Joyce Wilson, Individually, and as Natural Guardian and Next Friend of the Minor Child, Natalie J. Wilson Est Datton Wilson, Jr. Anthony D. Wilson Anita D. Wilson Datton Wilson, III Crystal L. Johnson Kasha C. Wilson v. Luther Donald Meeks David Scott Lawson Phyllis Renee Lawson City of Haysville, a Municipal Corporation John Coleman, and Timothy John Stock Bruce K. Powers Lanon Thompson Debbie Mann J. Earl Kitchings, Joyce Wilson, Individually, and as Natural Guardian and Next Friend of the Minor Child, Natalie J. Wilson Est Datton Wilson, Jr. Anthony D. Wilson Anita D. Wilson Datton Wilson, III Crystal L. Johnson Kasha C. Wilson v. Luther Donald Meeks, and Timothy John Stock Bruce K. Powers Lanon Thompson David Scott Lawson Phyllis Renee Lawson Debbie Mann J. Earl Kitchings City of Haysville, a Municipal Corporation and John Coleman
Docket: 94-3179
Court: Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit; April 20, 1995; Federal Appellate Court
Joyce Wilson and her family, as plaintiffs, filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against members of the Haysville Police Department, alleging violations of constitutional rights through excessive force, failure to provide emergency medical treatment, and involvement in a cover-up related to the shooting death of Datton Wilson, Jr. The defendants, including police officers and the City of Haysville, sought summary judgment based on qualified immunity. The district court partially granted and partially denied this motion, finding disputed facts that required resolution at trial. The incident leading to the lawsuit occurred on December 7, 1990, following a confrontation between Mr. Wilson and David Lawson, who reported Mr. Wilson's alleged drunkenness to Officer Timothy Stock. Officer Stock relayed this information to Officer Luther Donald Meeks, who subsequently pursued Mr. Wilson to investigate. Upon arriving at Mr. Wilson's home, Officer Meeks observed him lying in his truck and later retrieving an unloaded revolver. The encounter was recorded by Officer Meeks's tape recorder in accordance with departmental policy. The appellate court ultimately reversed the district court's decision.
Officer Meeks arrived at a scene where Mr. Wilson stood by his porch with a concealed gun behind his leg, while Mr. Lawson was further away on the property. Following Mr. Wilson's directive to talk to Mr. Lawson, he insisted that Officer Meeks remove Mr. Lawson. After being warned by Officer Meeks about potential arrest for disorderly conduct, Mr. Wilson backed up toward the porch. Officer Meeks suspected Mr. Wilson was armed and demanded to see his hand, which Mr. Wilson did not comply with. Officer Meeks drew his weapon, and there is a dispute over whether Mr. Wilson aimed his gun at Officer Meeks or held it in a surrender position.
When Mr. Wilson presented his hand with the gun, Officer Meeks shot him twice. The entire exchange lasted about 43 seconds. After being shot, Mr. Wilson dry fired his weapon twice and fell face down with the gun underneath him. Officer Meeks instructed Mr. Wilson to put the gun down while maintaining his position at gunpoint and called for Officer Stock.
Officer Stock arrived shortly after, confirmed the gun was underneath Mr. Wilson, and disarmed him using a technique to prevent any potential threat while avoiding fingerprints. Officer Meeks radioed for medical assistance approximately 34 seconds after the shooting. Off-duty officer Lanon Thompson and Police Lieutenant Bruce Powers arrived soon thereafter, with Lt. Powers taking command and ordering Officer Stock to handcuff Mr. Wilson, while Officer Meeks was instructed to seal off the area.
No medical assistance was provided to Mr. Wilson before the EMTs arrived, despite him being alive and breathing while lying face down. The officers claimed they did not attempt first aid based on training not to move a breathing victim. However, plaintiffs allege that officers obstructed EMT Walter Langford's efforts to help Mr. Wilson. When Mr. Langford arrived, he found Mr. Wilson covered in blood and required the removal of handcuffs to facilitate treatment. An officer refused to assist with the handcuffs, leading to a delay in providing CPR, which was eventually performed after locating the key to the handcuffs.
