City of Seattle v. Kohles

Citations: 81 Wash. App. 678; 1996 WL 264911Docket: No. 34469-2-I

Court: Court of Appeals of Washington; February 26, 1996; Washington; State Appellate Court

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Seattle Municipal Court Local Infraction Rule (SMCLIR) 2.6 is found to conflict with the Infraction Rule for Courts of Limited Jurisdiction (IRLJ) 2.6 concerning the scheduling of contested hearings for infractions and the requirement for a defendant to waive a timely hearing date. The superior court reversed the municipal court's determination against David Kohles for a traffic infraction, affirming that Kohles was not properly informed of his rights regarding the hearing date, specifically the 10-day objection period outlined in SMCLIR 2.6. Kohles had requested a hearing for a speeding citation received on March 31, 1993, but was not notified of his right to object within the stipulated time frame when a notice scheduled the contested hearing for September 7, 1993. At that hearing, his motion to dismiss for failure to timely schedule was denied on grounds of not objecting within 10 days. The court concluded that the local rule's requirement to object within 10 days conflicts with IRLJ 2.6, which allows for a hearing to be scheduled 14 to 90 days from the request unless the defendant waives this timeline in writing. The ruling highlights that Kohles was not adequately informed of his obligations, distinguishing this case from prior precedents like Heaney v. Seattle Municipal Court, where the defendant was aware of their rights.

The record indicates that written correspondence from the City to a party does not inform them of the requirement of a local rule. The case of Heaney involved a local rule that mandated a party objecting to a trial date on grounds of exceeding speedy trial limits to file a motion within 10 days of receiving notice. The court determined that this local rule did not conflict with JCrR 3.08, which required dismissal of a complaint if a defendant was not tried within 60 days unless good cause was shown. The court emphasized that both rules could coexist if the defendant was aware of their rights.

In the current case concerning Kohles, the documents provided information about the right to a contested hearing but did not inform him of the right to object to the hearing date or the 10-day limit for filing such an objection. This absence of notification violates the critical condition established in Heaney regarding a defendant's awareness of their rights. The City's position would require an expansion of Heaney that would infringe upon due process rights.

The local rule in question conflicts with IRLJ 2.6(a)(2), which obligates a court to set a hearing for a traffic infraction within 14 to 90 days from the notice date, with the defendant able to waive this requirement in writing. The local rule improperly shifts the responsibility to the defendant to demand a speedy hearing, leading to a loss of rights under IRLJ 2.6 if no action is taken. This contrasts with Heaney, where the trial court had the responsibility to ensure timely trials. Citing precedents, the text asserts that defendants are not required to bring themselves to trial.

The two rules cannot coexist, and the local rule must yield due to the failure to notify Kohles about his rights and the necessary actions to preserve them, which violates the principle of fundamental fairness inherent in due process. It is deemed fundamentally unfair to impose a time limitation without notifying the affected party, especially when all other rules and procedures are detailed in the correspondence.

The notice provided to Kohles contained comprehensive information regarding the hearing, leading to a reasonable assumption that all relevant details, including the right to object to the hearing date, were included. The local rule in question was deemed invalid as it conflicted with IRLJ 2.6 and improperly relieved the court of its duty to ensure a party's trial rights. Additionally, the City's handling of infraction cases was found to infringe upon fundamental fairness principles, resulting in Kohles being denied due process. The superior court's reversal of the municipal court's decision was affirmed, with justices Kennedy and Agid concurring. The notice included specific instructions on obtaining subpoenas, outlining hearing procedures, rights to present and examine evidence, appeal rights, and consequences of failing to appear. The principles of fundamental fairness are rooted in the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.