United States v. Ruben Manzanarez-Mercoda, United States of America v. Damian Franco-Lopez
Docket: 94-30027
Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit; May 1, 1995; Federal Appellate Court
Ruben Manzanarez-Mercoda and Damian Franco-Lopez appealed their convictions for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). They contested the district court's refusal to disclose the identity of a confidential informant and the denial of an in camera hearing regarding this informant. Additionally, they argued that the search violated the "knock-and-announce" requirement under 18 U.S.C. § 3109.
The facts reveal that an officer received a tip from a confidential informant about cocaine sales occurring in a motel room. A search warrant was obtained, and on April 29, 1993, officers announced their presence but forced entry after a brief wait when no response was heard. Upon entry, they found one co-defendant in the room and the other defendant fleeing toward the kitchen. Following their arrests, both defendants provided statements after being read their Miranda rights.
Subsequently, both defendants filed motions to suppress evidence and compel the informant's identity, which were denied by a magistrate and affirmed by the district court. The court found that the officers adhered to the "knock and announce" statute and justified their entry due to exigent circumstances. A jury trial led to guilty verdicts for both defendants, resulting in sentences of 78 months for Manzanarez-Mercoda and 94 months for Franco-Lopez, each with three years of supervised release.
Jurisdiction for the case was established under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3231 for the district court and 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1291 for appellate review. The judgment was entered on January 20, 1994, with defendants filing a timely appeal the following day. The critical discussion centers on the denial of a motion to disclose the identity of a confidential informant (CI) and the refusal to hold an in camera hearing.
The standard of review for disclosing a CI's identity is based on whether the district court abused its discretion by balancing the public interest in protecting information against the defendants' rights to prepare a defense. Disclosure is warranted if it is essential for a fair determination of the case. In this instance, the appellants argued that the district court erred by not disclosing the CI's identity, asserting that it would have been relevant to their defense. However, similar to previous cases, the CI only assisted in establishing probable cause for a search warrant and did not testify at trial, making the information less critical to the defendants' convictions.
The refusal to conduct an in camera hearing was also scrutinized. In prior case law, the court found that failing to hold such a hearing was an abuse of discretion when the prosecution relied heavily on the CI’s identification of a defendant. However, in this case, the court distinguished it by noting that the defendants were not charged with offenses directly linked to the CI's observations. The magistrate concluded that the informant's previous presence at the location did not make their identity material for the defense, emphasizing that the case hinged on the evidence from April 29th, the date of the alleged offense. Thus, the motion to disclose the informant was denied.
The district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to identify the confidential informant (CI) or conduct an in-camera hearing, as the CI's testimony would pertain only to uncharged acts irrelevant to the defense. Franco-Lopez argued that his confrontation rights were violated by Detective Kerns' testimony regarding expectations of finding an individual named "Damien" at a motel, which the government contended was not hearsay but indicative of Kerns' state of mind. Violations of the confrontation clause are reviewed de novo, and if a violation is found, the prosecution must prove the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The court ruled that Kerns' statements, while implying Franco-Lopez's identity, did not constitute hearsay as they were not presented to establish the truth of the matter but rather Kerns' expectations. The defense failed to object based on relevance or confrontation clause grounds, and given the strong evidence against Franco-Lopez—cocaine and a firearm found in a room registered to him, along with his admissions regarding their ownership—the court determined any potential error was harmless and did not warrant overturning the conviction.
In a separate matter, Manzanarez-Mercoda's motion to suppress evidence claimed that officers violated the "knock-and-announce" rule under 18 U.S.C. § 3109. However, the court found that the officers had complied with the statute and that exigent circumstances justified their entry method. The statute allows officers to break into premises to execute a search warrant when they are refused entry after announcing their authority.
In United States v. Becker, the court ruled that a police entry was unconstitutional when officers announced their presence while simultaneously forcing entry. In a related case, United States v. Mendonsa, a three to five second delay between announcement and entry was deemed insufficient given minimal exigent circumstances, leading to a reversal. The Mendonsa decision referenced United States v. McConney, which established that exigent circumstances could justify a failure to wait for a response before entering forcibly. In the current case, officers reported a five to ten second interval between their announcement and entry, during which they observed no activity inside. Upon entering, they found one individual fleeing and another on a bed nearby. The warrant was based on information about a cocaine sale in the room. The situation parallels United States v. Markling, where a seven-second wait before entry was justified due to the absence of sounds and the likelihood of evidence destruction. The court concluded that the officers acted reasonably in this case and affirmed the decision. Consistency in naming the defendant, Franco-Lopez, is maintained as "Damien." The excerpt also clarifies the definition of hearsay under Fed. R. Evid. 801, which pertains to statements offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted.
