United States v. Floyd Mayweather, Carlos Montoya, Angel Miyares, Marcus Manning, and Duncan Martin

Citations: 57 F.3d 1071; 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 21013Docket: 94-1414

Court: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit; June 16, 1995; Federal Appellate Court

SummaryOriginalCytator Case TreatmentBackward CitatorAnalysis

EnglishEspañolSimplified EnglishEspañol Fácil

Defendants Floyd Mayweather, Carlos Montoya, Angel Miyares, Marcus Manning, and Duncan Martin appealed their convictions for conspiracy to possess and distribute cocaine, violating 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841(a)(1). The appeals addressed the sufficiency of evidence for the convictions, the existence of multiple conspiracies, evidentiary rulings by the district court, and claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. A federal grand jury indicted eleven defendants in January 1993, later superseding the indictment in February 1993 to include twelve defendants, charged with conspiracy to distribute cocaine from approximately 1987 to August 1, 1992. Following a joint trial, the jury found the defendants guilty on December 13, 1993. Sentencing for the defendants occurred between April and June 1994, with varied incarceration periods and supervised release terms. Testimonies during the trial established a cocaine distribution conspiracy primarily involving William Echenique, who sourced cocaine from Ovidio Montoya and Angel Miyares. The Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions and sentences.

Defendant Miyares supplied multiple kilograms of cocaine to William Echenique via unidentified couriers and several co-conspirators, including Jody Howland, Francisco Echenique, and Mark Petkovitch. Carlos Montoya, Ovidio Montoya's nephew, briefly lived with Echenique in Grand Rapids, overseeing his drug distribution and ensuring payments to Ovidio Montoya. Carlos also acted as a courier alongside Maria Carmen Echenique, transporting drugs to Grand Rapids and money to Chicago. Echenique's distribution network involved regular, substantial quantities of cocaine being delivered to various distributors, including defendants Floyd Mayweather, Duncan Martin, and Marcus Manning, with Mayweather receiving large quantities, such as half a kilogram on one occasion and smaller amounts on others. Duncan Martin, a member of the 'Nasty Dawgs,' received cocaine from Echenique multiple times. Testimony indicated unusual visitor patterns at Manning's residence, consistent with drug dealing activities, and he hid assets under others' names to evade law enforcement. DEA Agent Munson explained these behaviors, while Agent Peters testified about Manning's flight from law enforcement. Carlos Montoya was arrested during a reverse sting operation in 1992 after attempting to trade a Corvette for cocaine. Defendants Mayweather, Miyares, Manning, and Martin claimed insufficient evidence for their convictions, with Mayweather specifically arguing that the evidence indicated multiple conspiracies rather than a single one, and that he was merely an ultimate purchaser of cocaine with no involvement in the conspiracy.

Defendant Miyares challenges the credibility of government witnesses, arguing they were drug dealers, addicts, or felons who received favors for their testimony, and that there is no corroborating evidence against him. Defendant Manning contends that the evidence points to multiple conspiracies rather than a single one as charged, asserting he was merely a purchaser of narcotics. Similarly, defendant Martin claims the evidence supports the existence of multiple conspiracies. The court's review for sufficiency of evidence is constrained to viewing it in the light most favorable to the government, and convictions must be upheld if any rational juror could find the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. The elements of conspiracy include the willful formation of the conspiracy, the accused's membership, an overt act by a conspirator, and that act being in furtherance of the conspiracy's objective. A formal agreement is not required; a tacit understanding suffices, and both direct and circumstantial evidence can prove conspiracy. In drug conspiracy cases, the government must demonstrate the existence of the conspiracy, the accused's knowledge, and voluntary participation. Participation can be inferred from actions, and a slight connection to the conspiracy is adequate for establishing guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Knowledge of all conspiracy details is not necessary for a conviction, and the determination of whether there is a single or multiple conspiracies is a factual question for the jury.

An indictment alleging a single conspiracy can lead to reversible error if evidence supports multiple conspiracies and the appellant demonstrates prejudice. The core of conspiracy law is the notion of agreement. In 'chain' conspiracies, where drug distribution involves interdependent roles, the agreement can be inferred despite participants' lack of knowledge about each other. A single conspiracy persists even if individuals do not know all members or are involved in every aspect of the conspiracy. The Seventh Circuit clarifies that participants must know of each other's existence, but not necessarily their identities, and that conspiracies can evolve over time with different parties joining or leaving. The presence of a common goal among various participants indicates a single conspiracy, even if a small core group exists. Evidence in this case, particularly from several witnesses, indicates a single 'chain' conspiracy with William Echenique as a central figure coordinating between suppliers and local distributors in Grand Rapids, Michigan. The testimony supports the jury's conviction of defendant Mayweather, who received cocaine deliveries from Echenique or Francisco Echenique with assistance from Mark Pekovitch.

