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United States v. $405,089.23 U.S. Currency, Charles Arlt, James Wren, Payback Mines, Claimants-Appellants
Citations: 56 F.3d 41; 95 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 3964; 95 Daily Journal DAR 6883; 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 12946; 1995 WL 321826Docket: 93-55947
Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit; May 30, 1995; Federal Appellate Court
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals amended its opinion regarding the case of United States v. $405,089.23 U.S. Currency, affirming the denial of a petition for rehearing and rejecting the suggestion for rehearing en banc. The panel's decision indicated that the government cannot both convict a drug dealer for trafficking and pursue civil forfeiture of the proceeds, as this would violate the Double Jeopardy Clause by imposing dual punishments for the same offense. Circuit Judge Rymer, dissenting, argued that this decision could potentially release many drug dealers, asserting that civil forfeiture serves as a remedial sanction and does not constitute punishment for double jeopardy purposes, referencing the Supreme Court's previous ruling in United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms. Rymer contended that the panel misinterpreted the Supreme Court's stance on related cases, suggesting that this interpretation undermines established precedent. Halper's case did not address civil forfeiture but focused on civil fines under the False Claims Act. The Court clarified that civil sanctions that serve retributive or deterrent purposes are considered punishment. In the Austin case, the Court extended this reasoning to civil forfeitures of property under drug laws, concluding that such forfeitures trigger the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment when they serve a punitive function. The panel's opinion conflates Halper's cautious approach, which applies to exceptional cases, with a general rule for routine cases and improperly merges the analysis of excessive fines with double jeopardy considerations. It incorrectly equates forfeitable proceeds with tangible property used in drug offenses. The author highlights a conflict with the Fifth Circuit's stance that proceeds forfeiture cannot constitute punishment for double jeopardy, as it involves property the defendant never had a legal claim to. The author questions whether the Supreme Court has shifted its position on the punitive nature of forfeiture and expresses concern over the implications of the panel's reading of excessive fines and double jeopardy jurisprudence, especially regarding the civil forfeiture program's national importance. A recent high-profile case involving an alleged drug dealer, Pius Ailemen, illustrates the potential consequences of the ruling, as it may allow him to evade charges based on double jeopardy. The author also notes Halper's standard for assessing disproportionate penalties and discusses the implications of the Montana Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch case, which reinforced concerns regarding double jeopardy but only briefly referenced Austin.