Court: Supreme Court of Virginia; September 16, 1994; Virginia; State Supreme Court
The Court, led by Justice Hassell, addresses the issue of whether landowners can claim a vested property right based on a zoning variance. In 1989, James H. and Mary C. Snow sought to purchase a 3.76-acre parcel in Amherst County for residential development, which was constrained by a conservation zone prohibiting construction within 200 feet. They applied for and received a variance from the Board of Zoning Appeals (BZA) to reduce the setback requirement to 120 feet before purchasing the land for approximately $5,000 and investing an additional $4,000-$5,000 in preliminary work.
In 1991, the County's zoning ordinances were amended to classify the parcel as part of a watershed district, which imposed stricter construction prohibitions, effectively barring any residential development. The Snows requested another variance from these amendments, but the BZA denied it. They subsequently petitioned the circuit court for a writ of certiorari to review the BZA's decision, focusing on whether they had vested rights from the 1989 variance.
The trial court found that the Snows did not demonstrate that the BZA's decision was plainly wrong and concluded that they lacked vested rights since they had not constructed a residence prior to the amendments. The Snows appealed, arguing that the BZA's granting of the variance constituted a significant official act on which they relied. However, the BZA maintained that the Snows did not have vested rights. The Court supported the BZA's position, referencing precedent that establishes the criteria for determining vested rights in land use classifications, emphasizing that without prior construction, the Snows could not claim such rights.
A vested right to land use is established when a special use permit is granted under a zoning classification, a bona fide site plan is filed and pursued, and substantial good faith expenses are incurred before any change in zoning. This principle, affirmed in various cases, emphasizes the necessity for landowners to identify a significant official governmental act, such as a permit or approval, that allows a specific land use otherwise prohibited. The courts have consistently ruled that mere reliance on a zoning classification or the grant of a variance does not confer vested rights. A variance is merely a deviation from zoning requirements and does not constitute a significant governmental act as defined by precedent. Consequently, the Board of Zoning Appeals’ grant of a variance does not fulfill the requirements for establishing a vested property right, leading to the affirmation of the trial court's judgment. The Board of Supervisors' argument regarding the Snows’ assignment of error lacks merit.