Defendant Mayweather received various quantities of cocaine, including one-half kilogram on one occasion, nine ounces on another, and repeated deliveries of four and one-half ounces. William Echenique testified that he consistently supplied Mayweather with cocaine shipments from Chicago, particularly after his release from incarceration, receiving one to three kilograms every seven to ten days. Francisco Echenique corroborated that he delivered multi-ounce quantities to Mayweather during a two to three month period in 1991 as part of a conspiracy. The evidence indicates that Mayweather was not an end consumer but a distributor, receiving far more cocaine than he could personally use, which necessitated a customer base to pay for the drugs. Without the conspiratorial structure facilitating the shipments, Mayweather would not have obtained the cocaine.

Defendant Manning's conviction was supported by evidence showing he was supplied numerous kilograms of cocaine by William Echenique. Testimony indicated drug trafficking activity at Manning's residence, with a neighbor noting frequent car activity at the house. Additionally, Manning placed titles of luxury vehicles in others' names, a tactic often used by drug dealers to evade detection. This evidence, viewed favorably for the prosecution, allowed a reasonable juror to conclude Manning was part of the cocaine distribution conspiracy.

Defendant Martin was identified as part of the conspiracy by William Echenique and others, with evidence showing he received cocaine in quantities exceeding personal use. He was associated with a group named the 'Nasty Dawgs,' and Echenique detailed Martin's involvement in his drug distribution network. The evidence supports the conclusion that Martin's cocaine receipts depended on cooperation with others in the distribution chain, particularly with Echenique and Ovidio Montoya.

Local distributors in Grand Rapids, specifically defendants Manning, Mayweather, and Martin, played a crucial role in a cocaine conspiracy by successfully selling cocaine to end buyers, which provided defendant Echenique the funds needed for shipments from Chicago; without these sales, the conspiracy would have collapsed. Defendant Miyares challenges the sufficiency of evidence supporting his conviction by questioning the credibility of witnesses against him, claiming they lacked reliability and had motives to dishonestly testify. However, the jury is tasked with assessing witness credibility, and sufficient evidence was presented showing Miyares supplied numerous kilograms of cocaine to Echenique from January to July 1991.

Defendants argue various evidentiary rulings by the district court were erroneous, particularly concerning co-conspirator statements admitted under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E). The court conditionally admitted these hearsay statements, requiring the prosecution to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that a conspiracy existed, that the defendants were participants, and that the statements were made in furtherance of the conspiracy. The district court, after reviewing the government's case, ruled that a rational juror could conclude that a conspiracy existed, identifying multiple co-conspirators, including Montoya, the Echeniques, Pekovitch, and others, and determined that the statements made by these co-conspirators were indeed made in the course of and furtherance of the conspiracy.

The district court's admission of co-conspirator testimony was upheld as not clearly erroneous, with sufficient evidence linking all defendants to a single conspiracy. Defendants Mayweather and Martin's claims regarding the need for individualized admissibility determinations and the distinction between single and multiple conspiracies were rejected. The court found hearsay statements admissible against the conspirators involved, confirming the existence of a single 'chain' conspiracy.

Defendant Montoya contested the inclusion of evidence from a July 14, 1992, reverse sting involving co-conspirator Jose Omar Santamaria, arguing it was irrelevant to the charged conspiracy. He claimed this evidence was prejudicial and insufficient to support his conviction without it. However, even assuming the evidence was improperly admitted, it was deemed harmless error under the Chapman standard, which assesses whether the evidence likely influenced the conviction. The court noted that overwhelming evidence, particularly the testimony of William Echenique—who described Montoya's active role in drug distribution—supported the conviction. Echenique's accounts were corroborated by additional witnesses, including Maria Carmen Echenique, who detailed Montoya's involvement in transporting cocaine.

Additionally, defendant Manning objected to the admission of 'other acts' evidence, including his placement of assets in others' names, drug dealings with unindicted co-conspirator Ismael Nunez, his flight from police, and expert testimony from DEA Special Agent Munson regarding drug trafficking practices.

Manning contends that the district court improperly admitted evidence of his financial transactions involving placing assets in others' names. Under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b), such evidence is not admissible to prove character but may be permitted for other purposes, including establishing motive, intent, or planning. For this evidence to be admissible, it must meet four criteria: relevance (Rule 402), proper purpose (Rule 404(b)), not being substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice (Rule 403), and a jury instruction on limited use must be provided upon request (Rule 105). The court has broad discretion in these determinations.

