Merilyn Ludwig, Special Administrator of the Estate of James Robert Ludwig, Deceased v. Charles Anderson, Individually and as a Police Officer for the City of St. Paul Joseph Strong, Individually and as a Police Officer for the City of St. Paul City of St. Paul, a Municipal Corporation
Docket: 93-3157
Court: Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit; June 15, 1995; Federal Appellate Court
Merilyn Ludwig, as Special Administrator of her son James Ludwig's estate, appeals a district court decision that granted partial summary judgment, dismissing police officers Charles Anderson and Joseph Strong based on qualified immunity. The incident occurred on September 22, 1990, when Ludwig was shot and killed by the officers after a concerned citizen reported that he appeared mentally unstable while camping behind a Wendy's. Officer Denise Hossalla was dispatched and observed Ludwig in a makeshift shelter, initially finding him cooperative. However, upon the arrival of Officer Richard Munoz, Ludwig became agitated. Despite him handing over identification, neither officer conducted a radio check as per standard procedure. Ludwig, unresponsive to commands to reveal his hand, began retreating while gripping something under his poncho. Munoz then deployed mace, but Ludwig continued to move away without apparent effect. The court's decision to dismiss the officers was reversed on appeal.
Two squad cars arrived at the scene where Ludwig, armed with a knife, crouched in a defensive posture. Officers Hossalla and Munoz drew their weapons, while other police units arrived, including Robert Lodmell, who turned off his lights to avoid escalating the situation due to Ludwig's potential emotional disturbance. Lodmell observed Ludwig moving away from the officers before Ludwig fled north into the woods, pursued by several officers including Hossalla, Munoz, Johnson, Lodmell, and Strong.
Sergeant Anderson, the ranking officer, arrived after hearing a dispatch about an emotionally disturbed individual, although he later denied having that knowledge. Upon reaching the scene, he saw Ludwig running and attempted to stop him by hitting him with his squad car at 30-40 mph, but Strong estimated the car was still moving at 10-15 mph when it made contact. Ludwig managed to vault over the car after the impact.
Following this, officers formed a semicircle around Ludwig, demanding he drop the knife. Anderson joined the confrontation, and Ludwig alternated holding the knife by the blade and handle, indicating potential aggression. When Ludwig asked for Anderson's name and badge number, he refused to comply with orders and made statements suggesting a desire for confrontation. While Anderson recognized the possibility of Ludwig being emotionally disturbed, he expressed uncertainty based on Ludwig's calm demeanor and lack of visible agitation during the encounter.
Anderson directed Simmons to use mace against Ludwig, despite knowing it could exacerbate Ludwig's emotional distress. Simmons, lacking guidance to avoid using mace on emotionally disturbed individuals, complied and maced Ludwig, who then ran towards a street with pedestrians visible to Anderson. Without any warning, Anderson shot Ludwig twice from a distance of 8 to 15 feet, firing the second shot less than a second after the first. Although Ludwig flinched, he continued running. Strong, another officer, yelled about having a shotgun and shot Ludwig after Anderson’s shots, causing Ludwig to fall. Strong stated he did not feel immediate danger due to Ludwig’s distance and running away, but shot to prevent potential harm to bystanders. However, Ludwig was approximately 50 feet from the nearest bystander and running away from them, with the closest bystanders about 150 feet away at the time of the shooting. Witnesses, including Simmons and Lodmell, confirmed that Ludwig did not approach any officers menacingly during the incident. Anderson’s claim that Ludwig was lunging at officers is contradicted by earlier statements and other officers' accounts. Various officers were deposed, and the district court considered an expert affidavit from Dr. George Kirkham, who criticized the officers' actions as a violation of law enforcement standards, deeming their use of force excessive. Summary judgment may be granted when the evidence shows no genuine issue of material fact, and the court reviews such decisions de novo, favoring the nonmoving party, Merilyn Ludwig, in its evaluation.
Under the doctrine of qualified immunity, government officials are protected from civil liability for actions taken while performing discretionary functions unless their conduct infringes upon clearly established statutory or constitutional rights that a reasonable person would recognize. The specific rights violated must be clearly understood, allowing room for mistaken judgments but not for those acting incompetently or knowingly breaking the law.
The applicability of qualified immunity is assessed through a three-part analysis: (1) whether a constitutional right violation was asserted by Merilyn Ludwig against Sergeant Anderson or Officer Strong; (2) whether the law regarding that right was clearly established at the time of the incident; and (3) if a violation occurred, whether the officials can show there are no material factual disputes regarding the reasonableness of their actions based on the circumstances they faced.
In this case, apprehension through deadly force constitutes a seizure under the Fourth Amendment. It is established that Ludwig was seized; thus, the key questions are the nature of the seizures that occurred and their objective reasonableness. Previous rulings indicate that a seizure during police pursuit occurs only if a stop is made, although a seizure can happen when force is applied or if the individual submits to authority.
The court determined that Ludwig experienced two potentially unreasonable seizures: first, when Anderson attempted to strike him with a squad car, and second, when he was shot. However, the application of mace on Ludwig did not violate any clearly established rights, indicating that while there were problematic actions, not all were unlawful under established legal standards.
