Varnall Weeks v. Ronald E. Jones, Commissioner of Corrections
Docket: 95-6386
Court: Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit; May 11, 1995; Federal Appellate Court
Varnall Weeks, sentenced to death for the 1981 murder of Mark Anthony Batts, is seeking an emergency stay of execution and a certificate of probable cause from the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals. This case marks Weeks's second habeas corpus petition, following the earlier denial of his first petition and the subsequent denial of certiorari by the Supreme Court. After the Alabama Supreme Court set an execution date of May 12, 1995, Weeks filed for state collateral relief, claiming incompetence to be executed under Ford v. Wainwright. The Macon County Circuit Court conducted a comprehensive evidentiary hearing, including psychiatric evaluations, and ultimately ruled that Weeks was competent to be executed, denying relief.
Weeks's subsequent motion for a stay of execution was dismissed by the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals. He then filed a second habeas corpus petition in the Middle District of Alabama, which also denied relief, affirming that the state court's hearing was thorough and all-encompassing. On May 11, 1995, Weeks submitted an emergency motion for a stay of execution and a certificate of probable cause, raising four issues. The court recognized his ineffective assistance of counsel claim as a successive petition and considered his competency claim separately, deeming the other two claims meritless. The ruling emphasizes that under Rule 9(b) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, a second petition can be dismissed if it presents new grounds that could have been raised earlier, and the burden is on Weeks to show cause and prejudice for not doing so.
The burden of proof regarding the alleged abuse of the writ has shifted to the petitioner, who must demonstrate that he did not deliberately abandon the claim, the omission was not due to inexcusable neglect, and there was a justifiable reason for not raising it earlier. Newly discovered evidence may suffice to overcome this burden, which requires showing an external impediment that prevented counsel from raising the claim. However, the petitioner, Weeks, did not meet this burden, leading to the conclusion that his ineffective assistance of counsel claim is successive and constitutes abuse of the writ.
Regarding competency to be executed, a certificate of probable cause is issued only if the petitioner shows a substantial denial of a federal right, which must be debatable among reasonable jurists. Weeks claims he is incompetent for execution under Ford and argues that the state trial court's competency finding should not be presumed correct in federal court, as it lacked a "full and fair" hearing and applied the incorrect standard. Weeks bases his argument on the trial judge's questioning without allowing his counsel to ask questions, but this was deemed invalid. The judge's questioning aimed to understand Weeks's mental processes and was intended to clarify his competency. The court found that the judge provided ample opportunity for Weeks to present evidence and made a competency determination based on the hearing’s evidence and the judge's observations. The state court concluded that Weeks was competent to be executed, applying the American Bar Association's standard for competency.
The document addresses an emergency motion filed by Varnall Weeks regarding his competency to be executed, referencing the legal standards set forth in previous cases. It states that the court does not need to establish a specific competency standard under Ford to resolve Weeks's motion for a stay of execution and a certificate of probable cause. The court notes that the applicable standard is no more stringent than the one proposed by Weeks and utilized by the state trial judge, as supported by Martin v. Dugger. While expert opinions on mental health may assist in the competency evaluation, they are ultimately recommendations rather than definitive judgments.
The conclusion reached is that the issues presented by Weeks lack sufficient debate among reasonable jurists, indicating that they do not warrant further review. Consequently, Weeks's motion for a stay of execution and certificate of probable cause is denied.
The document further details the procedural history of a hearing on April 7, 1995, where the court began considering Weeks's petition for relief from the death sentence based on mental incompetency. The hearing was continued to April 14, 1995, due to time constraints. During the April 14 hearing, the court ensured the defense could present all relevant evidence and addressed issues regarding the attendance of key mental health experts, Dr. Blaine Crum and Dr. Joseph Thomas. The court took steps to secure their presence, including contacting them directly to attend the hearing. Dr. Thomas's compliance was initially hesitant due to concerns about the validity of the subpoena, prompting the court to issue a writ of arrest to enforce attendance.
