Court: Court of Appeals of Washington; November 18, 1985; Washington; State Appellate Court
The State appeals the dismissal of DWI charges against Sam Prok, arguing that suppression of evidence should have been the remedy instead of dismissal, following a violation of JCrR 2.11(c). The incident occurred on December 3, 1983, when Prok was arrested after a car accident. There was ambiguity regarding whether his observed symptoms were due to intoxication or a head injury. Prok, a Cambodian speaker, claimed he did not understand his Miranda rights, particularly his right to an attorney. The district court found a violation of JCrR 2.11(c) and dismissed the case, a decision upheld by the Snohomish County Superior Court.
JCrR 2.11(c)(1) mandates that individuals in custody must be clearly informed of their right to counsel, including that those unable to afford an attorney are entitled to one without charge. The courts determined that Prok's inability to comprehend the warnings constituted a violation of this rule, consistent with constitutional rights established in Miranda v. Arizona. The courts maintained that the responsibility to ensure understanding lies with the police, and that the requirements of JCrR 2.11(c)(1) do not impose an additional burden on law enforcement.
The dismissal of charges correlates with precedents like State v. Fitzsimmons, where dismissal was deemed appropriate due to a violation of the right to counsel in a DWI context, as the loss of evidence could impede the defendant's ability to mount a defense. Tacoma v. Heater further supports this by emphasizing the critical nature of timely legal access for effective defense preparation. The ruling affirms the lower courts' conclusion that dismissal, rather than suppression, is the correct remedy in this case.
The defendant was required to provide evidence demonstrating his sobriety at the time of arrest, ideally through disinterested witnesses and a medical blood test, as evidence of intoxication diminishes over time. The court dismissed the City's argument that testimony from friends could suffice, emphasizing that jurors would likely give more credence to an arresting officer's account. It noted that denying a defendant the opportunity to secure compelling evidence constitutes a deprivation of constitutional rights, regardless of whether it resulted in actual harm.
In discussing relevant case law, the court referenced *Evergreen District Court*, where a defendant's Miranda warning was delayed, leading to evidence suppression. The distinction was made that while the right to counsel under JCrR 2.11(c) attaches upon custody, the defendant in *Evergreen* was not deprived of counsel during critical intoxication periods, unlike Prok, who was not properly informed of his right to counsel in time to mount a meaningful defense.
The court found similarities between Prok’s situation and *Fitzsimmons*, agreeing that Prok's lack of timely counsel notification hindered his ability to contact a lawyer during a critical time. The State's argument that a distinction exists between denial of access to counsel and failure to advise was rejected, as the purpose of informing defendants of their rights is to enable their exercise.
The court concluded that suppression of the Breathalyzer results would be insufficient since it would not eliminate other incriminating evidence, thereby leaving the defendant at a disadvantage. While the State argued against dismissal due to potential prosecution burdens, the court clarified that dismissal in such cases is appropriate when JCrR 2.11(c) has been violated, and that the duty to inform defendants of their rights already exists. The ruling was affirmed, with concurrence from Judge Ringold.
