Hodges v. Delta Airlines, Inc.

Citations: 44 F.3d 334; 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 2904Docket: 91-06037

Court: Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit; February 15, 1995; Federal Appellate Court

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Frances Hodges sustained injuries during a Delta Airlines flight when a fellow passenger accidentally dislodged a box from an overhead compartment, which fell and struck her. Hodges filed a negligence lawsuit against Delta, claiming the airline's actions led to her injuries and subsequent medical costs. The key legal issue addressed by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals is whether her state law tort claim is preempted by § 1305(a)(1) of the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 (ADA). The court determined that the claim is not preempted, thus overruling the previous case Baugh v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., which had established a contrary precedent. The court reviewed the summary judgment from the district court de novo and examined the ADA's intent to prevent states from imposing regulations that could interfere with the economic deregulation of airlines. The interpretation of § 1305(a)(1) is crucial in assessing its preemptive scope, with prior Supreme Court rulings indicating that the provision does preempt state laws related to airline rates, routes, or services.

The phrase "relating to" in ERISA cases is interpreted broadly, meaning it pertains to any association or connection with employee benefit plans. Federal law preempts state law under three circumstances: explicit preemption by Congress, implied preemption due to a pervasive regulatory scheme, or when state law conflicts with federal law. A state law is considered preempted if it has a connection with or reference to an employee benefit plan, and this interpretation is expansive and broadly worded. 

In the context of airline regulation, state actions related to "rates, routes, or services" are preempted under § 1305(a)(1), and the Court rejected the notion that only state laws specifically targeting the airline industry are affected, noting that even generally applicable laws may be preempted if they significantly impact airline operations. The Court acknowledged that some state actions may not be preempted if their effects are too remote. 

While Morales establishes that state laws concerning airline services are broadly preempted, it does not specifically define "services." However, the panel concluded that "services" encompass the contractual relationship between airlines and passengers, including ticketing, boarding, and baggage handling, which Congress intended to protect from state regulation. This definition aligns with a subsequent Supreme Court decision, which confirmed that claims related to airline services, such as frequent flyer programs, are connected to rates and services.

Federal preemption of state laws does not eliminate state tort actions for personal injuries or property damage resulting from aircraft operation and maintenance. The definition of "service" in airline regulatory law aligns with legislative intent of the Airline Deregulation Act (ADA) and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) regulations. "All-cargo air service" pertains to the transport of property or mail only, while "air service" includes point-to-point transportation of passengers and cargo, encompassing both the transportation business and related contracts. The court's interpretation of "service" allows federal regulation of airline operations, such as smoking policies on flights, as seen in Diefenthal v. C.A.B. However, Diefenthal did not address federal preemption issues, making it irrelevant to interpreting § 1305(a)(1) of the ADA. The Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) indicated that the ADA primarily focused on economic deregulation rather than displacing state tort claims. The FAA maintains that "services" cover aspects of the carrier-customer relationship but does not imply that all state tort claims are preempted. Furthermore, Congress intended for state claims for personal injury not to be preempted, as evidenced by requirements for air carriers to maintain insurance for bodily injuries and property damage under § 1371(q). This provision illustrates the limited scope of preemption under § 1305(a)(1) and suggests that full preemption would undermine the necessity for insurance. Additionally, § 1506 of the FAA clarifies that existing common law remedies remain intact, indicating that federal regulations are supplementary to state remedies.

Prior to the ADA's enactment, states had limited authority to regulate intrastate flights and enforce laws against airlines. The Supreme Court deemed this authority marginal in Morales, labeling it a "saving clause" that could not override specific preemption provisions. The FAA defines "operation of aircraft" broadly, encompassing all activities related to air navigation, including the use of onboard amenities. Notably, neither the ADA nor its legislative history suggests that Congress intended to preempt state tort law concerning personal injuries from aircraft operations, nor does it imply that such preemption was considered. The Supreme Court has consistently advised against federal law displacing state police powers without a clear congressional intent.

Delta Airlines contends that Mrs. Hodges' accident relates to baggage handling and boarding services, which it argues fall under the ADA's preemption clause. However, this assertion is flawed for two reasons. First, the distinction between services and aircraft operation is not strict; issues related to luggage placement and compliance with safety regulations are integral to safe flight operation. Second, while the ADA aims to prevent states from interfering with economic deregulation of services, it also preserves airlines' liabilities for tort actions related to personal injury or property damage. Unlike the NAAG Guidelines in Morales, tort remedies for personal injuries do not significantly impact airline services or operations, suggesting that state enforcement of such remedies is permissible.

