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Herndon v. St. Mary's Hospital, Inc.
Citations: 266 Va. 472; 587 S.E.2d 567; 2003 Va. LEXIS 94Docket: Record No. 030070
Court: Supreme Court of Virginia; October 31, 2003; Virginia; State Supreme Court
Justice Keenan delivered the Court's opinion addressing whether Code 8.01-8 allows parents to initiate a lawsuit in their own name as next friends of their minor child. The facts involve Matthew McNeil Herndon, born on December 28, 1991, who allegedly suffered injuries due to negligent medical care at St. Mary’s Hospital during his delivery. On December 27, 2001, his parents, Debbie and Larry Herndon, filed a medical malpractice suit against the hospital, naming themselves as next friends of Matthew. The hospital sought to dismiss the action, claiming it was improperly filed since it was not in the child’s name as required by Code 8.01-8, which states that any minor entitled to sue may do so through a next friend and that either or both parents may sue on the minor's behalf. This statute was amended in 1998, adding the provision regarding parents. The circuit court granted the hospital's motion to dismiss, leading the Herndons to appeal, arguing that the amendment allows parents to sue in their own names on behalf of their child. They contended this interpretation modifies the previous ruling in Kirby v. Gilliam, which held that parents could not initiate an action in their own names for their child. The Herndons asserted that if the amendment intended to allow simultaneous representation, it would have explicitly stated that. The Court disagreed with the Herndons, determining that the language of Code 8.01-8 is ambiguous. The first sentence implies that the minor must bring the action through a next friend, while the second allows parents to sue on the child’s behalf, creating a conflict in interpretation. Interpretation of statutory language requires understanding the intent of the General Assembly, as established in various case precedents. The court applies a comprehensive approach, analyzing the statute's language in context rather than isolating terms. It follows the principle that statutory changes to common law must be expressly stated or clearly implied. Before a 1998 amendment to Code § 8.01-8, common law mandated that actions on behalf of minor children be brought in the child's name. The court reiterated that the child is the real party in interest. The amendment's language does not indicate a legislative intent to alter this common law rule; it only clarifies that parents may act as next friends. The first sentence permits a minor to bring an action through a next friend, while the second sentence does not suggest that parents can sue in their own names. The court concluded that the amendment did not change the common law, affirming the dismissal of the Herndons' action. The dismissal concerning another plaintiff, Matthew McNeil Herndon, was not contested on appeal.