusion that it was not a valid picket.
Local 172 workers resumed their project one week after Local 30's picketing, completing it without further interruptions. Tony Priesol, Gundle’s Vice-President of Construction, contacted Pedrick regarding the picketing, to which Pedrick questioned Gundle's use of Local 172 employees for work typically assigned to Local 30. On November 13, 1989, Gundle filed an unfair labor practice charge against Local 30, claiming the picketing aimed to unjustly reassign work, violating section 8(b)(4)(ii)(D) of the NLRA. Following a section 10(k) hearing, the Board ruled on June 28, 1990, that both Local 30 and Local 172 had valid claims to the work, ultimately awarding it to Local 172 after considering employer preference, past practices, and operational efficiency, in line with Supreme Court directives from NLRB v. Radio, Television Broadcast Engineers Union.
On November 14, 1989, Local 30 alleged Gundle violated the RSMCA collective bargaining agreement, to which Gundle responded that their contract had expired on January 27, 1989. Subsequently, Local 30 filed a grievance on December 5, 1989, for Gundle's alleged breach regarding hiring and wage payments. The RSMCA's Joint Conference Board (JCB) scheduled a hearing for January 3, 1990, but Gundle refused to participate, claiming the JCB lacked jurisdiction due to the expired contract. The JCB ultimately upheld Local 30's grievance, ordering Gundle to compensate affected individuals.
On March 26, 1990, Local 30 filed a federal lawsuit under section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA) to enforce the arbitration award. The Board's section 10(k) ruling favored Local 172 on June 28, 1990. On December 14, 1990, the Board charged Local 30 with unfair labor practices for picketing and continuing the lawsuit post-ruling. An Administrative Law Judge later dismissed the complaint. Meanwhile, on June 30, 1992, the district court granted summary judgment for Local 30 in the section 301 case, ruling that Gundle's failure to vacate the arbitration award within the thirty-day limit precluded it from asserting defenses against Local 30's confirmation motion.
On July 20, 1992, the Board overturned the Administrative Law Judge's (ALJ) dismissal of an unfair labor practice complaint against Local 30, concluding that Local 30 had engaged in unfair labor practices through picketing and pursuing a section 301 lawsuit. The Board ordered Local 30 to withdraw its lawsuit and reimburse Gundle for any payments related to the disputed work. Local 30 contested this decision, prompting a review and cross-application for enforcement from the Board, with jurisdiction established under 29 U.S.C. 160(f). The review is limited to assessing whether the Board's factual findings are supported by substantial evidence and whether its interpretations of the law are reasonable.
The central issue involves the Board's authority to enforce its section 10(k) determination, which awarded work at the Ocean County Landfill to Local 172 instead of Local 30. This determination followed Gundle's unfair labor practice charge related to Local 30's picketing. The Board argued that its section 10(k) ruling superseded a previous arbitration award favoring Local 30. Local 30's ongoing section 301 lawsuit was seen as undermining the finality intended by the section 10(k) determination regarding work assignments.
Additionally, Local 30 acknowledged that picketing to coerce an employer into assigning work to its members over another union violates section 8(b)(4)(ii)(D). However, Local 30 contended that it was unaware that the work was being performed by members of another union, citing a lack of “advance notice.”
The Board determined that Local 30's picketing constituted an unfair labor practice, despite the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) finding it lawful due to Local 30's claim not to seek work from Local 172, but rather to address a contract violation. The Board disagreed, citing that Local 30's picketing aimed to coerce the Employer into reallocating disputed work to Local 30's employees. Local 30 contended that its intent was to highlight Gundle's failure to pay competitive wages, a lawful aim. However, the law states that the presence of any unlawful objective renders the picketing illegal, even if other lawful goals exist. The Board's conclusion rested on substantial evidence indicating Local 30's intent to reclaim work, including prior protests regarding work assignments and statements made by Local 30 representatives. While the factual determination of a union's intent in picketing is complex and subject to interpretation, courts defer to the Board's inferences unless unreasonable. The evidence presented neither explicitly connected the picketing to the work assignment dispute nor undermined the Board's inferences.
The Board's conclusions diverged from those of the ALJ, demonstrating its authority to draw different inferences from the evidence presented. The Board's inferences were found to be reasonable and consistent with its precedents, as illustrated in prior cases such as Painters, Drywall Finishers, Local No. 79, where the Board identified reasonable cause for an unfair labor practice despite the union's claims regarding the nature of picketing. The Act aims to protect against economic disruptions caused by jurisdictional disputes, and allowing a union to circumvent Section 10(k) by not inquiring about representation would undermine this purpose.
The Board maintained that the ALJ erred in relying on Teamsters Local 107, as the Supreme Court clarified that the Safeway rule applies only when there are no conflicting claims to the work. The Board distinguished the case at hand from Safeway, emphasizing that Local 30 lacked a stable employee representation and was focused on obtaining work for its hiring hall applicants. The ALJ's view that the employer's assignment decision created the dispute was rejected, as the Board asserted that applying Section 10(k) standards was necessary to prevent employers from bypassing collective-bargaining agreements by arbitrarily reallocating work to another union. The Board's finding that the picketing had an unlawful objective was supported by substantial evidence and reflected appropriate deference to the Board's expertise.
The Board determined that the ALJ incorrectly assessed the implications of invoking section 10(k) jurisdiction related to conflicting collective bargaining agreements. Specifically, if neither union engages in picketing or coercion, section 10(k) does not apply. However, Local 30's picketing to secure work assigned to another union activated section 10(k) jurisdiction. The Board rejected Local 30's claim of legal error regarding its picketing being an unfair labor practice under section 8(b)(4)(ii)(D).
