Leon Ray Solesbee, Jr. v. Richard Witkowski, Warden Brad Basic John Mills Sue Mills Matthew Ogunsile, and Jimmy Sewell, Supervisor, South Carolina Department of Corrections Mary Ann Sanders Larry Arrowood Benjamin Hunter Vernon Miller Larry Keller Jeff Henderson Lillian Westfield Jimmy Brown

Citations: 56 F.3d 62; 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 19132; 1995 WL 323941Docket: 94-6916

Court: Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit; May 31, 1995; Federal Appellate Court

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The case involves Leon Ray Solesbee, Jr., an inmate at South Carolina's Perry prison, who was attacked on July 8, 1988, by fellow inmate Mark Houston, resulting in multiple stab wounds. Solesbee was in the recreation area of Q-3 dormitory when he was attacked from behind. Several correctional officers (COs), including Larry Keller, Sue Mills, Mary Ann Sanders, and John Mills, were present but failed to prevent the attack. During the incident, Sanders attempted to intervene by throwing chairs, while Keller ordered Houston to stop but was unable to prevent the attack. After the initial confrontation, Solesbee fled outside but was attacked again by Houston, who was eventually deterred by the arrival of Captain Sewell and other COs. Despite conflicting testimonies regarding Houston's actions after the initial attack, Solesbee sustained 12-19 stab wounds but ultimately recovered. The Fourth Circuit Court affirmed the judgments against the COs for their inaction but reversed the judgment against the warden of the prison.

Solesbee, representing himself, initiated actions under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 against Sewell and Basic, which were consolidated with additional defendants. Summary judgment was granted to the defendants regarding Solesbee's Fourteenth Amendment claims, while after a jury trial, seven defendants received judgment as a matter of law. The jury ruled in Sewell's favor, but Solesbee was awarded $199,000 against five appellants. The prison officials appealed, contending insufficient evidence for the jury's constitutional violation finding under the Eighth Amendment, which prohibits cruel and unusual punishment and requires prison officials to protect inmates from violence from other prisoners. 

Solesbee's claim was based on the appellants' failure to protect him, satisfying the objective prong of the Eighth Amendment by demonstrating serious harm occurred. The focus of the appeal was the subjective element, which requires proof of the officials' 'sufficiently culpable state of mind,' specifically 'deliberate indifference' to inmate safety. Evidence must show that officials were aware of a substantial risk of serious harm and disregarded it. The court found that the risk from Houston's attack was clear to the appellants, and the issue was whether their response amounted to constitutional disregard. The jury was correctly instructed that prisoners have a right to reasonable protection from fellow inmates, and inaction by officials could constitute cruel and unusual punishment if due to deliberate indifference. 

The appellate court will uphold the verdict if reasonable evidence supports it and will not disturb the denial of a motion for a new trial unless exceptional circumstances exist. The court concluded the evidence supported the verdicts against the individual corrections officers and denied the motion for a new trial.

COs assert that they cannot be held liable for Solesbee's safety, arguing three main points: they were unaware of any threat from Houston before the attack, there is no legal obligation for them to intervene if it risks their safety, and their actions during the incident were reasonable and in line with their training. They reference previous cases to support their stance that prior knowledge of risk is essential for liability. However, the liability analysis begins from the moment they became aware of the attack, which posed a significant risk of further harm until Houston was subdued.

The COs also claim that their response—issuing verbal commands and demonstrating force—was a sufficient intervention, as they argue that a reasonable response can mitigate liability under the Eighth Amendment. Their defense emphasizes that they were not trained to intervene in violent situations involving weapons and that their safety protocols advised against risking personal harm. 

Nonetheless, substantial evidence indicates their responses may not have been reasonable. Testimony reveals that one CO, Sue Mills, chose to secure a cell rather than assist Solesbee, and the verbal commands issued by the COs had no discernible effect on the attack. Witness accounts noted that the COs observed the assault for up to three minutes without calling for backup or utilizing available equipment, such as the PR-24 baton. Additional testimony from other COs suggested that they felt they could have intervened, contradicting the COs' claims of adherence to policy. Ultimately, the lack of decisive action by the COs raises questions about their adherence to reasonable intervention standards during the incident.

