State v. Robinson

Citations: 35 Wash. App. 898; 671 P.2d 256; 1983 Wash. App. LEXIS 2927Docket: No. 5296-6-III

Court: Court of Appeals of Washington; October 18, 1983; Washington; State Appellate Court

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Kenneth D. Robinson appeals his convictions for second-degree burglary and third-degree theft, raising three key issues: whether the trial court applied the wrong standard of proof to his motions to dismiss and for arrest of judgment; whether the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; and whether the trial court erred by not defining intent as an element of accomplice liability. The court affirmed the convictions.

During a drinking session at Vickie Griffin's home, Robinson and others discussed stealing beer from the Chalet Restaurant. Initially reluctant, Robinson ultimately accompanied two others to the Chalet. Testimony varied; Authier claimed Robinson acted as a lookout but later carried a case of beer, while Midland stated Robinson refused to enter or carry anything. Robinson did not testify due to a prior conviction being admissible for impeachment.

Robinson’s counsel argued the State failed to provide sufficient evidence for a conviction, prompting the court to deny the motion to dismiss, incorrectly applying a substantial evidence standard instead of the required beyond a reasonable doubt standard. The court recognized that the proper standard, established in State v. Green, requires a review of whether evidence could reasonably support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, extending this standard to motions in arrest of judgment and motions to dismiss.

The court examined whether sufficient evidence existed for a rational jury to conclude that Robinson committed the charged acts, focusing on Authier's testimony and Midland's expectation of Robinson acting as a lookout. Robinson argued that Authier's intoxication undermined his credibility, thus failing to meet the reasonable doubt standard. However, the jury was responsible for assessing witness credibility. The court clarified that it need only consider evidence favorably towards the State and determine if it met the reasonable doubt standard, rather than substantial evidence. 

Robinson also contended that the trial court erred by not including a proposed instruction regarding the necessity of intent for a bystander to be considered an accomplice. The proposed language was derived from In re Wilson, which emphasized that mere presence does not equate to complicity in a crime without intent to aid. The court referenced State v. Wilson, which clarified that physical presence alone, with knowledge of the crime, is insufficient for aiding and abetting charges. The absence of specific language about being "ready to assist" constituted reversible error, and criminal intent can be inferred from a defendant's conduct. 

The court concluded that the existing WPIC 10.51 instruction adequately addressed Robinson's intent, stating that both presence and readiness to assist must be proven for accomplice liability. The court acknowledged ongoing confusion regarding this language and suggested alternative wordings for clarity in future cases.

The document proposes two alternative rewrites for the definition of "aid" in relation to criminal conduct. The first alternative asserts that "aid" encompasses all forms of assistance, including presence at the scene, thereby indicating that a person ready to assist is aiding in the crime. The second alternative specifies that mere presence alone does not qualify someone as an accomplice but reiterates that readiness to assist constitutes aiding in the crime. Both alternatives do not benefit Mr. Robinson, as evidence against him exceeds mere presence, but they provide clarity for prosecutors, defendants, juries, and reviewing courts in cases of slight evidence of aid. The conviction is affirmed, with Justices McInturff and Edgerton concurring. Relevant statutes are cited, including RCW 9A.08.020, which outlines legal accountability for accomplices, and RCWs 9A.52.030 and 9A.56.050, defining second-degree burglary and third-degree theft, respectively. The court opinion applied a substantial evidence standard, as noted in the State v. Theroff case. The jury instruction WPIC 10.51 clarifies that an accomplice can be guilty regardless of their presence at the scene, emphasizing the broad meaning of "aid."