Narrative Opinion Summary
This case involves the review of a Benefits Review Board decision under the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act (LHWCA) concerning claims by the widow and daughter of John Cretan, who was exposed to asbestos while employed by Bethlehem Steel and subsequently died of mesothelioma. Prior to his death, Cretan had filed a compensation claim contested by his employer. Following his demise, his family sought disability and death benefits, which were also disputed by Bethlehem. They had settled third-party claims without obtaining the employer’s consent, triggering sections 33(f) and (g) of the LHWCA. An administrative law judge granted benefits but allowed Bethlehem to offset the settlements. The Board affirmed this decision but allowed further offsets based on total net recovery from tort claims. The court found that Renate and Nicole were indeed subject to sections 33(f) and (g), precluding further recovery under the Act due to their settlements. The ruling emphasized that section 33(g) required employer consent for settlements below statutory entitlement, and section 33(f) allowed Bethlehem to offset its liability. The Supreme Court’s interpretation in Cowart did not alter these provisions’ applicability. The court affirmed Bethlehem's offset rights, reversed the Board's finding on the Cretans' entitlement status, and remanded the matter. Costs were awarded to Bethlehem.
Legal Issues Addressed
Application of Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act (LHWCA) Sections 33(f) and 33(g)subscribe to see similar legal issues
Application: The court determined that Renate and Nicole were subject to sections 33(f) and (g) of the LHWCA, impacting their ability to recover under the Act due to their third-party settlements.
Reasoning: Upon reviewing the Board's decision for legal errors and evidence adherence, the court determined that Renate and Nicole were subject to sections 33(f) and (g) of the LHWCA, thus precluding their recovery under the Act.
Consent Requirement under Section 33(g) of the LHWCAsubscribe to see similar legal issues
Application: The court held that settlements without prior employer consent under section 33(g) preclude recovery if below statutory entitlement.
Reasoning: Section 33(g) requires that if a person entitled to compensation settles with a third party for less than the compensation amount, the settlement must receive prior written approval from the employer and its insurer; otherwise, the employer may not be liable for compensation.
Definition of 'Person Entitled to Compensation' under the LHWCAsubscribe to see similar legal issues
Application: The court interpreted the term to include claimants without a formal compensation order or payment, aligning with the Supreme Court's interpretation.
Reasoning: Consequently, a claimant can be barred from recovering Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA) benefits even without an order or payment.
Judicial Interpretation of Supreme Court Precedentssubscribe to see similar legal issues
Application: The court rejected the argument that the Supreme Court’s decision in Cowart implicitly overrules prior interpretations relevant to the Cretans' case.
Reasoning: The Cretans assert that the Supreme Court's decision in Estate of Cowart implicitly overrules Force, but the court disagrees, noting that Cowart involved different circumstances under section 33(g) and did not alter the interpretation of entitlement established in Force.
Offset of Third-Party Recovery under Section 33(f) of the LHWCAsubscribe to see similar legal issues
Application: Bethlehem is allowed to offset the Cretans' third-party recovery against its liability, preventing double recovery.
Reasoning: Section 33(f) stipulates that if a person entitled to compensation initiates proceedings, the employer must pay compensation equivalent to the difference between the Secretary's determined amount for the injury or death and any recovery from third parties.