Barkley E. SAMPLE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ALDI INC., Defendant-Appellee

Citations: 61 F.3d 544; 1995 WL 446993Docket: 94-2954

Court: Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; August 18, 1995; Federal Appellate Court

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Barkley E. Sample, an African American, was hired by Aldi Inc. as a district supervisor trainee in April 1990 and promoted to district supervisor in October 1990. His responsibilities included managing several Aldi stores in Chicago. Above the district supervisor level, Aldi has director positions and general managers, with the latter having exclusive authority over the hiring and termination of district supervisors. 

During Sample's tenure, he was not recommended for promotion despite being longer in position than two white colleagues who were promoted in late 1991. Sample was terminated on March 17, 1992, by the division's general manager, Scott Kornegay. Subsequently, Sample filed a charge of racial discrimination with the EEOC within the required timeframe, but the EEOC did not pursue action, issuing a right-to-sue letter.

Sample then initiated a lawsuit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 42 U.S.C. § 1981, claiming racial discrimination in promotion and termination. His suit also sought to represent a class of African American employees alleging similar discrimination by Aldi. However, the district court dismissed his class allegations for failing to meet the numerosity requirement and granted summary judgment to Aldi on Sample's individual claims.

The district court's grant of summary judgment is reviewed de novo, using the same standards applied by the court, with the record viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Summary judgment is appropriate when the record shows no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, particularly rigorously applied in employment discrimination cases where intent and credibility are key. If the non-moving party must prove an issue, they cannot rely solely on pleadings but must demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact. A judgment will be affirmed if, at trial, the defendant would have been entitled to a directed verdict, which occurs when only one reasonable conclusion can be drawn under the law.

Title VII prohibits employers from discriminating against individuals based on race or color concerning hiring, discharge, or employment conditions. Similarly, Section 1981 guarantees all persons in the U.S. the same rights to make and enforce contracts as white citizens, encompassing all aspects of contractual relationships. A claimant can succeed on Title VII and Section 1981 claims by providing direct proof of discriminatory intent or by using the indirect, burden-shifting method established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, which Sample has opted for instead of presenting direct evidence.

Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, a plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination by demonstrating, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the employer unlawfully discriminated against them. This creates a presumption of discrimination, shifting the burden to the employer to provide evidence of a nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse action. If the employer successfully meets this burden, the presumption is removed, and the plaintiff must prove that the employer's stated reasons were mere pretexts for discrimination. The ultimate burden of persuasion remains with the plaintiff throughout the process.

To establish a prima facie case for failure to promote, the plaintiff must show: (1) membership in a protected group, (2) qualification and application for the position, (3) rejection for the position, and (4) that the promotion was granted to a less qualified person of a different race. In cases of termination, the plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) membership in a protected group, (2) satisfactory job performance, (3) discharge despite that performance, and (4) that the employer sought a replacement.

The district court determined that the plaintiff, Sample, did not establish a prima facie case for the failures to promote or for his termination, concluding he was not qualified for the promotions and had not met the employer's legitimate performance expectations. Additionally, the court found that Sample did not create a factual issue regarding the pretextual nature of Aldi's nondiscriminatory reasons. Aldi maintains that the district court's judgment should be upheld based on these findings, and the question of whether Sample established a prima facie case is deemed irrelevant since Aldi met its production burden under McDonnell Douglas.

Aldi provided legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for not promoting Sample and for his termination. There are no specific guidelines regarding a general manager's authority in these matters. Kornegay's affidavit outlines essential qualifications for a district supervisor's promotion, emphasizing that merely fulfilling daily responsibilities is insufficient. 

The first incident involved Sample during his training in August 1990, where he misled his supervisor about a locked safe, later admitting to lying. Kornegay reprimanded Sample, stressing the need for integrity and extending his training by four weeks due to this incident. 

The second incident also occurred during training when Kornegay found Sample had left a cooler door open for an extended period, contrary to company policy. After being promoted to district supervisor, Sample exhibited a lack of professionalism, including tardiness and failure to adhere to dress standards, leading to multiple counseling sessions by Hofstetter.

