Court: Court of Appeals of Washington; August 23, 1982; Washington; State Appellate Court
Audrey Ruud filed a personal restraint petition seeking a reevaluation of her parole eligibility date or a hearing before the Board of Prison Terms and Paroles. Her petition was denied. Ruud is serving a mandatory life sentence for first-degree murder. Following signs of psychotic behavior while confined in 1972, she was transferred to Western State Hospital but left without permission, leading to her return and a certification of "continuous confinement" starting from her 1972 return rather than her initial 1969 confinement. Consequently, her earliest parole eligibility was set for February 14, 1986, instead of January 19, 1983.
Ruud argues that RCW 9.95.115, which governs the calculation of confinement periods, should not apply to her involuntary absence due to her mental state. She claims it is unfair and violates her due process rights to extend her minimum term based on an absence for which she was not mentally responsible. The court noted that the statute is clear and does not differentiate between voluntary and involuntary absences, nor does it consider the mental state of the prisoner during such absences. The court concluded that RCW 9.95.115 applies regardless of the circumstances of the absence, suggesting any legislative change is outside judicial purview.
Additionally, Ruud claimed a constitutional liberty interest in receiving credit for time served prior to her absence, arguing she expected to be eligible for parole after 20 years of continuous confinement unless interrupted by an "actual escape." She referenced Morrissey v. Brewer, which recognized a parolee's conditional liberty interest, but the court distinguished between the deprivation of an existing liberty (parole) and the denial of a desired conditional liberty (discretionary parole-release).
In Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal Correctional Complex, the court determined that the petitioner lacked a constitutionally protected expectation regarding parole, as such an expectation was not founded in constitutional law. The petitioner referenced state law cases, notably Monohan v. Burdman and In re Sinka, to argue for a justifiable expectation. Monohan involved the cancellation of a tentative parole release date, while Sinka dealt with the setting of a discretionary minimum term. However, the current case pertains to a mandatory life sentence, where no tentative parole date had been established. Under RCW 9.95.115, the parole board can grant parole to life term prisoners only after they have been continuously confined for 20 consecutive years, less any earned good time. Until these conditions are met, the petitioner cannot claim a justifiable expectation based on state law. The court also noted that the mental state of the petitioner during periods of unauthorized absence from custody does not influence the parole board's decisions regarding mandatory minimum sentences. The court upheld the redetermination of the petitioner's mandatory minimum sentence without a hearing and denied the personal restraint petition. RCW 9.95.115 specifies that parole for life term prisoners requires a certification of meritorious conduct by the penitentiary or reformatory superintendent after the requisite period of confinement.
