Court: Court of Appeals of Washington; November 16, 1988; Washington; State Appellate Court
Nearing filed a lawsuit against Golden State Foods Corporation for racial discrimination, citing RCW 49.60.180, but his case was dismissed due to not being initiated within the 3-year statute of limitations. He argued that the statute was tolled under RCW 4.16.170. The trial court found that RCW 4.16.170 had either been amended or repealed by new legislation or was superseded by Supreme Court rules regarding action commencement. However, the appellate court reversed this decision, affirming that RCW 4.16.170 remained effective and applicable to the case. Nearing’s first attorney served a summons on October 18, 1985, within the limitation period, although no complaint was filed at that time. A subsequent attorney filed both a summons and complaint on January 16, 1986. The court concluded that the initial service of summons did not suffice to initiate the action according to CR 3, which necessitates that a complaint be served alongside the summons or filed to toll the statute of limitations. Nonetheless, the appellate court highlighted that CR 3 explicitly refers to RCW 4.16.170, thus indicating that the statute governs this matter and was not superseded by the court rules. The court also noted that the presumption against implied repeal of statutes applies, and no evidence supported the claim that RCW 4.16.170 had been amended or repealed.
Repeal by implication requires that either (1) a later act completely covers the subject matter of the earlier legislation and is intended to supersede it, or (2) the two acts are so contradictory that they cannot coexist. In this case, the criteria for repeal do not apply, as the housekeeping legislation does not address the relevant subject matter, nor does any other statute or rule. Notably, the absence of the statute in the repeal schedule of the later act reinforces the reluctance to find repeal by implication.
Nearing contends that the trial court incorrectly ruled that RCW 4.16.170 was not complied with due to a different summons being filed than the one served. The conclusion reached is that the filed summons need not be identical to the served summons, provided they are substantially similar. Golden State did not dispute the initiation of the action but claimed it was untimely, leaving the court to focus solely on statutory compliance for tolling the statute of limitations.
The distinction between procedural and substantive law is highlighted, noting that procedural rules cannot alter substantive law. The court identifies a lack of Washington cases directly addressing whether tolling statutes of limitations are procedural or substantive. The 1984 legislation, which amended various sections in RCW Title 4, did not reference RCW 4.16.170, emphasizing that the housekeeping statute does not constitute a complete act in this context. Previous cases are mentioned, suggesting they may have assumed similar requirements without explicitly addressing the current issue.
