Department of Labor & Industries v. Baker

Citations: 57 Wash. App. 57; 786 P.2d 821; 1990 Wash. App. LEXIS 74Docket: No. 13222-2-II

Court: Court of Appeals of Washington; February 21, 1990; Washington; State Appellate Court

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The court ruled that the widow of a permanently and totally disabled worker, who committed suicide due to an industrial injury, is entitled to survivorship benefits. The Department of Labor and Industries initially denied the application, arguing that the suicide indicated a deliberate intent to take his life and that the worker was not considered permanently disabled at death. The Board of Industrial Insurance Appeals affirmed the worker’s permanent disability status but sided with the Department regarding the cause of death. The superior court upheld the Department's denial, interpreting RCW 51.32.020 as barring benefits after a suicide. However, the court clarified that RCW 51.32.050(6) allows benefits for survivors when the worker was permanently disabled prior to death, regardless of the cause. It emphasized that RCW 51.32.020 only applies when the death is the sole basis for the claim, while RCW 51.32.050(6) focuses on the worker's pre-existing disability. The decision was supported by statutory language and legislative history, concluding that benefits should be available to the widow since the permanent disability, not the suicide, is the basis for compensation.

The Legislature designed two distinct sections to address different issues regarding survivor benefits, indicating intent for them to coexist rather than one superseding the other. Legislative history shows that from the inception of the Industrial Insurance Act in 1911 until 1986, survivor benefits were separately allocated for two compensable events, initially offering the same benefit amount. In 1919, separate provisions were maintained, introducing a lump sum award for deaths directly linked to industrial injuries. Amendments in 1971 adjusted the benefit calculation while preserving the separate provisions and eliminating prior disparities. By 1986, the survivor compensation provisions were consolidated into a unified scheme requiring workers eligible for permanent total disability benefits to choose a survivor benefits option, which governed claims post-enactment.

Case law, while not conclusive, illustrates a consistent formula for determining entitlement to survivor benefits based on whether an industrial injury caused death or if the decedent was permanently and totally disabled from an industrial injury at the time of death. Previous cases have focused on the nature of suicides related to industrial injuries, with no denials of benefits where the decedent was already deemed permanently and totally disabled, regardless of the volitional nature of the suicide. Key cases affirming this principle include Hepner, Gatterdam, McFarland, Karlen, Schwab I, and Schwab II, where courts established causal connections between industrial injuries and resulting suicides, although Mercer found insufficient evidence for such a connection in one instance.

Two cases are particularly relevant, with a brief mention of McFarland. In McFarland, the court addressed whether a worker's death resulted from a deliberate intention to commit suicide, highlighting that under RCW 51.32.020, if a workman intentionally causes his own injury or death, neither he nor his widow is entitled to compensation from the accident fund. The Department cites this case to support its position, but the core issue in McFarland was not applicable to the current case. The statement in McFarland appears to be a mere paraphrase of the statute governing compensation for death claims.

The case of Schwab II is significant, as the court examined a range of suicide cases and shifted its focus from the volitional aspect of suicide to viewing RCW 51.32.020 as a statutory barrier between cause and effect. It concluded that the pertinent question in suicide cases is whether the industrial injury caused the death. This analysis aligns with the conclusion that RCW 51.32.020 has limited applicability in the present situation.

Based on legislative intent and judicial interpretation, Mr. Baker's widow is entitled to survivor benefits, leading to a reversal of the previous decision. There was a challenge from the widow's counsel regarding the Department's finding that Mr. Baker was not permanently and totally disabled at the time of death, questioning the relevance of his disability status, which the Department failed to clarify. The claim was filed before July 1, 1986, and subsequent claims are governed by RCW 51.32.050(7) and RCW 51.32.067, which outline survivor benefits according to the disabled worker's chosen option. Initially, lump sum payments were contingent on burial costs not exceeding a statutory limit, but a 1923 amendment allowed for payments whenever death directly resulted from the industrial injury.