At noon, Dr. Thomas' office notified that he would voluntarily appear and was en route from Mobile. The Court dismissed the arrest writ accordingly. It overruled the State's Motion to Reconsider the legal standard for determining a defendant's competency to be executed and provided a detailed discussion on this legal issue. Additionally, the Court denied a Motion from the Alabama Board of Pardons and Paroles to quash a subpoena for specific records, ordering the Board to submit all relevant records directly to the Court, which were later presented to the defense counsel. The defense also successfully moved for the production of the defendant’s medical records from Holman Prison, which had not been previously submitted by the Department of Corrections.
The evidentiary hearing included testimony from various medical experts, lasting two days: April 7 and April 14, 1995. The Court found that all pertinent testimony was heard and supplemented with independent legal research. The Supreme Court of Alabama scheduled the defendant's execution for May 12, 1995. The defendant, sentenced to death on June 23, 1982, following a jury conviction and a judge-sentenced penalty phase, has engaged in extensive appeals and legal proceedings since then. The only issue currently before the Court is the defendant's alleged incompetency to be executed, with all other claims deemed procedurally barred. The petition for relief is based on Title 15-16-23 of the Code of Alabama, which allows for the suspension of execution if the convict is found insane before execution.
The mode of suspending the execution of a sentence due to a convict's insanity is exclusive and cannot be reviewed or revised by any other court or judge in the state. No court has the authority to suspend a sentence from another court based on insanity. Judges retain the ability to impanel a jury to assess insanity or examine witnesses for guidance. Although the current Petition was not filed under Rule 32 of the Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure, the Court will interpret it as such to determine the issue of incompetency for execution, without assuming jurisdiction over other issues. This aligns with both Alabama law, which prohibits executing an 'insane' defendant, and the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling in Ford v. Wainwright, which forbids executing incompetent individuals. A 1988 Petition for Coram Nobis alleged inadequate consideration of the defendant's mental condition during trial and claimed ineffective assistance of counsel; however, this Petition was denied and tested in appropriate courts. The Court is only addressing the issue of incompetency for execution, not the defendant's competency to stand trial or mental status during the offense. Regarding psychotropic medication, the defendant has not received such medication since before February 1, 1995, and there is a likelihood he has not taken it for approximately a year. An expert witness confirmed that medication is not a significant factor in assessing the defendant's current competency for execution. Consequently, while the defense motion to bar involuntary administration of psychotropic medication is granted, the Court orders that such medication shall not be administered unless requested by the defendant and his legal team.
The legal principle that individuals deemed insane or incompetent cannot be executed is well-established in Anglo-American jurisprudence, dating back to Blackstone’s Commentaries. Blackstone asserted that individuals who are insane at the time of their offense or subsequent legal proceedings should not face trial or execution due to their inability to defend themselves or comprehend the proceedings. This principle has evolved into both common law and statutory law, including in Alabama, and is recognized as federal Constitutional law. However, there is no universally accepted standard for determining incompetency, leading to significant variations across states.
In the case at hand, the clarity of Alabama's statute regarding execution suspension for an "insane" defendant is questioned, as neither the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals nor the Supreme Court of Alabama has provided a clear interpretation. The defense contends that the defendant is currently "insane" in the common sense, while the State argues for a narrower interpretation aligned with the Criminal Code’s incompetency standard, which focuses on the defendant's mental state at the time of the offense. The defense advocates for the American Bar Association’s standard, asserting that individuals currently deemed mentally incompetent should not be executed, emphasizing the necessity of a stay of execution in such cases.
A convict is deemed incompetent for execution if, due to mental illness or retardation, they cannot understand the nature of the legal proceedings, the charges they faced, the reasons for their punishment, or the punishment itself. Additionally, incompetence arises if they lack the capacity to recognize factors that could render their punishment unjust or unlawful, or if they cannot communicate such information to their counsel or the court. The Eleventh Circuit's decision in Magwood v. Smith suggests that the standards for determining competency to stand trial and sanity at execution are analogous, implying that the same standards could apply in this context. The court finds the broader standard proposed by the defense, aligned with American Bar Association guidelines, more appropriate than the state’s interpretation of statutory definitions of mental disease or defect. This broader standard addresses constitutional concerns raised in Ford v. Wainwright. The defense has the burden of proving incompetency, and even with the adopted standard, the court concludes the defense failed to meet this burden. The court's interpretation expands the definition of incompetence beyond Alabama's statutory definition to avoid inadequacies regarding federal constitutional standards. The Alabama statute against executing insane defendants dates back to 1907 and was intended to limit the number of insanity claims rather than impose stricter requirements for the death penalty. The term "insane" in this context does not reflect modern medical definitions of incompetence.