Conflicting evidence regarding the crowd's size at the incident ranged from 20-50 to 400 inmates. Testimonies from Ogunsile and Basic indicated they did not hear threats from the inmates or feel threatened themselves. Inmates assisted in carrying Solesbee on a stretcher, and CO Arrowood noted that inmates, not corrections officers (COs), restrained Houston after his final attack. The evidence was insufficient to prove that the COs' responses were unreasonable, despite indications of a lack of training and a non-intervention policy. However, the COs' failure to ensure Solesbee's safety supported a finding of "deliberate indifference," justifying the verdicts against them. Previous cases affirmed damages against COs for failing to protect inmates in similar situations.

The COs' claim for qualified immunity was rejected, as the duty of prison officials to protect inmates has been clearly established. While COs are not required to risk their safety, they have a duty to intervene in inmate-on-inmate attacks. The case was properly submitted to the jury, and the verdicts were upheld. 

Solesbee's claim against Warden Witkowski focused on his alleged awareness of safety risks in the high-risk Q-3 dorm and failure to address them, constituting deliberate indifference. Jury instructions clarified that the warden could be liable if he tacitly approved or failed to correct his subordinates' violations of constitutional rights. Solesbee argued that the warden's understaffing violated a consent decree, but evidence showed that Q-3 had more COs present than required at the time of the attack. Thus, the failure to have a CO in each wing was not the proximate cause of Solesbee's injuries. Witkowski was not responsible for CO training and had been in his position for less than two months before the incident. Consequently, there was no evidence linking the lack of training to the attack, leading to the reversal of the judgment against the warden while affirming the verdicts against the COs.

John Mills and Ogunsile, acting as inmate relations coordinator and classification caseworker respectively, were certified correctional officers with security duties on the day of an assault involving inmate Solesbee. CO Price locked the control room doors to secure the yard. Following the incident, Solesbee retained legal counsel. The court rendered verdicts as follows: Warden Witkowski was awarded $40,000 in compensatory and punitive damages; Basic, Ogunsile, and John Mills each received $16,500 in compensatory and punitive damages; and Sue Mills was awarded $10,000 in similar damages. The court ruled that the COs were entitled to qualified immunity, referencing 1985 standards that did not recognize a clearly established Eighth Amendment right for inmates requiring COs to risk their safety for protection. This position was later challenged by the Eighth Circuit, which stated in Williams v. Mueller (1994) that deliberate indifference occurs when a guard present during an assault fails to intervene. However, it clarified that unarmed guards’ inaction does not constitute a violation if intervention could lead to serious injury. The warden, sued personally, could not be liable for state actions. During the attack, COs including Keller and John Mills attempted to intervene but were ineffective. Houston, the assailant, continued to stab Solesbee despite commands to stop, ultimately fleeing when backup arrived. Solesbee suffered multiple stab wounds but eventually recovered without ongoing treatment. Acting pro se, Solesbee filed actions under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 against Sewell and Basic, which were consolidated, but summary judgment was granted to the defendants on his Fourteenth Amendment claims.

A jury trial concluded with a verdict in favor of Sewell, while Solesbee was awarded $199,000 against five appellants, who are prison officials. Following the trial, the magistrate judge granted judgment as a matter of law to seven defendants, and the prison officials appealed. The appeal centers on an Eighth Amendment claim, which prohibits cruel and unusual punishment and obligates prison officials to protect inmates from harm by other inmates. Solesbee's claim was based on the defendants' failure to protect him, while the appellants argued that the evidence was insufficient to support a constitutional violation.

To establish an Eighth Amendment violation, a claim requires both an objective and subjective element. The objective element necessitates that the harm suffered is sufficiently serious, which the appellants concede was met. The subjective element requires demonstrating that prison officials acted with deliberate indifference regarding the inmate's safety. This involves proving that officials were aware of a substantial risk of serious harm, that they drew the inference of that risk, and that they disregarded it.

The ongoing attack by another inmate was evident to the correctional officer (CO) appellants, and the case focuses on whether their actions amounted to a disregard of that risk constituting a constitutional violation. The jury was instructed that prisoners have a right to reasonable protection from violence and that a violation occurs if prison officials act with deliberate indifference, allowing one inmate to attack another without intervention.

