Hampton v. Lynch Motor Co.

Citations: 6 Wash. App. 644; 495 P.2d 345; 1972 Wash. App. LEXIS 1220Docket: No. 422-3

Court: Court of Appeals of Washington; March 31, 1972; Washington; State Appellate Court

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On appeal from a jury verdict in favor of Lynch Motor Company, plaintiff Onetha Hampton alleges personal injuries after falling into a grease trap on the defendant's premises. The appeal addresses issues related to jury instructions on the status of the plaintiff as a licensee versus a business invitee, wanton misconduct, and contributory negligence. On the day of the incident, plaintiff visited the premises after her husband, an employee, informed her about a vehicle for sale. After fueling her vehicle, she and her husband examined cars and returned to their vehicle. Instead of walking around the tow truck, plaintiff stepped onto a metal covering over the sump, which collapsed, causing her injury.

The plaintiff contends that she was a business invitee due to purchasing gasoline and viewing cars, while the defendant argues that the visit offered no economic benefit, as the Hamptons' financial condition would have precluded a sale. The court references McKinnon v. Washington Fed. Sav. Loan Ass’n to clarify that a business invitee is someone invited onto the property for a purpose that benefits the owner, indicating that potential benefits must be demonstrated.

An invitee, as defined by the Restatement (Second) of Torts, is a business visitor invited to enter land for business-related purposes. The plaintiff, who visited a used car lot to view a car for potential purchase, was classified as an invitee since her actions could benefit the defendant. Consequently, she was not a licensee, and instructions regarding the duty of care owed to a licensee were incorrectly provided. The defendant's arguments about reluctance to sell to employees were unconvincing, as there was no documented policy against such sales, nor had the defendant communicated any restrictions to the plaintiff. 

The defendant argued that the invitation only extended to the used car lot, not the adjoining work area where the injury occurred. This argument was rejected because there were no signs restricting access to the work area, and it was sometimes traversed by salesmen with customers. The route taken by the plaintiff was deemed appropriate as it was the shortest path to her vehicle. The court determined that the area of injury fell within the invitation, mandating that instructions should clarify the plaintiff's status as an invitee and the corresponding duties owed by the defendant.

Regarding contributory negligence, the plaintiff contended the trial court erred in instructing the jury on this issue, asserting that there was no evidence of her negligence. The court disagreed, noting that the plaintiff's choice to walk between a tow truck and a building, rather than around the front of the truck, raised questions about her negligence. The jury was tasked with interpreting whether the plaintiff failed to maintain proper lookout or acted imprudently. Lastly, an instruction requiring the plaintiff to demonstrate that a temporary unsafe condition was either brought to the defendant's attention or existed long enough for discovery under ordinary care was also challenged, indicating a need for careful consideration of the premises' safety dynamics.

The instruction in question pertains to a temporary unsafe condition not caused by the defendant or their employees. The court agrees with the plaintiff that there is no evidence to justify the instruction's application, leading to the conclusion that it should not have been given. The plaintiff contests a portion of Instruction No. 16 regarding the expectations of ordinary care while walking. The court finds that there is no evidence indicating the plaintiff was aware of any hazard, nor was it apparent, as she was unaware of the iron cover's condition until her fall. This finding allows the defendant to argue contributory negligence, asserting that the plaintiff should have noticed the cover's condition with ordinary care. The court also denies the plaintiff's proposed instruction that she did not have to keep her eyes directly in front of her, as she was entering an area with differing surface conditions. Furthermore, the plaintiff's claim that a momentary distraction should not negate her right to recover was rejected due to a lack of evidence for such distraction. Remaining claims of error are not addressed due to the absence of supporting authority. The judgment is reversed, with concurrence from Munson, C.J. and Evans, J. A rehearing petition was denied on May 30, 1972, and the Supreme Court declined review on July 21, 1972.