The district court found that the evidence regarding Manning's asset placements was relevant, demonstrating his motive and planning to conceal wealth gained from drug trafficking. It concluded that the evidence had minimal prejudicial impact and that Manning waived the right to a cautionary instruction. Therefore, the court did not abuse its discretion in admitting this evidence.

Manning also argues against the admission of evidence related to his interactions with Ismael Nunez, claiming Nunez was not part of the conspiracy. However, this argument is rejected as Nunez was identified as a co-conspirator by William Echenique, who testified about selling cocaine to Nunez and witnessing transactions involving Manning.

Lastly, Manning disputes the admission of DEA Agent Peters' testimony regarding his flight during an attempted arrest. Since Manning did not object to this testimony at trial, it can only be evaluated for plain error. Flight evidence is permissible as it can indicate guilt by conduct, depending on inferences drawn from the defendant's behavior, flight, and consciousness of guilt regarding the charged crime.

All four inferences must be substantiated by evidence, with flight evidence being admissible if it demonstrates a sudden fear of arrest or conviction. In this case, defendant Manning fled when DEA agents attempted to arrest him on March 2, 1993. Prior to the arrest, Deputy Sheriff Pellerito informed Manning of his pending investigation for cocaine trafficking. On the day of the arrest, Manning escaped through a window, leaving behind personal items, which suggests a consciousness of guilt. Manning's claim that the evidence presented was unrelated to the charges was rejected, as it was determined that the evidence of drug deals and money laundering was integral to the conspiracy he was charged with. Testimony from William Echenique further linked Manning to the conspiracy. The district court was found not to have erred in admitting evidence of Manning's flight. Additionally, Manning did not object at trial to DEA Agent Munson's expert testimony regarding drug trafficking practices, meaning any review of this testimony on appeal would be limited to plain error. For an appellate court to reverse based on plain error, there must be clear evidence of an error that affected substantial rights, and the court should only correct such errors if they undermine the fairness or integrity of the judicial process.

Admission of expert testimony is at the court's discretion, allowing law enforcement officers to provide insights on criminal activity methodologies and the modus operandi of specific crimes, which are often beyond the average person's understanding. In this instance, the district court correctly allowed Special Agent Munson to testify as an expert on drug trafficking methods, including asset placement and the significance of frequent visitors to defendant Manning's residence. This testimony contextualized other evidence and demonstrated that Manning's actions were related to the conspiracy rather than innocent behavior.

Defendant Manning contested the admission of Sheila Echenique's testimony regarding a statement from William Echenique identifying Manning as a key customer in the conspiracy, claiming it was mere "idle chatter." However, the statement was deemed admissible under the co-conspirator exception of Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E) since it pertained to a co-conspirator's actions and served to advance the conspiracy. Sheila Echenique's role as a bookkeeper within the conspiracy supported the relevance of her testimony, which was found to be in furtherance of the conspiracy’s objectives.

Additionally, defendants Manning, Mayweather, and Martin argued that the district court erred in denying their motions for severance. Manning had initially moved to sever pretrial on September 21, 1993, and oral motions during trial were also denied. However, as the defendants did not renew their severance motions at the close of evidence, they waived the right to appeal this issue, limiting review to a plain error standard.

Joinder of defendants is permissible under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 8(b) when they are alleged to have participated in the same series of acts constituting an offense. Case law confirms that multiple defendants can be joined in a single conspiracy charge. A district judge's denial of a motion for severance is only reversible for an abuse of discretion, requiring the defendant to demonstrate compelling prejudice, specifically that the jury cannot distinguish the evidence relevant to each defendant. Even if potential jury confusion is established, it must be weighed against the need for efficient trials. A defendant must show the inability to obtain a fair trial without severance, rather than merely a better chance of acquittal in separate trials.

In the case at hand, the joinder of defendants Martin, Mayweather, and Manning was appropriate as they were charged with a single conspiracy. Mayweather claimed prejudice from DEA Agent Gay’s testimony regarding Montoya’s drug deal; however, this testimony only implicated Montoya without causing confusion. Furthermore, defense motions for severance based on Agent Gay’s comments about Montoya's attorney were deemed unfounded, as there was no evidence of prejudice against the defendants. The court noted that Montoya was correctly indicted under the name Angel Pabon, and no assertions were made that any defendant or their counsel lacked integrity.