The appellate court will uphold the verdict if there is substantial evidence in favor of the prevailing party, and it will not overturn a judgment if a reasonable jury could have reached the same conclusion. The denial of a motion for a new trial will only be reviewed for abuse of discretion under exceptional circumstances.

The court found sufficient evidence to uphold the verdicts against the correctional officers (COs) and denied the need for a new trial. The COs claimed they were unaware of any risk Houston posed to Solesbee before the attack, argued they were not legally obligated to intervene due to potential personal harm, and stated their response was reasonable and consistent with their training. The court clarified that liability for each CO begins at the moment they became aware of the attack, noting the ongoing risk of harm until Houston was subdued.

The COs referenced previous case law to assert they could not be held liable without prior warning of the risk, but the court explained Solesbee's claim did not rely on prior knowledge. They also cited a case suggesting no Eighth Amendment duty exists to intervene in inmate attacks if self-harm is a risk. However, a reasonable response to a known threat is sufficient to avoid liability, even if harm occurs.

The court highlighted that the COs were not trained for intervening in knife fights and were instructed to prioritize their safety, with physical intervention potentially inciting other inmates. Yet, substantial evidence suggested their responses were unreasonable. Testimony revealed that CO Sue Mills, concerned for property rather than safety, did not intervene after noticing the attack. The verbal commands from COs Keller, Basic, Ogunsile, and John Mills had no effect, and they did not summon backup or use available tools to stop the attack, which only ceased when Captain Sewell and others arrived. Some corrections officials indicated that departmental policy was followed, but testimony from COs suggested they might have acted differently.

Keller, a correctional officer (CO) with only two weeks on the job, reported having intervened in fights at personal risk. CO Larry Arrowood, who witnessed the attack on inmate Houston, indicated he might have attempted to control the situation. Meanwhile, other COs, including Sanders, only issued verbal commands and threw chairs, showing a lack of proactive intervention. There was conflicting testimony regarding the crowd size during the incident, with estimates ranging from 20-50 to 400 inmates. Both Ogunsile and Basic stated they did not feel threatened by the inmates, and it was noted that inmates carried the injured Solesbee on a stretcher, not COs. Evidence suggested that the COs' responses were inadequate and that they showed deliberate indifference to Solesbee's safety, leading to the upholding of verdicts against them. Previous cases, such as Ayala Serrano v. Gonzalez and Walker v. Norris, supported judgments against COs who failed to protect inmates. The COs' claim of qualified immunity was rejected, as the duty of prison officials to protect inmates had been well established prior to the attack. The jury correctly considered the case regarding COs' failure to intervene during inmate assaults.

In contrast, the theory of liability against the warden, Witkowski, stemmed from allegations of his knowledge of dangers in the high-risk Q-3 dorm and his failure to act. Jury instructions indicated that the warden could be liable if he tacitly approved of or failed to correct his subordinates' violations of constitutional rights. However, Solesbee did not provide sufficient evidence to establish the warden's liability. His claim included that the warden understaffed the dorms against a consent decree requiring three COs per dormitory, which exacerbated safety risks.

Only two correctional officers (COs), Price and Sanders, were officially assigned to Q-3 during the attack; however, there were more officers present than required by the consent decree. Consequently, the absence of a CO in each wing could not be deemed the proximate cause of Solesbee's injuries. The warden, who had been in his position for less than two months prior to the incident, was not responsible for the training of the COs, as he inherited the officers assigned to him. The court found insufficient grounds to attribute a lack of training or the staffing pattern to the cause of Solesbee's injuries. The judgment against Warden Witkowski was reversed. The verdicts awarded included $40,000 in compensatory and punitive damages against the warden and $16,500 each against Basic, Ogunsile, and John Mills, with $10,000 against Sue Mills. Earlier cases indicated that COs could claim qualified immunity for failure to intervene in inmate assaults unless there was a clear Eighth Amendment violation. The court highlighted that, while earlier rulings were more lenient, subsequent standards required prison officials to act when present during an assault. The warden was sued only in his personal capacity, limiting liability. Additional officers, such as Keller and Sue Mills, were conducting duties outside of Q-3 but were nonetheless present at the facility.