Plaintiffs claim Mr. Wilson's death resulted from asphyxiation rather than gunshot wounds, supported by medical experts Dr. Kenneth Ransom and Dr. William Eckert. They assert that Mr. Wilson's prone position led to "positional asphyxiation" or inhalation of bodily fluids, and that the blood loss was insufficient to cause death. Evidence includes an audio recording from Officer Meeks' belt showing labored breathing and a photograph of Mr. Wilson's eyeglasses, allegedly contaminated with dirt and vomit. Witness William Langford reported cleaning pink liquid from Mr. Wilson's throat, and Dr. Eckert suggested Mr. Wilson could have survived if repositioned.
Following the incident, Mr. Wilson was unresponsive upon paramedics' arrival and was pronounced dead shortly after at the hospital. The plaintiffs' cover-up claims involve Debbie Mann, Haysville Police Department Communications Supervisor, and Chief of Police James Earl Kitchings, centered on four allegations: the disappearance of photographs, a witness report, a "code of silence," and alterations to the belt tape.
The missing photographs were taken after Mr. Wilson's body was removed but were lost during development, allegedly under Mann's control. Additionally, William Sample, a neighbor, provided a report of the events, which Mann was responsible for retaining. On December 9, Kitchings held a meeting where he played the belt tape and instructed officers not to discuss the case, which reportedly led to delayed and inaccurate reports. Plaintiffs argue there was a lack of proper investigation by local authorities.
Lastly, audio expert William Andrews indicated that a 4.5-second segment of the belt tape was erased, which was intact during a previous grand jury review. The legal context includes mention of qualified immunity, considered a legal question, and the potential for interlocutory appeal on this defense if material conflicts exist in the case.
Summary judgment is appropriate when, considering the facts favorably for the non-moving party, no genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The moving party must demonstrate the absence of such an issue, after which the burden shifts to the non-moving party to produce evidence that creates a genuine issue for trial. This evidence must go beyond mere allegations, requiring specific facts to support the claim.
Plaintiffs can pursue claims under Section 1983 for violations of constitutional rights, which serves as a procedural mechanism rather than creating substantive rights. Qualified immunity is an affirmative defense available to public officials against Section 1983 claims, aimed at protecting them from undue liability and trial burdens, unless their actions violate clearly established constitutional rights. When qualified immunity is invoked, plaintiffs must provide sufficient facts to demonstrate that the defendant's conduct was unlawful and that the law was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation. This "clearly established" standard requires particularization, typically through relevant case law, so that officials are adequately informed of unlawful conduct.
Defendant Meeks contests the district court's refusal to grant summary judgment on the excessive force claim, referencing the Supreme Court's ruling in Graham v. Connor that all excessive force claims should adhere to the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness standard. This standard, deemed "clearly established" for section 1983 actions, evaluates the circumstances objectively, considering factors such as the severity of the crime, potential threats to officer safety, and resistance to arrest. The plaintiffs argue that the district court correctly identified material factual disputes regarding the reasonableness of Officer Meeks' actions, particularly whether Mr. Wilson pointed a gun at him.
Officer Meeks asserts he heard a handgun being cocked and that Mr. Wilson aimed the gun at him, leading to two gunshot wounds to Mr. Wilson, one in the chest and one that severed his fingers on the trigger. Witness Rene Lawson corroborates that she saw Mr. Wilson point the gun at Officer Meeks. The plaintiffs claim Mr. Wilson held the gun in a "surrender position," a term they coined that lacks expert validation. They describe this position in two ways: the gun pointing downward or rolled sideways. However, evidence from Officer Meeks and expert Wayne Dunning does not support these claims, showing Mr. Wilson's gun was mostly pointed straight ahead or slightly downward.
Furthermore, forensic evidence regarding the bullet's path does not confirm a "surrender position," as Mr. Wilson's hand was not angled sufficiently to dispute Officer Meeks' fear for his safety. Ultimately, the description of Mr. Wilson's hand positioning does not mitigate the reasonable fear an officer would have when confronted with a gun.