Mr. Mirque did not exhibit knowledge that the alias used was incorrect, nor was there evidence of efforts to conceal Mr. Montoya’s true identity; Agent Gay was aware of Montoya's actual name. The testimony from Agent Gay did not prejudice the defendants, as demonstrated by the acquittal of co-defendants Freeman and Akrap, indicating the jury evaluated the evidence for each defendant independently. Consequently, the district court's denial of the motion for severance was appropriate. Even if there had been an error in this denial, it would be deemed harmless due to the substantial evidence of guilt against defendants Manning, Mayweather, and Martin.

Defendant Martin contends his conviction should be overturned due to ineffective assistance of counsel provided by Attorney James Miller. Martin expressed dissatisfaction with Miller's representation, particularly regarding advice to accept a plea deal, which the district court rejected, finding that Miller's advice fell within acceptable professional standards and that no conflict of interest existed. On appeal, Martin claims several errors by Miller: a problematic cross-examination technique that resulted in government objections, an ineffective opening statement lacking clarity on key conspiracy issues, a closing argument that referenced Martin's religious beliefs, failure to demonstrate his incarceration during a relevant time frame, and not filing a motion for a new trial promptly as required by Fed. R. Crim. P. 33.

A defendant typically cannot raise claims of ineffective assistance of counsel for the first time on direct appeal due to the lack of a developed record for evaluating these claims. The appropriate procedure is to present such claims in a post-conviction proceeding under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2255. In this case, defendant Martin's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is dismissed without prejudice because the record is insufficiently developed for analysis. Defendant Mayweather's assertion of being prejudiced by attorney Miller's representation of Martin is also dismissed, as he was not represented by the same counsel and did not claim any ineffectiveness or conflict of interest regarding his own counsel. Under the Strickland v. Washington standard, a claim of ineffective assistance requires showing both deficient performance and resultant prejudice, which Mayweather fails to demonstrate.

Additionally, Martin contends that the district court improperly applied sentencing guidelines. He challenges the enhancement of his sentence based on a prior drug conviction, disputes the finding of accountability for more than five kilograms of cocaine, and argues that the mandatory minimum sentence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. The review of factual findings related to sentencing is conducted under a "clearly erroneous" standard, with de novo review for the application of guidelines to undisputed facts. Martin specifically claims the district court erred in applying the mandatory minimum under 21 U.S.C. Sec. 841(b)(1)(A)(ii) based on his 1991 felony drug conviction, arguing that the conviction was for a nonexistent offense and that his guilty plea was constitutionally invalid.

The district court found that the defendant was charged with delivery of cocaine under Michigan law, including attempted delivery. During the plea proceedings, the defendant admitted to possessing cocaine with the intent to sell or deliver it. Although there was some ambiguity regarding whether the plea was accepted under specific delivery statutes or the general criminal attempt statute, the court determined the defendant pled guilty to a valid offense under Michigan law.

The defendant argued that the plea was insufficient, claiming he was not properly informed of his rights, which violated his constitutional rights. He asserted that the transcript did not demonstrate he understood the law adequately to make an informed plea, that the court failed to ensure his attorney explained the charges, and that the court did not verify the defendant's authorization to possess the controlled substance.

Upon reviewing the transcript, the court concluded that the defendant was properly advised of his rights, including the right to a jury trial, presumption of innocence, and the right to remain silent. The transcript confirmed that the defendant had discussed the charges with his attorney, and he acknowledged his actions related to the offenses.

The court found no violation of the defendant's constitutional rights during the plea proceedings. The plea was deemed to have been made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently, consistent with the standards set in Boykin v. Alabama. Additionally, the court affirmed that the defendant pled guilty to an existing crime, specifically an attempted delivery of cocaine, and noted that related charges were dismissed as part of a plea agreement.

Defendant contests the application of Michigan's general attempt statute for attempted delivery of a controlled substance, which the government agrees is incorrect since the Controlled Substances Act explicitly addresses attempts to deliver. Count III of the amended information references both Michigan's Controlled Substances Act and the general attempt statute, but the latter is deemed nonexistent in this context. Consequently, the defendant can only plead guilty to attempted delivery of cocaine under the Controlled Substances Act. Although the plea agreement suggested a sentence applicable under the general attempt statute, Michigan may still honor the plea bargain without infringing on the defendant's rights.