All individuals are presumed competent, placing the burden of proof of incompetency on the party asserting it, which in this case is the Defendant's counsel. The court requires this burden to be met by proving incompetency to a reasonable satisfaction, akin to a preponderance of the evidence standard. The Defendant must demonstrate that he is or will be incompetent, more likely than not, either currently or at the time of execution.
The court evaluated evidence and testimonies from multiple mental health experts, all of whom agreed that the Defendant has a significant mental disorder. However, the presence of a serious mental disorder does not automatically equate to incompetence for execution. After thorough consideration, the court determined that during the hearing, the Defendant met the competency standards proposed by the defense. The judge personally observed the Defendant on two occasions in April 1995, noting that the Defendant understood the nature of the proceedings, recognized the roles of the participants, was aware of the execution date, and comprehended the implications of his execution and his conviction for murder.
Additionally, evidence presented by the State indicated that the Defendant had communicated his wishes regarding his personal effects to the warden, demonstrating a clear understanding of the situation. The Defendant's long-standing diagnosis is schizophrenia of the paranoid type, established since 1974. While the Defendant exhibits symptoms characteristic of this mental disorder, including delusions and hallucinations with religious and racial/sexual themes, such conditions do not preclude a legal determination of competency. Despite commonly perceived notions of insanity, the court found that the Defendant was competent to be executed.
Experts unanimously agree that the Defendant can respond to specific questions and articulate a common understanding of relevant matters, despite the argument from defense counsel that the Defendant’s understanding differs from that of a 'normal' person due to his delusional beliefs centered on religion and race/sex. The defense contends that these delusions impair his ability to meet the legal competency standards for execution. However, the Judge finds the defense's reliance on subjective interpretations of the Defendant's understanding speculative, especially given the Defendant's schizophrenia and paranoid delusions, which include self-identifying as divine figures.
The Defendant recognizes that execution will end his physical life, but he believes it will lead to a transformation, a view shared by many religious beliefs concerning death. The Judge acknowledges the limitations of medical expertise in addressing spiritual beliefs about the afterlife. Additionally, the argument regarding the Defendant's delusions about race and their impact on his understanding of execution lacks strong factual support, as claims of racial persecution related to the death penalty are not inherently delusional.
The Judge critiques Dr. Lyman’s interpretation of the Defendant referring to another inmate as his 'lawyer,' noting that such behavior does not indicate a failure to utilize his actual legal representation. The Court recognizes the existence of 'jailhouse lawyers' and routinely receives documentation prepared by inmates without implying incompetence. Overall, the Judge expresses skepticism toward the defense's claims of the Defendant's delusional understanding affecting his comprehension of the execution process.
Consultation with a jailhouse lawyer indicates that the Defendant possesses a degree of clarity in his thinking, contradicting Dr. Lyman's assessment of the Defendant's understanding of reality. The Court finds no competent evidence suggesting the Defendant is incapable of assisting counsel. Over nearly twenty hours of hearings, the Court closely observed the Defendant, noting unusual behavior such as wearing a headband with a domino and bringing various religious texts to court. Despite these eccentricities, the Defendant remained attentive and engaged during proceedings, even articulating an objection based on the use of circumstantial evidence, demonstrating an understanding of the situation, even if his objection lacked legal merit.
The Court concludes that the Defendant's responses to questions reveal a clear understanding of his impending execution, the reasons for it, and the roles of those involved, despite his severe mental disorder. The Court finds it inappropriate to dwell on philosophical discussions about consciousness and normalcy when assessing the Defendant's competence. Ultimately, the Court recognizes the Defendant's understanding of his circumstances as strikingly coherent, even if it exists within a delusional framework.