Plaintiffs have mischaracterized the factual dispute as one regarding Mr. Wilson's intent to surrender. While he may have intended to surrender, the key issue is whether Officer Meeks had a reasonable fear for his life based on an objective assessment of the situation. Qualified immunity requires an officer to react reasonably to perceived threats rather than to discern the intentions of the suspect. The plaintiffs argue that Mr. Wilson could only have complied with Officer Meeks' command to "let me see that hand" by revealing his gun, but common sense suggests he could have chosen to drop the weapon or communicate his intent to surrender, especially given his training as a certified small arms expert.
Additionally, plaintiffs present three doctrinal arguments regarding excessive force. Firstly, they claim that an officer must provide a verbal warning prior to using deadly force, citing Haysville Police Department regulations. However, a violation of such regulations does not establish liability under Section 1983, and warnings are only required when "feasible." Secondly, they assert that Mr. Wilson had a right to defend himself against Officer Meeks, but provide no legal authority to support this claim. Lastly, the plaintiffs argue that Officer Meeks' command to show his hand instigated the confrontation, suggesting a citizen's right to be free from police actions that lead to a deadly force situation. However, this proposition lacks clarity in its legal grounding and is contrary to rulings in other circuits, which focus on whether the officer was in danger at the moment of the threat. Courts have ruled that the inquiry into excessive force centers on whether the officer had probable cause to believe that the suspect posed a threat at the time of the shooting.
Plaintiffs did not provide sufficient evidence to counter Officer Meeks' claim that Mr. Wilson pointed a gun at him, leading to a reasonable belief that his life was in danger during the incident, which lasted less than a minute. The specific way Mr. Wilson held the gun was deemed irrelevant. The district court incorrectly denied summary judgment based on qualified immunity. Additionally, Defendants Meeks, Powers, Stock, and Thompson contend that the district court erred by denying summary judgment regarding the claim of failure to render medical aid, arguing their obligation was met by calling for medical assistance. There are two legal standards regarding police duties to provide medical aid—one from Due Process jurisprudence, established in *City of Revere v. Massachusetts Gen. Hosp.*, which requires cities to ensure medical treatment for those injured by police, and another from Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, concerning the obligations of prison officials to provide medical care to inmates.
The court has not definitively ruled on the duty to both provide and summon medical care under the Fourteenth Amendment, with referenced cases being distinguishable as they involved no summoned medical help. The Eighth Amendment standard, articulated in *Estelle v. Gamble*, recognizes "deliberate indifference" to prisoners' medical needs as a violation of constitutional rights, extending to pretrial detainees as well. The standards converge in *Howard v. Dickerson*, where the Eighth Amendment's standard of care was applied to the Due Process rights of pretrial detainees, establishing that the deliberate indifference standard is clearly defined for section 1983 claims.
The district court referenced Maddox v. City of Los Angeles, which clarifies that the due process clause does not impose an absolute duty on police officers to provide CPR under all circumstances. The court interpreted Maddox as not negating the possibility of a duty to render aid in specific situations, but the analysis suggests that Maddox actually supports the view that there is no obligation for police to offer or summon medical assistance, even when trained in CPR. The distinction between medical aid and first aid is emphasized, noting that while first aid can be performed by anyone to sustain life until medical professionals arrive, the expectation for police to provide medical aid is inappropriate. The court acknowledges that police officers may not have a duty to provide first aid in this case.
The case involves elements of both malfeasance and nonfeasance. Plaintiffs argue that police actions aggravated Mr. Wilson's medical condition, drawing a comparison to the case of Howard, where police actions were deemed inappropriate. However, the court distinguishes this case from Howard by noting that officers could not reasonably foresee that their actions would worsen Mr. Wilson's medical situation, especially considering he was armed. The primary duty of police officers is to ensure public safety, and handcuffing an armed individual is justified and not a constitutional violation.
Additionally, the plaintiffs claim that police obstructed attempts to assist Mr. Wilson, citing only the refusal of an officer to allow Mr. Langford to perform CPR. The officer's behavior, while potentially lacking in moral consideration, does not constitute a constitutional violation, especially since Mr. Langford was able to check vital signs while waiting for the handcuffs to be removed.