Defendant Martin challenges the district court's determination that he was accountable for over five kilograms of cocaine for sentencing under U.S.S.G. Sec. 2D1.1, a finding that is upheld unless clearly erroneous. The court's assessment includes all foreseeable actions related to jointly undertaken criminal activities. The district court found Martin responsible for 5,168.76 kilograms, which included one kilogram he allegedly offered to sell to an undercover officer. Martin argues against the inclusion of this kilogram, asserting he was not capable of delivering that amount at the time of the conversation. Furthermore, he claims including it in the total would constitute double counting. However, the district court's conclusion that Martin was accountable for five kilograms of cocaine is deemed not clearly erroneous.

The court determined that the 1272.75 grams of cocaine testified by William Echenique as delivered to Ben Maglichi were reasonably foreseeable to defendant Martin. Echenique also stated he delivered two kilograms of cocaine to Marcus Martin on four occasions, with at least two deliveries occurring in Martin's presence. Additionally, he made two deliveries of 4.5 ounces and two deliveries of nine ounces to Martin. Given this evidence, the district court reasonably concluded that Martin was capable of supplying the one kilogram he offered for sale to an undercover officer. 

Defendant Martin contended that the 20-year mandatory minimum sentence under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(ii) constituted cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment due to its disproportionate nature. However, referencing United States v. Dunson, the court affirmed that the 20-year sentence does not violate the Eighth Amendment based on the precedent established in Harmelin v. Michigan, thus rendering Martin's claim meritless.

Defendant Miyares challenged the district court’s enhancement of his offense level by two levels for his role as a manager or leader in the drug conspiracy under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(c). The court explained that enhancement requires participation of at least two culpable individuals, but it is not necessary for the defendant to directly manage or control a partnership. A defendant can still be considered a manager or supervisor even while in a subordinate role. The commentary to U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1 outlines seven factors to assess a defendant's role, with no requirement that all factors be satisfied. The district court found that Miyares supervised two individuals who delivered cocaine from Chicago to Grand Rapids.

William Echenique, Francisco Echenique, and Mark Pekovitch provided testimony indicating that two unidentified men followed William Echenique to Grand Rapids with a kilogram of cocaine. This event took place one day after William met with defendant Miyares in Chicago, where Miyares agreed to sell him nine ounces of cocaine. The two men not only followed Echenique but also assisted in dividing the kilogram by delivering nine ounces to him the day after arriving in Grand Rapids, some of which were sold to defendant Mayweather. Echenique later recovered the remaining cocaine and sold it.

Defendant Miyares contested the district court's finding that he managed or supervised these two men, arguing their identities were never established and there was no proof of his control over them. However, the court found no error in its conclusion that Miyares was their manager, noting that the men acted in accordance with his instructions to follow Echenique and transport the cocaine, demonstrating their roles as co-conspirators in the conspiracy.

Miyares also challenged the two-level enhancement of his offense level for obstruction of justice due to alleged perjury during his trial testimony, where he denied involvement in the conspiracy. The jury rejected his testimony, resulting in his conviction. Miyares argued that his brief testimony did not obstruct justice. The district court applied the enhancement consistent with the precedent set in United States v. Dunnigan, which requires a finding of willful intent to provide false testimony for perjury enhancements. The court determined Miyares' testimony was a deliberate attempt to influence the jury, and given the overwhelming evidence against him, he could not have been mistaken in his denials.

Consequently, the district court's judgment was affirmed in all respects, and Miyares' claims of ineffective assistance of counsel were dismissed without prejudice.

Honorable Thomas A. Wiseman, Jr., presided over a case involving seven defendants, of which Mark Petkovitch and Marcus Martin pled guilty before trial. Kevin Freeman and Nikola Akrap were acquitted, while Ovidio Montoya, Victor Ward, and Fernando "LNU" remain fugitives. Defendant Mayweather contended that the prosecution failed to present all evidence mentioned in its opening statement, arguing that it did not sufficiently prove he was a street-level dealer. However, the court found this argument unmeritorious, as ample evidence indicated Mayweather sourced cocaine from William Echenique in quantities exceeding personal use.

The government asserted that defendants waived their right to claim multiple conspiracies due to not raising a multiplicity objection at trial, referencing precedents from *United States v. Woods* and *United States v. Colbert*. However, since the defendants were charged with a single conspiracy count, their claim challenges the sufficiency of evidence rather than multiplicity, allowing the issue to be preserved for appeal.

Regarding defendant Martin's challenge to a prior Michigan conviction, the government argued it was barred by *Custis v. United States*, which restricts collateral attacks on prior convictions used to enhance sentences under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA). The Supreme Court distinguished that under 21 U.S.C. Sec. 851(c), defendants can challenge prior convictions impacting federal drug offense sentences. Since Martin's sentence enhancement fell under federal drug laws, not the ACCA, the *Custis* decision does not prevent his collateral challenge.