The discovery of a delusional pattern in the Defendant does not provide a solid foundation for determining competency for execution. The Defendant's clear ability to engage in coherent conversation is a more reliable indicator of understanding than the ambiguous assessments of experts. According to Alabama law, a hearing is necessary to assess the Defendant's competency, and execution can only be suspended if the Defendant is found incompetent at that hearing. However, precedent from Ford v. Wainwright necessitates that the Defendant must also be competent at the time of execution. The Court finds that the Defendant exhibited competence on April 7 and April 14, 1995. The determination of competency at the execution moment is challenging, yet the defense has not sufficiently proven the Defendant's likely incompetence at the scheduled execution time. The law presumes ongoing competency, which has not been disproven. The State must ensure the Defendant's mental status is periodically reviewed and evaluated by mental health experts, with updates communicated to the Court. The standard for incompetency, as proposed by the Defendant and endorsed by the American Bar Association, states that execution should be stayed if the convict cannot understand the nature of the proceedings or the punishment due to mental illness or retardation.
The Court determines that while the ultimate legal question rests with them, the standard set serves as guidance for the State and its mental health professionals to assess the defendant’s mental competency leading up to execution. The Defendant's Petition for Relief from Sentence of Death based on claims of mental incompetency is denied, and the execution is to proceed as scheduled, with conditions previously stated. The Clerk of the Court is instructed to distribute copies of this order to relevant parties, including the Defendant's counsel, the District Attorney's Office, the Attorney General's Office, the Governor's Office, the Supreme Court Clerk, and the Department of Corrections.
Concurring in part and dissenting in part, Judge Kravitch highlights the case of Varnall Weeks, who, despite being diagnosed as severely mentally ill and acknowledged as meeting the definition of insanity, faces imminent execution. Judge Kravitch criticizes the majority for addressing complex legal issues without oral argument or comprehensive review, advocating for a stay of execution and a certificate of probable cause based on the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against executing the insane. The judge references the standard established in Barefoot v. Estelle for granting a certificate of probable cause, emphasizing that Weeks has made a sufficient showing regarding his competency claim. Citing Ford v. Wainwright, Judge Kravitch points out that the Supreme Court prohibits executing an insane prisoner, noting the lack of a clear definition of insanity from the Ford decision, while acknowledging that differing interpretations of mental competency for execution have emerged in subsequent cases.
The excerpt references key legal principles surrounding the execution of individuals deemed insane, citing the case law that establishes a prisoner only needs to understand the connection between their crime and its punishment to be executed. The Eleventh Circuit examines this issue for the first time, expressing concern over the lack of a thorough evaluation of insanity under the Eighth Amendment. The dissent emphasizes the historical context, highlighting that executing an insane person is considered both inhumane and against legal principles rooted in common law.
The document discusses the background of the case involving Weeks, including the procedural history and the testimony of multiple mental health experts, with a majority supporting Weeks' claim of severe mental disorder. The court allowed additional examinations by defense-suggested experts to better understand Weeks' mental state, given the episodic nature of his condition. The judge required time to study the legal complexities surrounding competency to be executed.
Moreover, the excerpt notes that the court accepted a variety of evidence without juries present and highlights Weeks' previous conviction and the denial of certiorari by the United States Supreme Court. Weeks' legal team argues that previous courts have overlooked his mental incompetency during earlier proceedings and the alleged ineffectiveness of trial counsel.
Evidence presented by the defendant included aspects related to previously adjudicated matters, but some evidence regarding the defendant's mental condition at earlier times was allowed for its potential relevance to his current mental status. The defendant's attempts to introduce mental health evidence during collateral attacks on his conviction were largely ignored or dismissed by state and federal courts, raising questions about his trial counsel's effectiveness in failing to present mitigating evidence. Consequently, no court has addressed the fundamental issue of whether a severely mentally ill defendant deserves the death penalty. The text references significant cases and legal commentaries, highlighting that historically, Blackstone articulated that an insane person cannot undergo trial, sentencing, or execution, suggesting a consistent standard of incompetency across these stages. The discussion also emphasizes the importance of accountability in the legal system, asserting that punishment is predicated on free agency. The Supreme Court has indicated that executing an incompetent person may violate the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, although some commentators argue that the cruelty of executing an insane person is debatable. Additionally, the historical context of Anglo-American jurisprudence is noted, suggesting that the proximity of crime, trial, and execution may contribute to contemporary misunderstandings of competency standards.
