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Helen McCray v. Corry Manufacturing Company

Citation: 61 F.3d 224Docket: 95-3004

Court: Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit; September 7, 1995; Federal Appellate Court

Narrative Opinion Summary

In this case, the appellant challenged the district court's dismissal of her age discrimination suit against her former employer, asserting that the denial of her EEOC reconsideration request should have tolled the ninety-day filing period mandated by the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). The appellant had initially filed a discrimination charge with the EEOC, which issued a Determination and Notice of Right to Sue on August 31, 1993. Despite requesting reconsideration, the EEOC denied this request on October 7, 1993, and confirmed the original ninety-day limitation from the August determination. The appellant filed her civil complaint on January 3, 1994, exceeding the deadline. The district court granted summary judgment for the employer, ruling the suit was time-barred. On appeal, the court upheld this decision, emphasizing that the ADEA's ninety-day filing period is not extended by a reconsideration request unless the EEOC issues a notice of intent to reconsider, which did not occur here. The court rejected arguments for equitable tolling, as they were not preserved for appeal. Consequently, the appellant's complaint was deemed untimely, affirming the lower court's summary judgment in favor of the employer.

Legal Issues Addressed

Equitable Tolling and the ADEA

Application: Equitable tolling does not apply where the claimant fails to raise the argument in the district court or preserve it for appeal, resulting in the dismissal of the claim as untimely.

Reasoning: McCray, employed at Corry Manufacturing from 1971 to 1992, raised allegations concerning the conduct of EEOC representatives relating to her claim's reconsideration, suggesting this could allow for equitable tolling of the 90-day filing period for civil action. However, she did not present these allegations in the district court nor preserve them for appeal.

Filing Deadline under the ADEA

Application: The ninety-day period for filing a civil lawsuit under the ADEA begins upon receipt of the EEOC's Determination and Notice of Right to Sue, not upon the denial of a reconsideration request.

Reasoning: The court ruled that merely filing a request for reconsideration does not extend this deadline, especially since the EEOC clearly communicated that the original ninety-day period began upon her receipt of the Determination and Notice of Right to Sue.

Final Agency Action in the Context of the ADEA

Application: The denial of a reconsideration request does not constitute a final agency action that resets the ninety-day filing period for a civil lawsuit under the ADEA.

Reasoning: McCray contended that her request for reconsideration submitted to the EEOC on September 27, 1993, tolled this period, asserting that the final action triggering the start of the filing period was the EEOC's denial of her reconsideration request on October 7, 1993. However, this denial did not replace the August 31 determination as the final agency action.

Reconsideration Requests and Statute of Limitations

Application: A request for reconsideration does not toll the statute of limitations for filing a civil action under the ADEA unless the EEOC issues a notice of intent to reconsider within ninety days of the no cause determination.

Reasoning: McCray's request for reconsideration did not lead to such a notice, and she was informed that the August 31, 1993, Right to Sue Notice remained valid for filing a civil action.