Nimali Desilva Sondel Holly Novack Kim Shaller Brenda Glapa Stephanie Sangsoon Chung Denise Johnson, on Behalf of Themselves and All Others Similarly Situated v. Northwest Airlines, Inc. Republic Airlines, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Amicus Curiae

Citation: 56 F.3d 934Docket: 94-2524

Court: Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit; August 1, 1995; Federal Appellate Court

SummaryOriginalCytator Case TreatmentBackward CitatorAnalysis

EnglishEspañolSimplified EnglishEspañol Fácil

Nimali Sondel and five other plaintiffs appeal a district court's summary judgment favoring Northwest Airlines, which ruled their Title VII class action was barred by res judicata. The initial class action, filed on June 8, 1992, claimed disparate impact discrimination due to a 5'2" minimum height requirement for flight attendants, and was later amended to exclude a Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA) claim. Eleven days after the federal suit's MHRA claim was dismissed, some plaintiffs initiated a state court class action on the same MHRA grounds. The state court denied their attempts to certify a class, leading to an individual capacity trial for the plaintiffs. After an eight-day bench trial in December 1993, the state court ruled in favor of Northwest, affirming that while the height requirement adversely affected women, it was justified as essential for passenger safety, customer service, and reducing injuries among flight attendants. The Eighth Circuit Court affirmed the district court's ruling, upholding the summary judgment against the plaintiffs.

The Minnesota Court of Appeals upheld the state court's ruling in Novack v. Northwest Airlines on January 3, 1995. Following this, Northwest Airlines sought summary judgment in a federal lawsuit, claiming that the plaintiffs were barred by res judicata and collateral estoppel. The plaintiffs countered with their own motion for summary judgment, arguing that the state court's conclusion that a 5'2" height requirement adversely affected women should prevent Northwest from contesting this issue again in federal court.

The district court granted Northwest's summary judgment motion, concluding that res judicata barred the federal class action and dismissed the case with prejudice. This decision was based on the finding that the absent federal class members were in privity with the state court plaintiffs (Novack, Glapa, and Shaller) during the state suit. The plaintiffs appealed, contending that the district court erred in several respects: determining the applicability of res judicata regarding privity, applying res judicata in a manner inconsistent with federal Title VII standards, denying their motion for summary judgment based on collateral estoppel, and ruling that a party did not meet the administrative prerequisites of Title VII.

The discussion emphasized that the state court judgment in Novack carries the same preclusive effect in federal court as it would in Minnesota, per 28 U.S.C. § 1738. The court's review of the district court’s interpretation of state law and its grant of summary judgment is de novo. Under Minnesota law, res judicata serves as a finality doctrine to conclude litigation on the same cause of action, barring subsequent suits between the same parties or their privies, unless its application would result in injustice. The plaintiffs conceded that res judicata applied to the state plaintiffs but contested whether the federal class was in privity with them in the state suit. The district court had found privity based on the shared legal interests between the representatives and the class regarding the impact of Northwest's height requirement.

In Minnesota, privity lacks a uniform definition applicable across all cases, but it generally refers to a relationship where one party is so identified with another that they share the same legal right. Privity also indicates that nonparties connected to an action may be affected by the judgment as if they were parties themselves. Determining privity depends on the specific facts of each case, particularly the relationship of the parties to the subject matter. 

Three categories of nonparties can be bound by a prior adjudication: (1) those who control the original action, (2) those whose interests are represented by a party in the original action, and (3) successors-in-interest to a party. In this context, the Class did not control the state suit nor are they successors of the state court plaintiffs, leading to the need to ascertain whether the state court plaintiffs represented the Class's interests.

When a class action is certified, the certified representatives and class counsel assume fiduciary responsibilities towards the Class, which include avoiding actions that could harm the Class's interests for personal gain. These duties extend beyond the federal lawsuit to any related state actions, indicating that the certified representatives represented the Class's interests in the state trial.

The Eleventh Circuit's decision in N.A.A.C.P. v. Hunt is relevant as it established privity between a state legislator and other legislators who had similar interests in a subsequent suit. The court found that the close alignment of interests created privity. This principle applies similarly to the current case, where the state court plaintiffs, as certified representatives of the federal class action, are closely aligned with the Class's interests, thereby establishing privity.