To oppose summary judgment, Sample needed to demonstrate that Aldi's reasons were pretextual, meaning he had to question the honesty of Aldi's beliefs about the incidents. Sample did not successfully challenge the significance of the first incident, as he admitted its occurrence and the dishonesty involved, and failed to undermine Kornegay's assessment of its impact on his promotion eligibility. Therefore, at least one unchallenged reason justified Aldi's actions, making summary judgment appropriate.

Sample claims that the cooler incident was a pretext for racial discrimination by Aldi, arguing he was not disciplined or terminated despite a prior warning from Kornegay regarding his integrity. He notes that neither the cooler nor the safe incident was documented in his personnel file, but he does not dispute their occurrence or establish that they undermined Kornegay’s confidence in him. Regarding his professionalism, Sample admits to being late to work and meetings, acknowledging Hofstetter raised this issue before his promotion. His claims about other supervisors being late without consequences lack substantiation, as he has not identified or deposed those individuals.

Sample asserts he wore a suit coat daily except once, yet admits he often left it in his car or store office and did not wear it while working. Although he claims to maintain a clean-shaven appearance, he acknowledges shaving only every two to three days, contradicting Kornegay's requirement for cleanliness. Sample's mention of store managers having "five o'clock shadow" does not counter Kornegay’s belief regarding his grooming deficiencies, as these managers were under Sample's supervision.

Aldi also cites an incident on October 2, 1991, where Sample reacted aggressively during a meeting following the Umscheid promotion announcement. Kornegay found Sample's behavior insubordinate and unacceptable for a district supervisor, which contributed to Kornegay’s decision not to recommend Sample for the Karrick promotion, alongside the earlier incidents and Sample's overall lack of professionalism.

Sample admits that the meeting with Kornegay was "heated" and acknowledges challenging him, despite denying a belligerent attitude. He has not demonstrated that Kornegay's belief that this behavior made him unfit for the Karrick promotion was dishonest; he was fortunate to retain his position as district supervisor post-meeting. Subsequent incidents leading to Sample's termination occurred after the Karrick promotion. During a March 10, 1992, meeting, Kornegay noted Sample's defiant posture and lack of note-taking, while Sample claimed he took brief notes and distributed handouts. District supervisors were expected to relay meeting information to store managers, but Sample failed to do so until prompted by Hofstetter, despite having conveyed that no new information was discussed. 

Following a robbery at one of Sample's stores, Kornegay observed a hole in the roof that Sample had not previously discovered, raising concerns about Sample's attentiveness. On March 13, a customer complained about a delayed store opening; Sample was conducting a cash audit and did not open on time. Kornegay terminated Sample on March 17, believing he exercised poor judgment by keeping the store closed and could have opened it while resolving cash discrepancies. Sample has not provided evidence to dispute Kornegay's reasons for his termination, which included his demeanor during the meeting, failure to communicate meeting information, neglect in discovering the robbery-related damage, and poor decision-making regarding the store opening.

Sample's reliance on statistical evidence to claim that Aldi disproportionately terminated African-American district supervisors and trainees does not support his individual claims, as he failed to establish a connection between the alleged discrimination and the employment decisions he is contesting. The court emphasizes that evidence of other discrimination instances does not suffice to demonstrate harm to the plaintiff, referencing *Chambers v. American Trans Air, Inc.*. The court also clarifies that it does not act as a personnel department to reassess business decisions, citing *McCoy v. WGN Continental Broadcasting Co.* and *Pollard v. Rea Magnet Wire Co., Inc.*, which assert that Title VII and Section 1981 do not intervene in managerial decisions, regardless of their perceived fairness. Sample has not presented sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find Aldi's reasons for his termination to be pretextual, and the decision to terminate him based on his performance and incidents was upheld.

Additionally, Sample's challenge to the dismissal of his class allegations is rejected because, given the summary judgment granted on his individual claims, he lacks the standing to represent a class. To do so, a plaintiff must be part of the class and share a common interest and injury, which Sample does not. The court concludes that Sample, characterized as a marginal employee, cannot invoke protections under Title VII and Section 1981 for his performance-related consequences. Consequently, the district court's judgment is affirmed. Furthermore, an argument raised for the first time during oral arguments regarding discovery requests has been waived, as established in prior case law.