Kenneth Duane Roy v. James Gomez John Van De Kamp and William Merkle
Docket: 94-15994
Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit; June 9, 1995; Federal Appellate Court
Kenneth Duane Roy appeals the denial of his habeas corpus petition concerning his 1983 California convictions for first degree murder and robbery. He contends that the jury's conviction was flawed due to the Superior Court's jury instruction not aligning with the standards set in *People v. Beeman*. Roy's case involved the deaths of Archie Mannix and James Clark, whose bodies showed signs of stabbing and drowning after an encounter with Roy and Jesse McHargue. Following their arrest, evidence linked Roy to the crimes, including a knife and personal items belonging to Mannix found in his possession.
At trial, the prosecution presented two theories for first degree murder: premeditation and felony murder. The jury convicted Roy of second degree murder for Clark's death but acquitted him of robbery related to Clark. However, they convicted him of first degree murder for Mannix's death. Roy argues that the second degree murder verdict negates premeditation for the first degree conviction, thereby making the validity of his first degree murder conviction reliant solely on the felony murder theory related to aiding and abetting the robbery of Mannix. Judge Hug dissented, indicating a differing opinion on the case's legal interpretation.
The trial court provided the jury with specific instructions regarding the special circumstance of murder committed during a robbery. To establish this circumstance, the jury had to find that the murder occurred while the defendant was engaged in or an accomplice to the robbery, and that it was committed to further the robbery, not merely incidental to it. Additionally, the jury was informed that anyone involved in the robbery, knowing its unlawful purpose, could be found guilty of first-degree murder, regardless of whether the killing was intentional or accidental.
The jury was instructed on the concept of aiding and abetting, which included that an aider must not only know the unlawful purpose but also intend to facilitate the crime. However, a critical error, known as the Beeman error, occurred because the court failed to instruct the jury that an aider and abettor must intend to encourage the commission of the robbery. This omission was not identified until after the trial, and the California Court of Appeal upheld the felony murder conviction, deeming the Beeman error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
The district court also found the error harmless, reasoning that a rational juror could not conclude that the defendant aided in the robbery without also inferring intent to assist in the unlawful act. The appeal argues that the lack of a Beeman instruction on intent, considered an essential element of the crime, necessitates a new trial based on the precedent set in Carella. However, it is emphasized that the analysis should focus on what the jury actually determined, suggesting that any rational verdict would imply that the jury found the defendant intended to assist in the robbery. The review requires examining the overall jury instructions and verdict to ascertain whether the jury made the necessary factual findings to support the conviction despite the incomplete instruction.
Roy contends that the jury could have concluded he was aware of McHargue's intent to rob Mannix and assisted him without having the intent to actively participate in the robbery. His defense presented expert testimony suggesting that Roy's mental capacity was impaired due to intoxication and immaturity, arguing that this prevented him from forming any intent, especially the intent to assist in the robbery. The state countered with evidence that the jury was entitled to disbelieve the defense's experts. Based on the evidence, it was determined that no reasonable jury could fail to find that Roy intended to aid McHargue in the robbery. Although hypothetical scenarios could be proposed to suggest otherwise, the jury received evidence that undermined Roy's claim of incapacity, and they did not accept this defense.
The conclusion, consistent with previous court decisions, is that the jury’s verdict logically implied that Roy intended to assist McHargue with knowledge of his purpose. For Roy to obtain habeas relief, he would need to demonstrate that a trial error substantially influenced the jury's decision or that there was "grave doubt" regarding the impact of such an error.
In dissent, Judge Hug emphasizes that the majority misapplies precedent by not focusing on what the jury actually decided regarding Roy's intent. The dissent points out that the trial court committed a "Beeman error" by failing to instruct the jury that they must find Roy intended to encourage the robbery to convict him of aiding and abetting. The dissent argues that while evidence could support a finding of intent, there is no definitive indication that the jury reached that conclusion.
Furthermore, the dissent critiques the majority for engaging in harmful error analysis, asserting that the jury might have reasonably found that Roy's intent was to assist McHargue in self-defense rather than to facilitate a robbery. The dissent concludes that the jury did not make the necessary finding of intent required for felony first-degree murder, rendering the error not harmless, and advocates for granting the habeas corpus petition for the first-degree murder conviction while allowing the second-degree murder conviction to stand.