A historical standard for determining insanity in criminal trials likely influenced decisions, as suggested by the 11th Circuit in Magwood v. Smith. Traditionally, "insanity" encompassed various stages of a trial when knowledge of mental illness was limited. The emergence of psychology as a distinct science and the development of diagnostic manuals like DSM IV have changed the perception of incompetence to be executed, complicating the application of the death penalty. The concept of free agency, foundational to legal accountability and civil damages, raises questions about the justification of capital punishment if the individual is deemed incapable of moral culpability.
The burden of proof for incompetence lies with the individual claiming it, reflecting the legal presumption of free agency. Competency standards for execution differ among states. For instance, Kentucky and Alabama mandate suspending executions for the insane, while Arkansas requires mental health treatment for those found incompetent. Georgia prohibits executing individuals deemed mentally incompetent. Approximately twenty-five states allow for execution suspension based on insanity or similar conditions, although many lack specific definitions of insanity. Some states, like Mississippi and North Carolina, have further refined these definitions by requiring condemned prisoners to assist in their defense, while Florida focuses on the individual's understanding of the death penalty and its implications.
Four states apply a broad standard for determining an inmate's competency for execution, requiring that the individual understands the nature of the proceedings, the charges, the purpose of punishment, and the potential for any unjust aspects of their punishment, as well as the ability to communicate this to their attorney. In Utah, the standard focuses on whether the prisoner suffers from a mental disease or defect that affects their rational understanding of the proceedings or their ability to consult with counsel. Despite these variations, all states mandate that competency must be established, though the Supreme Court has only confirmed that incompetent individuals cannot be executed, leaving a lack of uniform definitions for competency for execution. The Court has not directly addressed how to define this competency, resulting in ongoing discrepancies among states. The standards for competency to stand trial may set the outer limits for competency to be executed, given the complexities involved in capital murder trials.
Additionally, the excerpt references Alabama's legal presumption of responsibility for individuals charged with crimes and places the burden of proving incompetency on the defendant. The court noted that the defendant failed to meet the burden of proof for incompetency by clear and convincing evidence, rejecting the idea that the defendant only needed to raise the issue of insanity to shift the burden to the state.
The Court establishes that the burden of proof does not rest on the Defendant to demonstrate incompetence beyond a reasonable doubt, upholding the presumption of legal responsibility for one’s actions. The Defendant shares a diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia with a previously executed individual, Magwood. The Court's assessment of the Defendant was based on a non-testimonial conversation to evaluate his understanding of legal proceedings, rather than on sworn testimony. Expert opinions indicated that the Defendant may have intermittently struggled to comprehend legal matters, but substantial evidence was not provided to support ongoing incompetence. Despite the introduction of numerous documents by the defense, the Court found that the foundational evidence was sufficient for legal standards.
The Court noted discrepancies in the defense affidavits, particularly highlighting that Dr. Thomas's written assessment was more favorable than his in-court testimony. Observations during the proceedings indicated that the Defendant appeared to enjoy moments of courtroom interaction, raising concerns about the paradox of his understanding leading to his potential execution. The Defendant's IQ range was noted, suggesting that his cognitive abilities could have influenced his legal understanding. Dr. Thomas expressed a belief in a bipolar diagnosis for the Defendant, emphasizing the seriousness of mental health issues. The Court considered the implications of the Defendant’s mental state, referencing past Supreme Court opinions that underscore the ethical considerations surrounding executing individuals who may not comprehend their punishment. Lastly, there was an acknowledgment of conflicting circuit precedents regarding the weight given to state court competency assessments, with a consensus that the Defendant’s other claims should be denied.