State tort laws related to the operation and maintenance of aircraft can be enforced independently from Congress's deregulation of airline services, but this does not apply to all state tort claims. Preemption is illustrated through two significant cases. In *O'Carroll v. American Airlines*, the court vacated a jury verdict for wrongful eviction from a flight, finding the claims preempted by § 1305(a)(1) as they directly related to the airline's services and the discretion allowed under federal law to refuse passengers. In *West v. Northwest Airlines*, the Ninth Circuit held that the plaintiff's state law claims for being bumped from a flight were too tenuously connected to airline services to be preempted, although punitive damages were found to be preempted. In contrast, Hodges’ claim regarding negligence related to a stowed case of rum was deemed not to reference airline services specifically and thus not preempted by § 1305(a)(1), aligning with other case precedents. The judgment of the district court was reversed and remanded for further proceedings. Additionally, Judge Jolly expressed concurrence with the judgment but criticized the rationale used, emphasizing the need for clearer application of the ADA's preemption provision, which should only apply to claims directly relating to price, route, or service.

Claims related to services are not prohibited under the ADA preemption provision, which restricts state legislation or regulation enforcement regarding rates, routes, or services. These claims, instead, arise from private individuals seeking relief under state common law tort rules, not from state-imposed standards. Statutory construction principles dictate that the ADA preemption provision and the general savings clause of the Federal Aviation Act must be interpreted together unless there is a clear conflict. The American Airlines case determined that private individuals can pursue remedies for breach of contract outside the preemption's scope; similarly, claims for breach of the duty of reasonable care are not preempted. Unlike ERISA, which broadly preempts state laws and includes comprehensive civil enforcement mechanisms, the ADA preemption provision only addresses the enactment or enforcement of laws, explicitly omitting common law references. The interpretation that the ADA excludes common law aligns with prior judicial constructions regarding preemption statutes in Cipollone and Norfolk, where the terms and scope of preemption differ significantly.

The Cipollone Court determined that the term 'state law' within a specific statute could include common law claims. In contrast, the ADA's preemption provision explicitly refers to 'law[s], regulation[s], or other provision[s],' indicating a narrower scope than the broad term 'all other law' found in the Norfolk Western R. Co. ruling, where preemption included obligations from collective bargaining agreements. The ADA does not preempt all legal claims; it specifically addresses statutory laws and regulations. This interpretation does not permit all tort suits, as other federal aviation laws may implicitly preempt certain state common law claims. The majority's interpretation is viewed as overly broad, creating vague distinctions that lack clarity and practical application. Instead, a straightforward reading of the ADA aligns with Congressional intent, aimed at minimizing regulatory conflicts between state and federal jurisdictions regarding airline operations. The House Report clarifies that § 1305 prevents states from regulating airline routes, rates, or services but does not exempt airlines from the duty of reasonable care for passenger safety. The majority's rulings on previous cases, including Baugh and O'Carroll, reveal complications stemming from straying from the statute's plain language, suggesting that the current approach could lead to further confusion in legal applications.

The majority in Hodges includes "provision of food and drink" in a broad definition of services subject to preemption. It assumes that since the flight attendant in Baugh was providing food and drink at the time of injury, the claims in Baugh are preempted. However, the majority questions why Baugh should be reversed when it relied on O'Carroll, which is also reaffirmed by Smith. The majority argues that O'Carroll's claims are preempted due to their relation to services, although Smith suggests that claims implicating safety concerns might fall outside the preemption provision. The dissenting opinion argues that O'Carroll's claims, stemming from the wrongful exclusion of intoxicated passengers who posed a safety threat, should not be preempted. It cites 49 U.S.C.App. 1511(a), which grants discretion to refuse transport if it threatens flight safety, indicating that O'Carroll's situation clearly fell under this safety concern. The dissent emphasizes that the distinction in O'Carroll's claims should not be conflated with mere service provisions, and highlights that Congress did not intend for the operation or maintenance of aircraft to be included under the statute's definition of services. Ultimately, it asserts that O'Carroll's claims are indeed preempted, but under a separate federal statute rather than the express preemption provision.

An air carrier can be held liable for bodily injuries or property damage resulting from the operation or maintenance of its aircraft, as established under 49 U.S.C.App. 1374(q)(1). The determination of liability hinges on whether a claim pertains to "rates, routes, or services" under 49 U.S.C.App. 1305(a)(1). If a claim is related to services, it is preempted unless it directly results from the operation or maintenance of the aircraft. In cases of ambiguity regarding whether a claim arises from aircraft operation or maintenance, the interpretation should favor the latter category, as supported by Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., which applies a presumption against preemption of state police powers.

The practical implications of tort claims are illustrated by the case Schwamb v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., where a passenger was injured by a falling briefcase from an overhead bin. An expert testified about steps that could reduce this risk, including passenger announcements and inspections. However, the placement of baggage in overhead compartments is deemed related to airline services and does not pertain to the navigation or maintenance of the aircraft. Therefore, the claim is preempted, leading to the conclusion that the district court's judgment should be upheld.