Additionally, the Board concluded that Local 30 violated section 8(b)(4)(ii)(D) by continuing its section 301 lawsuit in federal court to confirm an arbitration award after the Board awarded the work to Local 172. The Board found that maintaining this suit post-June 28, 1990, undermined the Board's determination and coerced the employer to reassign work to Local 30's members. The interpretation aligns with precedent that lawsuits with illegal objectives under federal law can be enjoined as unfair labor practices. Subsequent cases affirmed that pursuing a section 301 breach of contract suit that conflicts with a section 10(k) determination is also an unfair labor practice. The NLRB's decisions take precedence over contrary arbitrator awards, as established in several cases.
The suit to enforce the arbitration award was deemed an attempt to bypass the Board's primary jurisdiction over representational issues. Regardless of the union's intentions, the pursuit of the suit post-Board's ruling was considered illegal. The critical issue was whether the arbitration award for Local 30 conflicted with the Board's assignment of work to Local 172. The Board highlighted that Local 30 had filed a grievance after facing an unfair labor practice charge and noted a distinction made by Local 30 that its claim for monetary damages did not seek the actual work involved in the unfair labor practice. However, this distinction was viewed as insubstantial; a jurisdictional dispute arises from two groups claiming compensation for the same work, regardless of whether they seek the work itself. The right to payment for a job is seen as integral to the work itself. The precedent set in NLRB v. Local 1291 clarified that if two groups claim pay for the same work, a jurisdictional dispute exists. Furthermore, the Supreme Court's ruling in Carey v. Westinghouse Electric Corp. reinforced that a Board ruling on representation issues protects employers from liability for damages if their actions align with the Board's decisions. The Board's position, supported by other appellate courts, emphasized that seeking payment in lieu of work is materially equivalent to seeking the work itself, as demonstrated by a case where a union's grievance for time-in-lieu payments was upheld as an unfair labor practice after work was assigned to another union.
The court upheld the National Labor Relations Board's (NLRB) determination that a union's section 301 lawsuit to enforce an arbitrator's award for pay-in-lieu of work, which had been awarded to another union through a section 10(k) decision, constituted an unfair labor practice. When an employer complies with a final NLRB 10(k) ruling, it is not liable for damages to the union that has been denied the work. The court acknowledged that a previous case, Hutter Construction Co., might support the disappointed union's position, but it rejected the distinction made between non-contractual basis awards and contractual claims for damages. Section 10(k) proceedings aim to resolve disputes over competing claims for work to prevent work disruptions. The court emphasized that if unions could seek damages in such cases, the effectiveness of section 10(k) would be undermined, frustrating its purpose. Therefore, the court concluded that the Board's interpretation of the Act was legally sound. The Board's order was enforced, and Local 30's petition for review was denied. Additionally, testimony discrepancies between Sullivan and Pedrick regarding union representation were resolved in favor of Pedrick by the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), whose credibility findings the Board accepted. Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(D) was cited, indicating that it is an unfair labor practice for labor organizations to engage in certain actions.
Engagement in strikes or refusals to work by individuals employed in commerce or industries affecting commerce is addressed, prohibiting any actions that induce such behaviors unless related to a Board’s order regarding bargaining representatives. Section 10(k) empowers the Board to resolve disputes related to unfair labor practices under section 8(b)(4)(ii)(D) unless the parties reach a resolution within ten days. The Board sought to enjoin a section 301 suit under its authority to obtain injunctive relief, but the district court denied this request, affirming that the injunction would not be just or proper. An unfair labor practice charge is dismissed if the section 10(k) ruling awards the disputed work to the union charged or if the union complies with an adverse ruling. Local 30’s argument that sections 10(k) and 8(b)(4)(ii)(D) apply solely to disputes between rival unions, excluding unrepresented employees, is contested. The Supreme Court has indicated that these sections do encompass jurisdictional disputes involving unrepresented groups, as supported by multiple appellate court decisions.
A jurisdictional dispute arises when a union asserts rights over work being performed by workers potentially represented by another union. The court rejected the notion that section 8(b)(4)(ii)(D) applies solely to disputes between rival unions, noting that Local 30 did not provide case law to support its claim that section 10(k) is restricted to disputes involving unionized workers. Local 30 contested the Board's decision to disregard an Administrative Law Judge's (ALJ) credibility finding regarding Local 30's awareness of rival union involvement at the Ocean County Landfill during picketing; however, the Board upheld the ALJ's determinations. The court cited that a section 10(k) proceeding operates independently from merit proceedings, and prior expressions of doubt regarding Local 30's picketing as an unfair labor practice are not binding. The simple act of filing a grievance before a section 10(k) ruling does not constitute an unfair labor practice. Local 30's claim that its section 301 suit to enforce an arbitration award is not an unfair labor practice hinges on the premise that such a suit must lack a reasonable basis in fact or law and be improperly motivated to warrant injunction. The court indicated that the "illegal objective" test is a standalone criterion for enjoining a lawsuit as an unfair labor practice. The cases cited by Local 30 did not address whether a section 301 action that undermines a Board section 10(k) decision constitutes an unfair labor practice. The court clarified that its previous statements regarding Local 30's motivation in filing the lawsuit are not definitive, emphasizing that improper motivation is not the sole basis for enjoining such actions.
