Thomas J. Simpson, Sr. v. David White, City of Loretto, Tennessee John T. Odem Johnny F. Cheatwood County of Lawrence, Tennessee

Citations: 52 F.3d 326; 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 18040; 1995 WL 216927Docket: 93-6583

Court: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit; April 11, 1995; Federal Appellate Court

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Defendant David White, a police officer from Loretto, Tennessee, appealed a district court's ruling that awarded damages and attorneys' fees to plaintiff Thomas J. Simpson, Sr. in a civil rights case under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, stemming from Simpson's arrest for contempt of court. The appeal raised several issues: (1) whether White was entitled to qualified immunity, (2) whether there was probable cause for Simpson's arrest, (3) the appropriateness of jury instructions, (4) the denial of remittitur, and (5) the grant of attorneys' fees without an oral hearing and the excessiveness of the fee amount.

Initially, Simpson filed his complaint against White and several other defendants on March 16, 1992, claiming a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. White's motion for summary judgment, asserting qualified immunity and probable cause for alternative charges, was denied on February 1, 1993. During the jury trial that began on August 17, 1993, White's motions for directed verdicts based on qualified immunity and probable cause were also denied, while the court granted a directed verdict for Simpson on the qualified immunity issue.

The jury awarded Simpson $40,000 on August 19, 1993. White subsequently filed motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or a new trial, and Simpson sought attorneys' fees. The district court awarded Simpson $35,018.76 in fees without a hearing and denied White's motions on November 3, 1993. The Court of Appeals ultimately reversed the district court's decision and remanded the case.

On March 18, 1991, at approximately 11:00 p.m., Officer White from the Loretto Police Department responded to a domestic dispute at Quik Mart in Loretto, Tennessee. He was accompanied by Deputy Odem and Officer Killen. Mrs. Sherri Simpson approached the officers, appearing distraught, and presented a restraining order against her husband, Thomas J. Simpson, Sr., prohibiting him from threatening or harassing her. Mrs. Simpson requested that the officers remove her husband from their home. Although Mrs. Simpson claimed her husband was drunk and had threatened her with a knife, this was disputed by the officers, who stated she made that claim privately. Officer Killen mentioned that plaintiff Simpson could not be arrested for violating the restraining order without a court order, which Officer White claimed he did not hear.

The officers then accompanied Mrs. Simpson to her residence, where they found the lights off and heard children crying. Upon entering, they encountered plaintiff Simpson, who appeared drunk and upset, engaged in an argument with Mrs. Simpson. Officer White noted a knife on the kitchen counter but did not take it into custody. Conversely, plaintiff Simpson testified that he had arrived at the house earlier that day to prepare dinner for the children and denied being drunk or threatening his wife with a knife. Conflicting accounts arose regarding the timing of Mrs. Simpson's return home, as she stated she was away in Alabama with the children until 10:00 p.m., while plaintiff Simpson claimed she had left the house during their argument.

Defendant White, a trained law enforcement officer, arrested plaintiff Simpson, believing the magistrate would determine the appropriate charges. Sergeant Cheatwood informed White that if the restraining order was valid, Simpson was in contempt of court, but did not instruct him to charge Simpson. White drafted an arrest report citing contempt of court based on an incident reported by Mrs. Simpson, who revealed that Tom Simpson (plaintiff) was at her residence on a non-visitation day while intoxicated, violating the restraining order.

Magistrate Leon Clayton later confirmed that Simpson should be charged with contempt after discussions with both White and Simpson. Following his arrest, Simpson spent time in a harsh jail environment and felt embarrassed by the experience. He was released after a short period, and the contempt charge was later dropped without any further charges. Subsequently, White apologized to Simpson and his employer for the arrest.

Defendant White contends that the district court wrongly denied his motion for a directed verdict and improperly granted Simpson's motion on qualified immunity grounds. He argues that a reasonable officer could misinterpret Tennessee law regarding authority to arrest someone for contempt related to a restraining order. The standard for reviewing such motions focuses on whether sufficient evidence exists to raise material factual issues for a jury's consideration.

Government officials are generally protected from civil liability when performing discretionary functions, provided their actions do not infringe upon clearly established statutory or constitutional rights that a reasonable person would recognize. The qualified immunity defense involves a two-part analysis: first, whether a constitutional right was violated, and second, whether that right was "clearly established" at the time of the violation, with the requirement that it must be sufficiently particularized to inform officials that their conduct was likely unlawful.

In Tennessee, it was established that an individual cannot be arrested for contempt of court related to a restraining order without a court order, which constitutes a violation of the Fourth Amendment's protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. The defendant claimed confusion regarding the contempt charge, but testimony from Officers Odem, Killen, and Cheatwood indicated they understood the legal requirements, leading to the conclusion that the district court correctly denied the defendant qualified immunity.

Additionally, the defendant White contested the district court's denial of his motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (J.N.O.V.) or a new trial, arguing that there was probable cause for the plaintiff's arrest on other charges. The review standard for such motions mandates that the court must view evidence favorably for the opposing party and cannot reassess witness credibility or substitute its judgment for that of the jury. The motion should only be granted if the evidence overwhelmingly supports the movant's position.

A district court's denial of a motion for a new trial is reviewed for abuse of discretion, particularly when based on the insufficiency of evidence. The court must assess and compare the evidence, overturning the verdict only if it is against the clear weight of the evidence. A verdict is acceptable if it is reasonable, even if alternative conclusions could be drawn. 

