State ex rel. A.N.C. v. Grenley

Citations: 91 Wash. App. 919; 959 P.2d 1130Docket: No. 21163-7-II

Court: Court of Appeals of Washington; June 19, 1998; Washington; State Appellate Court

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Grenley appeals the trial court's award of attorney fees to the State under the former Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act (URESA), now repealed. The court affirms the award, except for the fees related to the State's 1995 interlocutory review, which are reversed. 

The State of Texas initiated paternity and child support proceedings in January 1991 for A.N.C., a minor. The presumed father, Grenley, lived in Washington, where the action was transferred. The minor's mother assigned collection authority to the State of Washington, which filed an action in Pierce County, establishing Grenley as the biological father. Grenley sought visitation rights, but the State objected, claiming lack of jurisdiction. The trial court asserted jurisdiction, leading to the State's discretionary review. On August 1, 1995, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision and denied the State its attorney fees.

After this ruling, Grenley filed a motion to set child support, but the superior court commissioner denied it pending the appellate court's mandate and also denied the State's requested attorney fees. Between the case's initiation and conclusion in 1996, Washington repealed URESA and enacted the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA), which permits attorney fee awards against obligors, unlike the previous act which only referenced general costs.

The trial court ultimately awarded Grenley child support and ordered him to pay attorney fees to the State under former RCW 26.21.102, including fees for the interlocutory appeal. Grenley contends that the trial court erred by awarding fees for actions prior to the repeal, for the interlocutory review (previously denied), and under the UIFSA, which he argues unconstitutionally permits fee awards without considering the obligor's financial capacity.

The analysis highlights that Washington follows the 'American rule' regarding attorney fees, permitting awards only when specifically authorized by law. Grenley argues that URESA did not allow for such awards, and there are no Washington cases clarifying the trial court's discretion under former RCW 26.21.102 regarding attorney fees.

Black's Law Dictionary indicates ambiguity regarding whether 'costs' typically include attorney fees, stating that they do not unless specified by statute. The analysis presented supports Grenley's position that the relevant statute allows for 'fees and costs incurred' without specifically mentioning attorney fees, suggesting a focus on court-related fees. In contrast, other provisions in Chapter 26 RCW explicitly mention attorney fees, implying legislative intent to include them when desired. Former RCW 26.21.020 and similar statutes do not limit remedies, and attorney fees have been awarded in related cases, indicating a potential for their inclusion under the current statute. Ultimately, the court upheld the trial court’s decision to award attorney fees to the State based on former RCW 26.21.102. The award was also affirmed under RCW 26.21.325, which replaced the former statute, countering Grenley’s argument against retroactive application. Legal precedent dictates that the statute governing attorney fees is that in effect at the case’s conclusion, not at its start, and it operates prospectively unless it is remedial in nature. The determination of attorney fees follows the statute active at the termination of the action, confirming the court’s ruling.

The case cites City of Bellingham v. Eiford Constr. Co. to establish that the right to costs and attorney fees is determined by the statute in effect at the conclusion of an action, unless a statute indicates otherwise. RCW 26.21.325 is interpreted as remedial, expanding the fees the State or an obligee can recover from an obligor without creating new substantive rights. The trial court's award of attorney fees under this statute is affirmed. 

The court addresses the issue of attorney fees for an appeal, noting that while a statute may allow fees for trial and appeal, a trial court cannot reconsider and award fees that a higher court has previously denied. The State's reliance on Schumacher Painting is clarified; it does not support the notion that a trial court can override a higher court's denial of fees. 

Regarding the Superior Court Commissioner, the trial court's later award of fees was appropriate because the commissioner did not prematurely rule on the merits of the motion, thus allowing the trial court to properly award fees for defending the motion.

CR 8(a) mandates that pleadings must include a demand for judgment for the relief sought, while CR 9(g) specifies that special damages must be explicitly stated. However, under CR 54(c), a final judgment may grant relief to a party even if it was not specifically requested in the pleadings, except in cases of default judgments. This allows the State to recover attorney fees if entitled by statute or recognized grounds, regardless of whether these fees were explicitly requested. Former RCW 26.21 does not require attorney fees to be specifically pleaded, and under RCW 4.84, attorney fees are classified as "costs" that may be awarded as provided by law or equity.

Despite Grenley's argument that the State should have specifically requested fees under civil rules, the relevant cases he cites involve default judgments, which are treated differently from judgments after a trial, where full arguments were made. The trial court's decision on attorney fees was based on a trial where both parties discussed the issue, thus providing adequate notice.

Grenley further contends that the trial court should consider the State's need and his ability to pay when awarding attorney fees, and he argues that the lack of such consideration violates his equal protection rights. He compares this situation to RCW 26.09, which requires courts to consider these factors in dissolution cases. However, his constitutional claim lacks merit, as the Gunwall analysis he applies is inappropriate for comparing these statutes. Equal protection is only violated when similarly situated individuals are treated differently, which is not the case here.

RCW 26.21.325 distinguishes between unmarried parents with children living out of state and married parents with children living in Washington, which does not violate the Equal Protection Clause. The law applies equally to all unmarried parents in Washington, satisfying the first requirement of the 'rational relationship' test, which is used to assess legislative classifications. The second requirement is met as there are reasonable grounds for the distinction, primarily due to the different legal procedures required for enforcing child support across state lines. The state’s involvement in such cases necessitates taxpayer funding, justifying the classification. The trial court’s award of attorney fees to the State is affirmed, excluding those related to a 1995 interlocutory review, and the State's request for fees on this appeal is denied. Grenley's claims regarding the State's request for fees and its status as an 'obligee' were not properly argued or assigned error in lower court, thus are not considered on appeal. The appellate court holds that the trial court had authority to award fees despite the lack of a formal request from the State. Additionally, Grenley's assertion regarding the evidence of time spent on the appeal was not adequately supported and therefore will not be addressed.