Defendants assert that an Eighth Amendment claim for deliberate indifference to medical needs requires proving subjective intent akin to criminal recklessness, but this issue is not necessary to resolve. The Constitution does not empower oversight of police compassion toward injured parties nor does it permit questioning reasonable police actions within constitutional limits, as this would undermine qualified immunity. Despite acknowledging moral considerations, the circumstances do not support the plaintiffs' constitutional claims.
Defendants Stock, Powers, Thompson, Kitchings, and Mann contend that the district court erred by not granting their summary judgment motion regarding allegations of a cover-up, which plaintiffs argue deprived them of their right to access the courts. The district court indicated factual issues existed concerning the alleged alteration of a belt tape recording. Defendants claimed qualified immunity, with the district court noting if officers conspired to obstruct court access, their actions would be unreasonable. However, the court's brief analysis overlooked the necessity for plaintiffs to establish a clearly defined duty for their claim, which this circuit has not recognized, despite some other circuits acknowledging cover-up claims in dicta.
It is highlighted that even if such a duty existed, defendants would still qualify for immunity based on the facts presented. The claim that Mr. Kitchings enforced a "code of silence" regarding the shooting does not constitute a constitutional violation, as there is no obligation for police to publicly disclose shooting details. The duty to disclose may arise in legal contexts but is not constitutional in nature. There are no allegations of perjury or evidence tampering by Kitchings. Furthermore, there is no constitutional requirement for police officers to ensure the accuracy or completeness of their reports, which would be beneficial but does not indicate a cover-up. In fact, a lack of report review might suggest the absence of a conspiracy, as conspirators typically coordinate their narratives.
Plaintiffs claim that Mr. Kitchings' meeting was perceived as a directive to avoid reviewing reports, but this is unsupported by the record, which shows no such direction was given. Instead, a directive was issued to send all reports regarding the Wilson shooting to Captain Michael McElroy to centralize evidence for a civil suit. This approach was deemed appropriate, as noted by the grand jury's criticism of the Kansas Bureau of Investigation for not doing the same.
The plaintiffs further allege a lack of investigation by the Haysville Police, District Attorney, and Kansas Bureau of Investigation, but provide no evidence to support this claim. The record includes KBI autopsy photos and grand jury findings, and plaintiffs do not identify a constitutional right to demand such an investigation.
The plaintiffs’ arguments are characterized as incoherent, citing conflicting evidence about the timeline and actions surrounding the incident, which they claim suggests a cover-up. However, it is argued that such conflicting evidence more likely indicates the opposite and is irrelevant to their access to courts.
Regarding the alleged loss of Mr. Sample's statement, it is noted that a copy and deposition transcript exist, thus causing no harm to plaintiffs. The loss of photographs taken by police is acknowledged as a more serious allegation, but there is no claim of intentional destruction, and any negligence does not constitute a viable section 1983 claim. Despite the alleged carelessness, numerous other photographs from various sources are available.
Finally, allegations about the alteration of a belt tape and erasure of its initial segment are examined; however, these claims do not establish a deprivation of court access, as the plaintiffs fail to demonstrate the relevance of the erased content. Any potential alteration could stem from negligence rather than intentional wrongdoing, which was not sufficiently alleged.
Plaintiffs have not convincingly argued that the alteration of evidence affects their access to the court or their claims regarding excessive force or failure to provide medical aid. The issue of whether the gun was cocked does not significantly impact the case, as Officer Meeks' reasonable fear for his life is supported by other evidence, irrespective of the gun's state. Furthermore, the cocking of the gun is irrelevant to the medical aid issue. The court concludes that the facts do not demonstrate a violation of a clearly established constitutional duty, and the district court erred by not granting summary judgment based on qualified immunity. There are no material factual disputes, and plaintiffs' claims lack substantiation in the record, with their arguments described as bordering on misrepresentation and serving only to complicate the proceedings. The appeal is deemed meritorious, leading to the denial of plaintiffs’ motion for sanctions against the defendants, as the appeal is not considered frivolous. Remaining motions have been rendered moot. The decision of the district court is reversed.
