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Stubblebine v. Stubblebine
Citations: 21 Va. App. 635; 466 S.E.2d 764; 1996 Va. App. LEXIS 98Docket: No. 1915-94-4
Court: Court of Appeals of Virginia; February 13, 1996; Virginia; State Appellate Court
The trial court awarded spousal support to Geraldine Stubblebine, determining that her former husband, Albert Stubblebine, had imputed income despite being a sixty-four-year-old retiree. The court found that Mr. Stubblebine's ability to obtain gainful employment was evidenced by his past work history, including his recent unpaid efforts in organizing a conference and assisting a friend with her psychiatry practice. At trial, Mr. Stubblebine received a total of $6,204 per month from retirement benefits but claimed he was unable to pay support due to lack of earned income. In contrast, the court recognized Geraldine’s inability to work due to chronic health issues and her monthly expenses of approximately $5,200. The court ultimately ruled that Mr. Stubblebine, despite his claims of retirement, had the capacity to contribute financially and awarded Geraldine $1,000 per month in spousal support, affirming that he should provide for her needs given their financial circumstances. The court determined that the husband has a minimum imputed income of $40,000 and ordered him to pay spousal support of $1,000 monthly while providing health insurance similar to his current coverage. The trial court has discretion in deciding the entitlement and amount of support, guided by Code § 20-107.1, with its decisions presumed correct unless proven otherwise. The court can impute income to a spouse who is voluntarily unemployed or underemployed, regardless of the reasonableness of their employment decisions. In this case, Albert Stubblebine, though not gainfully employed at trial, had previously retired twice and engaged in unpaid work. His statements indicated a lack of interest in earning income. The court emphasized that his support obligation stems from his former spouse's needs and his ability to provide for those needs. Stubblebine was deemed capable of earning $40,000 annually based on a recent contract, despite his claims of an inability to find similar work due to a depressed industry. The court did not abuse its discretion in imputing income based on this recent earning capacity rather than prior earnings. While Stubblebine contended that spousal support should not compel retirees to work, the court acknowledged that each case's circumstances are unique, without establishing a strict rule against retirement for support obligations. The appellant in Pimm, having retired at sixty-five, sought to terminate his alimony obligations, arguing that without consideration of reduced income from voluntary retirement, payor spouses might be unable to retire. The Florida Supreme Court ruled that trial courts must consider voluntary retirement but emphasized that the receiving spouse's needs remain a critical factor. A payor spouse cannot unilaterally opt for retirement if it jeopardizes the receiving spouse's financial stability. The court referenced Antonelli, which stated that courts should evaluate reasonable employment decisions, including retirement, while also assessing potential underemployment or unemployment. In the current case involving Albert Stubblebine, while he had historically provided significant financial support, his wife Geraldine faced chronic health issues and had expenses exceeding her income from their retirement pensions. Despite his retirement, Albert was capable of gainful employment and had actively contributed to their household until shortly before the divorce. The trial court, therefore, did not err in imputing income to Albert based on his recent earnings rather than his retirement income, affirming the decision. The division of the pensions was likely considered an equitable distribution. The court refrained from commenting on the relationship between spousal support and equitable distribution statutes, focusing solely on the imputation of income for spousal support calculations.