Minnesota finds the precedent set in *Los Angeles Branch NAACP v. Los Angeles Unified School District*, 750 F.2d 731 (9th Cir.1984), relevant. In that case, a federal class action claiming unlawful intentional segregation was barred due to a prior state class action with the same claims. The court established that federal class members were in privity with state class members if their interests were adequately represented. Four criteria confirmed this privity: (1) no evidence of inadequate representation in the state action, (2) identical interests between state and federal class members, (3) the same substantive right against disparate impact discrimination, and (4) the relief available in the state action being more favorable than Title VII. 

Class counsel indicated that an unfavorable outcome in the state case would not impede the federal action, highlighting a concern against successive litigation. Minnesota law requires more than coincidental interests to establish privity, which was lacking in previous cases. However, the relationship between the class representatives, counsel, and the class in this instance was considered special, particularly since the same attorneys represented both the state and federal plaintiffs. 

In the federal summary judgment motion, class counsel confirmed no new evidence would be introduced beyond what was presented in the state trial, reinforcing that the class had a vested financial interest in the state case’s outcome to leverage offensive collateral estoppel in the federal lawsuit. Consequently, the district court’s determination of privity between the Class and the state court plaintiffs was upheld.

Minnesota law prohibits a nonparty with a vested interest in a prior suit from relitigating matters established in that suit. In *Brunsoman v. Seltz*, the court determined that Seltz, despite not being a named party in the original case, was in privity with the partnership due to his significant involvement and self-interest, thus barring him from contesting the partnership's debts. Similarly, in *Margo-Kraft*, the court ruled that Margo-Kraft was in "practical privity" with the plaintiffs, preventing them from relitigating negligence claims as Margo-Kraft's interests were represented in the earlier case. These cases illustrate that nonparties who engage in prior proceedings out of self-interest can be precluded from relitigating under res judicata.

In the current case, the court found that Johnson, having participated in the state court suit with self-interest, was similarly barred by res judicata due to privity with the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs contended that the district court misapplied res judicata, arguing it has discretion to refuse its application, particularly claiming potential injustice due to the application of Minnesota law instead of Title VII. However, the court disagreed, emphasizing that the plaintiffs had initially chosen to pursue their claims in state court after dismissing them from a federal class action, and conceded that all res judicata elements were met except for privity. The court found no merit in the plaintiffs' arguments regarding injustice or privity, affirming the appropriate application of res judicata.

The decision of the district court is affirmed. Republic Airlines merged with Northwest Airlines in 1986, with Northwest assuming all liabilities. Several plaintiffs, including Holly Novack, Kim Shaller, and Brenda Glapa, were added to a federal suit in 1992 and 1993, with Karen Johnson’s claim dismissed with prejudice in 1993. The court granted Northwest summary judgment on Sondel's Title VII claim, citing untimely filing. In September 1993, the district court certified a class comprising women under 5'2" who applied for flight attendant positions with Northwest and were rejected between specific dates. Novack, Shaller, and Glapa were designated as class representatives, while Stephanie Sangsoon Chung was denied that status. Denise Johnson was allowed to intervene as a plaintiff in 1994. 

The main distinction between claims under the Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA) and Title VII lies in the available remedies, with MHRA allowing for treble back pay, emotional distress, and punitive damages. The court affirmed that the class action is res judicata, thus not addressing issues of collateral estoppel or Sondel's claim timeliness. Plaintiffs contended that class representatives should not have to relinquish state law claims to pursue the federal action; however, this ignores their ability to assert state claims under federal supplemental jurisdiction, which they initially did but later dismissed. The court noted that the certified representatives had a shared interest in the litigation due to the common legal theory against Northwest. The Minnesota courts have indicated that the concept of virtual representation aligns with traditional privity analysis, which suggests that privity exists when a nonparty's interests are represented by a party in a prior action. Thus, Minnesota courts would likely find the virtual representation test persuasive.

The plaintiffs' claim that the Minnesota courts' analysis of the Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA) claim is inconsistent with Title VII law is rejected. Under Title VII, Northwest is required to demonstrate a "compelling need" for its 5'2" height restriction and to show that there are no effective alternative policies that would cause a similar disparate impact. To establish this "compelling need," Northwest must prove a "manifest relationship" to the employment in question and that maintaining the height restriction is essential, with no viable alternatives. The state trial court applied this standard, and the Minnesota appellate court affirmed that Northwest met the requirements under both old and current Title VII law. Additionally, the principle of offensive collateral estoppel is utilized in both Minnesota and federal courts to prevent a party from relitigating an issue that has been previously decided against them. The plaintiffs' argument about the potential impact of a successful state suit on collateral estoppel in the federal class action is deemed inconsistent, as collateral estoppel requires that the issues in both suits be identical.