Court: Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit; March 26, 1995; Federal Appellate Court
Cecil Paul Lockett was convicted of possession of crack cocaine with intent to distribute and maintaining a premises for drug distribution. He appeals his convictions and sentence, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support the jury's verdict. The case arose from a DEA search of an apartment in Stillwater, Oklahoma, where Lockett was present. Crack cocaine was found in two locations within the apartment, alongside drug paraphernalia, including a game board and razor blades with cocaine residue.
The apartment was leased under the name of Lockett's cousin, but he was involved in paying rent and renewing the lease. Testimony from Lockett's associates indicated he lived in the apartment and sold drugs from there. During the search, Lockett was arrested, and $600 in cash, along with a key to the apartment, was confiscated from him.
On appeal, Lockett contends that the evidence was circumstantial and lacked direct proof of his possession of the cocaine, arguing that no forensic evidence directly linked him to the drugs. He also claims there was insufficient evidence to prove he maintained the apartment for drug distribution purposes.
A criminal case's evidence sufficiency is assessed by determining if a reasonable jury could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. This involves considering both direct and circumstantial evidence in favor of the government. To convict Mr. Lockett of possession of crack cocaine with intent to distribute, the government must show he knowingly possessed crack cocaine with the intent to distribute it, as outlined in 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1). Possession can be actual or constructive, the latter requiring proof of knowing control over the narcotics and the premises.
Testimony from Ms. Chance indicated she purchased crack cocaine from Mr. Lockett at the apartment, where crack cocaine was found during a DEA search. Although it was not definitively proved that the men's clothing found belonged to Mr. Lockett, he paid rent, had a key, and lived there, which supports a jury's inference of possession with intent to distribute, bolstered by testimony of two individuals who claimed he sold crack from the apartment.
Mr. Lockett also contested the evidence supporting his conviction for maintaining a place for drug distribution under 21 U.S.C. 856(a)(1). Evidence showed he paid rent, sought to transfer the lease to another person, and lived in the apartment, indicating he was not merely a visitor. This supports a reasonable jury's conclusion that he maintained the apartment for drug distribution purposes.
Lastly, Mr. Lockett challenged the use of a prior state felony drug conviction to enhance his sentence to a minimum of 20 years. The legality of the sentence is reviewed de novo, while factual findings by the district court are disturbed only if clearly erroneous.
Mr. Lockett's sentence was enhanced to twenty years due to a prior state drug conviction for unlawful possession of a controlled dangerous substance. During the sentencing hearing, the government provided certified documentation from the Tulsa County court to establish this prior conviction, as permitted under 21 U.S.C. 851(c)(1). In response, Mr. Lockett presented transcripts from his state court proceedings, claiming his guilty plea was constitutionally invalid due to a lack of advisement on his rights. However, the transcripts demonstrated that he was represented by counsel and that the state judge conducted a thorough inquiry into his competency, understanding of the charges, and voluntary nature of his plea. The district court ruled that the state conviction was valid, and this finding was not clearly erroneous. Consequently, the court affirmed Mr. Lockett's conviction and sentence. The ruling is not binding precedent except under specific legal doctrines, and citation is generally disfavored unless in accordance with the court's General Order from November 29, 1993. Judge Howard C. Bratton presided over the case by designation.