Anderson and Strong's justification for using deadly force against Ludwig hinges on the objective reasonableness of their actions based on the law and the circumstances they faced. Objective reasonableness requires a balancing of the intrusion on Ludwig's Fourth Amendment rights against the governmental interests claimed to justify that intrusion. The Supreme Court's standard in Garner allows for the use of deadly force if an officer has probable cause to believe the suspect poses a serious threat to themselves or others. This standard applies to any seizure involving deadly force, which is considered highly intrusive and detrimental to judicial processes.
In this case, the district court concluded that Anderson and Strong's use of deadly force was objectively reasonable, believing Ludwig posed an immediate danger due to his behavior—waving a knife and fleeing in the presence of bystanders. However, the court's determination that Ludwig's emotional state was irrelevant to the officers' actions is contested. Key points against this conclusion include the acknowledgment of Ludwig's emotional disturbance, the officers' training in managing such individuals, and the significant differences in police procedures for emotionally disturbed versus stable persons.
The St. Paul police manual outlines protocols for the use of force, particularly regarding emotionally disturbed individuals. It emphasizes that reasonable physical force should only be applied after exhausting all other alternatives, and deadly force may only be used to protect oneself or others from apparent death or serious harm. The manual prohibits firearm discharge in misdemeanor or gross misdemeanor situations. For handling emotionally disturbed persons, officers are instructed to assess the situation, protect all involved, gather information, and de-escalate tension without showing force. Officers should build rapport and practice restraint, as haste can worsen the situation.
Although these guidelines do not establish constitutional rights, they inform the assessment of excessive force claims. Ludwig's status as emotionally disturbed is relevant to evaluating the reasonableness of the officer's actions during the trial, though it does not confer additional rights regarding qualified immunity. The question of qualified immunity hinges on whether the officer violated clearly established law, while the merits focus on the legality of the arrest itself.
The case raises critical questions about whether Ludwig's behavior posed a real threat of serious harm and whether deadly force was necessary to prevent his escape. The analysis indicates that attempting to apprehend Ludwig by striking him with a moving squad car constitutes using deadly force. The officer involved, Anderson, asserts he was nearly stopped at impact, while another estimate suggests he was traveling at 10 to 15 miles per hour when he struck Ludwig, who had just ceased running and expressed fatigue. Material questions of fact remain regarding the appropriateness of the officers' perception of Ludwig as a serious threat.
Material issues of fact exist regarding whether Anderson employed deadly force appropriately. If Anderson's car was nearly stopped and used as a barricade, the force may not have been unreasonable; however, if the car was moving at 15 miles per hour, the force could be deemed excessive. Without resolving factual disputes, Anderson cannot claim qualified immunity in attempts to strike Ludwig with the vehicle.
Additionally, questions remain about the objective reasonableness of the shooting incident. At the time Ludwig was shot, eight officers were present, and he was approximately 150 feet from the nearest bystander. Ludwig was seen only with a knife, and there was no evidence of him posing an immediate threat, as he did not advance towards the officers. Officer Strong admitted he did not fear for his safety and shot Ludwig to prevent a potential approach towards bystanders, although Ludwig was not currently attempting to do so.
The officers' accounts are inconsistent regarding key details, including the distance to bystanders and Ludwig's actions at the time of the shooting. These discrepancies, combined with expert testimony, indicate substantial factual issues that need to be resolved regarding whether Ludwig posed a threat warranting deadly force.
Qualified immunity issues hinge on factual disputes; thus, summary judgment is inappropriate. Furthermore, while officers are required to provide warnings before using deadly force when feasible, neither Anderson nor Strong issued a warning before shooting Ludwig. Although the absence of a warning does not inherently render the use of deadly force unconstitutional, it compounds the potential unconstitutionality of their actions.
Sergeant Anderson and Officer Strong should have known that their conduct under these circumstances could violate Ludwig's constitutional rights, yet they acted without hesitation. The facts suggest that Ludwig was initially suspected of being homeless and emotionally disturbed, later linked to minor criminal activity that posed no immediate threat. Given the inconsistencies in testimonies and the overall circumstances, Ludwig's case should proceed to trial.
The judgment of the district court has been reversed, and the case is remanded for trial against the City of St. Paul. The testimonies regarding the distance between Anderson and Ludwig vary significantly, with estimates ranging from 8 to 25 feet. The case highlights the evidentiary challenges typical of deadly force incidents, where police officers are often the sole surviving witnesses. Although multiple constitutional violations were alleged, all excessive force claims are analyzed under the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness standard, rather than substantive due process.
At the time of the shooting, Ludwig's alleged criminal actions were classified as misdemeanors, including possession of a knife without a permit and fifth-degree assault with a dangerous weapon. Officer Strong noted that Ludwig was approximately 50 feet from the nearest bystander, while Officer Johnson stated that bystanders were 50 yards away when the shots were fired. Officer Lodmell indicated that Ludwig was running toward people when shot, but Strong asserted that continuing in that direction would not have posed an immediate threat.
Sergeant Anderson observed a gathering of people as police surrounded Ludwig but lost concern for their safety when Ludwig ran away. Strong justified his decision to shoot by stating it was to prevent Ludwig from potentially harming others. Officer Lodmell testified that Ludwig remained in a relatively fixed position during the incident and did not approach any officers. Testimonies varied regarding Ludwig's movements, with Anderson describing backward motion while making forward lunges and Johnson indicating Ludwig only stepped towards him once. Officer Simmons confirmed he did not see Ludwig run towards any police officer.