Various circuits have established that if a police officer arrests someone without probable cause for a specific charge, the existence of probable cause for a related offense can justify the arrest. The Fifth Circuit, in Pfannstiel v. City of Marion, indicated that a lack of probable cause for the charged offense can be mitigated by having probable cause for a related offense. The Seventh Circuit emphasized that the objective standard is crucial in evaluating arrest propriety, focusing on whether a reasonably competent officer would have concluded that probable cause existed based on the facts known to them.

In this case, the defendant claimed probable cause to arrest the plaintiff for breaching the peace and suggested other potential charges like assault or domestic violence, all tied to conduct violating a restraining order. Since these offenses are related to the contempt charge, the jury was tasked with determining the probable cause due to disputed facts. Although the defendant contended that the jury misinterpreted the facts regarding his probable cause defense, the court did not consider this challenge because the jury received improper instructions on the probable cause defense.

Defendant contends that the district court incorrectly denied his motion for a new trial due to improper jury instructions. The record shows no objection was made by the defendant to the jury instructions at trial, which is a requirement under Fed. R. Civ. P. 51 to preserve the right to appeal such errors. Consequently, any objection on appeal is deemed waived unless it constitutes plain error. The court acknowledged a narrow exception to this rule but found no obvious and prejudicial error in the jury instructions. 

Defendant specifically argued that the jury should have been instructed on what constitutes a "breach of the peace threatened in the officer's presence" as a justification for warrantless arrest, which he claimed was essential for the jury to assess his defense of probable cause for arresting the plaintiff. The district court's jury instructions indicated that the defendant believed he lawfully arrested the plaintiff, despite the wrong charge, without violating the plaintiff's constitutional rights. 

The jury was informed about the complexity of lawful authority concerning arrests and instructed on the conditions under which warrantless arrests are permissible, emphasizing that probable cause must exist. However, the court failed to adequately define "breach of the peace," which was critical for the jury to evaluate the defendant's claim of probable cause. Thus, while the jury could consider his defense, they lacked a necessary framework to determine the existence of probable cause related to the claimed justification for the arrest.

Defendant sought jury instruction on the definition of "breach of the peace threatened in the officer's presence." The Tennessee Supreme Court has characterized "breach of the peace" as a broad term encompassing various indictable offenses, which can be categorized into two types: offenses against individuals and offenses against the public. For an offense against an individual to qualify as a breach of the peace, it must involve violence or a threat of violence. In this case, evidence presented at trial indicated that Mrs. Simpson had a restraining order against plaintiff, claimed he was intoxicated and threatening her with a knife, and requested defendant to remove him from her home due to fear. Defendant observed signs of plaintiff's intoxication and aggression, as well as a knife in the kitchen, leading to a potential jury conclusion of probable cause for arresting plaintiff on breach of the peace grounds. The district court's failure to instruct the jury on this definition was deemed plain error.

On appeal, defendant asserted probable cause for arresting plaintiff for disturbing the peace, domestic violence, and assault. However, because defendant did not request jury instructions on these offenses during the trial and did not object to the instructions given, these claims were waived under Fed. R. Civ. P. 51. Thus, the court found no error regarding these instructions.

Defendant also contended that the court erred by not instructing the jury that plaintiff needed to demonstrate defendant's "deliberate indifference" to his constitutional rights. The "deliberate indifference" standard primarily applies to cases involving prison officials and Eighth Amendment claims, where mere negligence does not violate due process. Since defendant did not argue that his arrest of plaintiff for contempt was mere negligence, the court concluded there was no plain error in refusing the requested instruction on deliberate indifference.

Defendant contended that the district court erred by not instructing the jury that his inaction in response to Mrs. Simpson’s request for help could expose him to a 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 action if she were injured or killed. However, the court found this instruction would likely confuse the jury since the defendant had indeed responded to the request, and such a request did not permit violations of constitutional rights. Consequently, the refusal to provide this instruction was deemed not to constitute plain error.

Additionally, the defendant argued that the court should have instructed the jury on the irrelevance of the plaintiff's innocence regarding the arrest warrant in relation to the Sec. 1983 claim, asserting that the Constitution does not protect against the arrest of the innocent. The court noted that since the plaintiff did not assert a state law claim, clarifying the difference between the two claims was unnecessary. Moreover, the instruction was misleading since the plaintiff was arrested for criminal contempt, a charge for which the defendant lacked authority to make the arrest, making the plaintiff's guilt or innocence irrelevant.

The court ultimately concluded that the district court had erred in failing to instruct the jury on an alternative charge related to probable cause for the arrest. As a result, the judgments for damages and attorneys' fees were reversed, and the case was remanded for a new trial.

The defense of probable cause in arrest cases has been recognized recently in an unpublished decision, with differing treatments among circuits regarding its relation to qualified immunity. Some circuits incorporate it within qualified immunity, while others consider it a separate defense under Section 1983 claims. In this case, even if probable cause were treated as part of qualified immunity, the issue must be submitted to a jury due to factual disputes regarding probable cause. The plaintiff contends that the defendant cannot claim this defense since the defendant was uncertain about the charge at the time of arrest. However, case law indicates that an officer's subjective reasoning for an arrest is irrelevant to a Fourth Amendment challenge, meaning that a specific charge does not need to be in mind for probable cause to exist at the time of arrest. Furthermore, it has been established that charging an offense is not necessary for justifying a warrantless arrest. 

The district court indicated it would hold a charge hearing, but no transcript of such a hearing is present in the record. The defendant sought jury instructions based on Tennessee Supreme Court precedents defining "a breach of the peace," noting that an arrest can be lawful to prevent a threatened breach of the peace, which encompasses various acts that disrupt public order. However, the requested jury instruction was deemed misleading as it centered on public offenses rather than individual offenses relevant to the case. Thus, on remand, the district court is advised to refine its jury instruction regarding breaches of the peace to focus on individual offenses.