Patricia A. Howard v. Beech Aircraft Corporation

Docket: 94-3259

Court: Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit; June 14, 1995; Federal Appellate Court

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Unpublished opinions may now be cited if they have persuasive value on a material issue, provided a copy is attached to the citing document or, if cited orally, copies are provided to the Court and all parties, as per the General Order of November 29, 1993, which temporarily suspends certain citation rules. In the case of Patricia A. Howard v. Beech Aircraft Corporation, the Tenth Circuit upheld the district court's summary judgment in favor of Beech, rejecting Howard's claims of age, sex, and ancestry discrimination, as well as retaliation and constructive discharge. Howard, a 67-year-old Hispanic woman, was terminated in 1991 for not properly recording inspection results but later had her termination converted to a suspension following a grievance settlement. She filed a discrimination complaint with the Kansas Human Rights Commission (KHRC) and subsequently with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), which found insufficient evidence to support her claims. After her federal complaint was filed, the district court granted summary judgment for Beech and denied Howard's motion to alter the judgment. Howard's appeal raised issues regarding the summary judgment standard, the merits of her discrimination claims, and the motion to amend the judgment. The appellate court reviewed the summary judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56, affirming that it was proper as there were no genuine issues of material fact.

Ms. Howard contends that the court failed to view evidence favorably towards her and made improper credibility determinations in its ruling. The district court accurately applied the summary judgment standard, and Ms. Howard did not demonstrate any inappropriate credibility assessments or evidentiary conclusions. She argues that the court incorrectly granted summary judgment on her sexual harassment claim, asserting a hostile work environment due to comments from her supervisor, Jerry Yeager. The legal standard for harassment requires that the workplace be permeated with severe or pervasive discriminatory conduct, as outlined in Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc. The court found that Ms. Howard's allegations, including Yeager's comments and actions, did not create a hostile environment when judged by a reasonable person's standard. The incidents were neither frequent nor overtly sexual enough to substantiate her claim.

Additionally, Ms. Howard claims the court wrongly granted summary judgment on her ancestry discrimination claim. To establish a prima facie case under Title VII, she needed to show she was in a protected class, performing satisfactorily, discharged, and that a non-class member filled her position. The basis for her claim was Yeager's comment regarding her appearance as potentially "passing for white," which he did not repeat after she expressed offense. Ms. Howard provided no further evidence of discriminatory remarks about her ancestry from others at Beech. The court upheld the district court's findings on both claims, concluding that Ms. Howard's allegations did not meet the legal thresholds for harassment or discrimination.

The district court determined that Ms. Howard did not meet the second prong of her prima facie case, which required her to demonstrate satisfactory job performance. Ms. Howard argued that her long tenure indicated satisfactory performance, citing Denison v. Swaco Geolograph Co., which states that a plaintiff need only show performance quality sufficient to merit continued employment. However, the court found evidence supporting its conclusion, noting Ms. Howard's termination due to a 26% error rate in inspections, significantly higher than her peers, and her history of five disciplinary actions since 1987. Consequently, her record did not suggest discriminatory treatment in her discharge.

Additionally, the court addressed Ms. Howard's claim of disparate treatment discrimination, stating that Mr. Yeager's isolated comment was insufficient to establish a pattern of discrimination, which requires evidence of systemic discrimination rather than sporadic incidents. While the court did not condone the comment, it classified it as an isolated event rather than indicative of a corporation-wide practice.

Regarding her age discrimination claim, the court applied Title VII standards to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. Ms. Howard cited two disputed facts—Mr. Yeager's instructions against using the inspection form and a testimony from Nina Long regarding the absence of company standards for such errors. However, the court reasoned that these facts did not necessarily imply satisfactory job performance, as Ms. Howard could still perform unsatisfactorily even if she followed directions. Thus, her arguments did not effectively challenge the district court's conclusion on this matter.

Ms. Howard argues that the court wrongly granted summary judgment on her retaliation claim, requiring proof of: 1) engagement in protected activity, 2) adverse action by the employer, and 3) a causal link between the two. She presents two pieces of evidence: her reassignment to 'tag and drag' work during sick leave, which she claims was retaliation for a prior complaint, and her termination, which she believes followed her calls to a Vice President. The court found she did not establish the causal connection, noting the time gap between her job reassignment and termination and a lack of evidence showing that decision-makers were aware of her calls. 

On her constructive discharge claim, the court ruled that the working conditions were not intolerable and that she voluntarily resigned, corroborated by her deposition and a message left in her tool drawer. The court's findings were deemed not a clear error. Lastly, Ms. Howard’s appeal to amend the judgment was denied because she did not present new matters for consideration. The appellate court found no abuse of discretion in this denial and affirmed the district court's decision. The order and judgment are not binding precedent, except under specific legal doctrines, and the court notes that certain claims were not reviewed due to lack of administrative exhaustion.