Court: Court of Appeals of Washington; May 18, 1998; Washington; State Appellate Court
A landlord must provide written notice at least 60 days before a new lease term under federal subsidized housing regulations. In the case of Kevin Price, the court determined the federal regulation did not apply because Price did not demonstrate that a rent increase from $127 to $139 constituted a new lease. Price was required to pay the increased rent, and his failure to do so led to an unlawful detainer action initiated by Housing Resource Group (HRG). The trial court found that Price was aware of his overdue rent yet willfully failed to pay the full amount, resulting in a judgment against him for unpaid rent, attorney fees, and costs, alongside restoring possession of the premises to HRG.
On appeal, Price argued that HRG did not comply with federal regulations, asserting the new lease was invalid due to the lack of a 60-day written notice. However, the court clarified that Price needed to demonstrate HRG made an offer of a new lease, which he failed to do. The regulation cited by Price pertains to a landlord offering a new lease, and without evidence of such an offer, the court found no basis for Price's claim. Additionally, the precedent set in District of Columbia v. Suydam supports the conclusion that a mere change in rent without altering the lease's terms does not constitute a new lease, affirming that SHA's increase in Price’s rent did not invalidate the existing lease.
The lease between the parties continued under the same rights and obligations, with the exception of a rent increase. Price did not present any evidence to counter that a new lease was offered by HRG; thus, the rent change alone was insufficient to establish a new lease under section 982.309(e)(2), meaning that regulation did not apply. Under Washington law, the lease terms were unambiguous and indicated that the Seattle Housing Authority (SHA) could adjust Price's rent. The lease specified that SHA would determine Tenant Rent in accordance with HUD regulations, with changes communicated through written notice. SHA followed the lease procedure correctly by notifying Price of the new rent amount, which he received on October 2.
The lease was deemed to create a month-to-month tenancy under the Residential Landlord-Tenant Act of 1973, as it was indefinite and required rent to be paid in advance monthly. Rent increases could occur with at least 30 days' written notice, which SHA provided when it delivered the revised lease to Price. Consequently, the increased rent was effective by December 1, 1995.
Regarding proper notice for rent payment, the unlawful detainer statute allows a summary proceeding for possession and requires compliance with procedural methods. A three-day notice to pay or vacate is valid for a tenant's rent default. Price's argument against jurisdiction due to a lack of a ten-day notice was rejected, as his non-payment after the rent increase made the three-day notice appropriate under the statute.
The court exercised proper subject matter jurisdiction in terminating the tenancy due to the tenant's failure to pay rent or vacate within three days of receiving notice. In Washington, a landlord waives the right to evict for a prior breach if they accept rent with knowledge of that breach; however, if rent is accepted after a three-day notice and applied to the earliest rent owed, the right to evict is not waived. The court found that HRG applied the tenant’s payments to the earliest rent first, and the tenant's arrearage continued to grow due to underpayment, leaving an outstanding balance prior to the final notice. Therefore, HRG did not waive its right to evict.
The lease permitted the housing authority to change the rent with proper notice, which the tenant received, making the new rent effective. The tenant's failure to pay the full amount after this notice justified the unlawful detainer action. The trial court's decision was affirmed, with unchallenged findings of fact considered valid on appeal. The court noted insufficient briefing on federal regulations and emphasized the necessity of interpreting lease terms according to their plain meaning. The lease's term begins from September 1, 1995, and can be terminated under specified conditions. No appeals were made regarding the trial court's calculation of arrears.
