United States v. Eduardo A. Garcia-Camacho, United States of America v. Jose Jesus Gutierrez-Rosales

Citations: 53 F.3d 244; 95 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 2744; 95 Daily Journal DAR 4811; 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 8717; 1995 WL 222457Docket: 94-10162, 94-10189

Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit; April 17, 1995; Federal Appellate Court

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Defendants Eduardo Garcia-Camacho and Jose Jesus Gutierrez-Rosales appeal the denial of their motions to suppress evidence obtained following an investigatory stop by U.S. Border Patrol agents. They argue the agents lacked reasonable suspicion for the stop, violating the Fourth Amendment. The district court conducted an evidentiary hearing and denied the motions. Subsequently, both defendants pleaded guilty to conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine under 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846. 

On September 27, 1993, Border Patrol Agent Bernardo Madrid observed their pickup truck traveling north on Interstate 5, approximately 300 miles from the U.S.-Mexico border. Madrid had just stopped a van carrying undocumented aliens when he noticed Garcia-Camacho's truck, which was moving faster than the surrounding traffic. Notably, Gutierrez-Rosales turned to look back at the agents, displaying a "surprise" expression commonly associated with individuals attempting to evade detection. Following these observations, along with the truck’s heavy load and its similar behavior to the previously stopped van, the agents pursued the truck and activated their emergency lights. The truck eventually pulled over after one to one-and-a-half miles. Upon inspection, the agents discovered five-gallon containers, chemical sacks, and a gas cylinder, indicative of methamphetamine manufacturing. The defendants, when questioned about their citizenship, admitted to being illegal aliens and were subsequently arrested. The Ninth Circuit has jurisdiction and has reversed the lower court's decision.

Agents discovered methamphetamine manufacturing equipment, a nine millimeter handgun along with ownership papers, and a bag of red phosphorous in the truck. The defendants sought to suppress this evidence, arguing that the agents lacked reasonable suspicion for the truck stop. The district court, after an evidentiary hearing, denied the motion, citing Agent Madrid's observations, including the passenger's facial expression and the truck's heavy load as the basis for reasonable suspicion.

However, the court's determination of reasonable suspicion was reviewed de novo, following the precedent that the Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and seizures, requiring specific, articulable facts for investigatory stops. The court referenced United States v. Rodriguez, where various factors related to a suspect's behavior and vehicle were deemed insufficient for reasonable suspicion, particularly emphasizing that broad profiles cannot justify stops without individualized suspicion.

In this case, the factors presented by Agent Madrid mirrored those in Rodriguez, such as the truck's route, the defendants’ behavior, and their demographics, leading to the conclusion that the evidence did not support reasonable suspicion for the stop. The court determined that the profile used by the agents was similarly inadequate, lacking a specific basis for suspecting the defendants of criminal activity.

Factor (2) is deemed irrelevant, as established in *Gonzalez-Rivera v. INS*, where a driver's failure to acknowledge a Border Patrol vehicle cannot justify reasonable suspicion for a stop. The court emphasized that a driver’s behavior, whether avoiding or glancing at a patrol car, creates a "heads I win, tails you lose" scenario for the officer and the driver. Similarly, Factor (6) lacks merit; the government’s claim that speeding past a Border Patrol car is suspicious was countered by past rulings where normal variations in driving speed near patrol cars were not deemed suspicious. Innocent driving can include slowing down or speeding up due to surrounding traffic without violating any laws, which is significant even if it isn’t determinative. 

Factor (7), which cites the "surprise" or "terror" on a passenger's face as suspicious, is also insufficient. Previous cases have assigned little weight to a defendant's nervous demeanor. Agent Madrid's subjective observations of the passenger's expressions are inconsistent and not based on objective criteria. His fluctuating impressions do not provide adequate grounds for suspicion and could lead to arbitrary enforcement by Border Patrol agents, particularly affecting minority groups. Overall, Agent Madrid’s subjective assessments contribute minimally to the government's claim for reasonable suspicion.

The government claims the defendants attempted to evade Border Patrol by accelerating after passing Agent Madrid's position and not slowing down for approximately one to one-and-a-half miles after the agents activated their emergency lights. In the precedent case Rodriguez-Sanchez, reasonable suspicion was established when a driver abruptly exited the highway while being followed by agents, which was deemed non-innocent behavior. However, the defendants in this case did not exhibit such behavior; they maintained a speed consistent with innocent driving and did not break any traffic laws. Unlike the situation in Rodriguez-Sanchez, the defendants slowed down when the emergency lights were activated and did not attempt to evade.

The government also references United States v. Franco-Munoz as a relevant precedent, claiming similarities with the current case. However, the court identifies several distinctions: (1) the area in question is not characterized as notorious for alien smuggling; (2) the defendants acknowledged the agents; (3) they were not in a rental car; (4) there is no evidence of a change in patrol shifts; (5) there is no indication that the defendants looked at the patrol car multiple times; and (6) the vehicle in Franco-Munoz was a car that appeared heavily laden with a single occupant, while the current case involves a truck with two passengers, which is less indicative of suspicious activity.

Due to these differences and the changes in case law from Gonzalez-Rivera, the court finds Franco-Munoz to be an unpersuasive authority in this instance.

The conclusions drawn by Agents Madrid and Jensen lack reasonable suspicion. Agent Madrid's profile could apply to many law-abiding individuals using Southern California highways, similar to the situation in Rodriguez. The courts in Hernandez-Alvarado, Rodriguez, and Gonzalez-Rivera emphasize that the indiscriminate detention of individuals, whether citizens or non-citizens, is unacceptable without specific, individualized, and observable evidence of criminal activity. While acknowledging the challenges faced by Border Patrol agents, it is imperative to uphold the rights of individuals to remain free from unlawful restraint or interference, unless substantiated by clear legal authority.

The ruling has been reversed by Senior District Judge Robert R. Merhige, Jr. Red phosphorous, recognized as a methamphetamine manufacturing chemical, was central to the case. The court expressed concern over the reliance on repetitive profiles used by Border Patrol agents to establish reasonable suspicion, noting that the consistency in their descriptions raises questions about their validity. A cross-examination of Agent Madrid revealed that agents were trained to interpret behaviors, such as avoiding eye contact, as indicators of illegal status. The government’s argument connecting a van containing undocumented aliens, stopped minutes before observing the defendants, to reasonable suspicion was dismissed due to a lack of evidence linking the two vehicles.

The court referenced the Hernandez-Alvarado case, which identified six factors that were deemed insufficient for establishing reasonable suspicion: nervous behavior of the occupants, a decrease in speed, the presence of a two-way antenna, the defendant's residence in a high-risk area, a license plate bracket from a drug trafficking-associated dealer, and the trunk size. The court criticized the potential for arbitrary interpretations of driving behavior as suspicious, suggesting that normal driving patterns, such as maintaining speed, could be mischaracterized as evasive. Furthermore, the court acknowledged prior findings that Border Patrol may unconsciously rely on racial stereotypes in their assessments of suspicious behavior.